

Voting for Development? Ruling Coalitions and Literacy in India

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Abstract

Across the world, governments skew the distribution of state resources for political gain. But does such politicisation of resource allocation affect development trajectories in the long run? We focus on the long-term effects of voting for the ruling coalition on primary education in India. Using a close-election instrumental variable design and drawing on a new socio-economic dataset of India's state assembly constituencies in 1971 and 2001, we examine whether areas represented by members of ruling coalitions experienced greater increases in literacy over 30 years. We find no evidence of this being the case, in the overall data or in relevant sub-samples. The null results are precisely estimated, and are consistent across OLS and 2SLS specifications and several robustness checks. These findings suggest the politicised distribution of some funds in the short run does not affect long-term development trajectories.

Keywords: Elections; Clientelism; Political economy; Development; Literacy; Education

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1 Introduction

Politicians in democracies face electoral incentives to asymmetrically distribute state resources for political gain. Evidence from across the world has found that areas or groups that support ruling parties tend to be rewarded with government largesse [e.g., 12, 1, 48, 33, 14, 35]. But does the partisan distribution of resources also affect overall development trajectories in the long run?

Endogeneity concerns and data scarcity have made it difficult to study the effects of alignment benefits on long-term development outcomes. The endogeneity problem stems from the fact that under conditions of at least some retrospective voting, development outcomes will affect political outcomes in addition to political outcomes affecting development patterns. This circularity makes it difficult to recover the causal effect of political power on development. This problem is compounded by a host of data challenges, including that few development indicators can be traced reliably over a long period, that states collect development data for administrative units that often do not match political units, and that the borders of both administrative and political units often change, making it hard to examine the associations between elections and development over time.

We address these challenges in the context of India, by examining whether state-level electoral districts (referred to as assembly constituencies or ACs) whose representatives are in the state governing coalition experience greater improvements in literacy over 30 years. To do so, we build a new dataset of literacy and demographic variables for the more than 3,000 state assembly constituencies in India’s 15 largest states in 1971 and 2001.¹ To our knowledge, this is the first dataset that includes development outcomes at the AC level in India over a long period. We merge these data with electoral returns data for each constituency, as well as with data on state-level governing coalitions. This dataset allows us to examine the effects of political alignment on development patterns over 30 years. Our

¹These data are supplemented with data on a broader array of development outcomes for the period 1991 to 2001.

constituency-level analysis enables us to hold a number of institutional and cultural factors constant, and yields the statistical power with which to detect even small effects of politics on literacy.

To address the possibility of reverse causality we use a close-election instrumental variable design, which leverages the fact that in India, winning or losing in close elections is quasi-random [see 24].² We use the proportion of time that a constituency was won by a member of the ruling coalition *in close elections* as an instrument for the total proportion of time the constituency was won by members of the ruling coalition. This is a strong instrument that allows us to study the causal impact of being politically represented by members of the ruling coalition in the state, while addressing the possibility of reverse causality. A similar, though not identical, research design has previously been used by Rehavi [44] and Clots-Figueras [19].

India is an important case for studying the link between political power and long-term development trends. The country is home to about a third of the world’s poor, political campaigns in India usually focus on development issues, and there is at least some degree of political responsiveness to public demands [47, 6]. Further, the distribution of several types of state resources in India have been found to be deeply politicised. Scholars characterise Indian politics as riddled with patron-client relations, favouritism, vote- and turnout-buying, patronage, pork-barrel politics and corruption [18, 50, 5, 51, 16]. Several studies of India have found that states with governments aligned with the central government receive more fiscal transfers [32, 45, 10]. Studies are also showing alignment effects on the distribution of public goods in the short run [13, 30]. But to our knowledge, no previous study has examined the long-term effects of partisan alignment.

We employ literacy as our main outcome variable since it is widely recognized as a key component of development (it is, along with GDP per capita and life expectancy, a compo-

²Note that Eggers et al. [24] show that the results of India’s close elections are quasi-random, despite the concerns raised by Grimmer et al. [25] and Caughey and Sekhon [17] that close elections in the USA can not be considered quasi-random.

ment of the UN Human Development Index); because changes in the census literacy variables in India are highly correlated with changes in the provision of other public goods like electricity, roads and water [3]; and because this is the most reliable development indicator for which it is possible to get data going back several decades. Importantly for our research design, state governments have the power to affect variation in literacy in India, and state-level governments have the power to geographically target resources for building schools, hiring teachers, and implementing education schemes. Primary education is also something many voters care about, and studies of MPLADS funds (politicians' discretionary development funds) show that providing school buildings or materials is a priority for many politicians [30]. Ideally, we would examine the effects of being represented by the ruling coalition on a broader array of development indicators, as the politicisation of resource distribution may be present for some types of goods and not others [35], but this type of information is not available at a disaggregated level in India over time. The examination of constituency-level changes in literacy between 1971 and 2001 is itself a contribution to existing literature. That said, as discussed in Section 4, our results are robust to the use of the alternative outcome variables that are available for a shorter span of time.

Despite remarkable overall increases in literacy in India between 1971 and 2001, our analysis shows that electing state-level politicians from ruling coalitions does not result in higher constituency-level literacy rates in the long run. The same holds for the literacy of the Scheduled Caste (SC) community—a particularly marginalised group that has been the target for many development programs. The null results are precisely estimated, and consistent across OLS, 2SLS specifications, and several robustness checks. We explore various explanations for these results, specifically whether literacy is politicised in particular constituencies (those represented by the Indian National Congress, party strongholds, governments in specific states, or those subjected to high media scrutiny); whether governments do invest in schools, but that this fails to translate into improved literacy; and lastly, whether strong bureaucracies prevent the politicisation of literacy. The data are inconsistent with these al-

ternative explanations. Whereas some government resources might be strategically allocated by politicians in India, our findings suggest that the great variation in the improvement in literacy that India experienced in the decades since 1971 has not been influenced by whether an area's political representative was part of a state's ruling coalition.

Whether areas benefit from supporting the parties who dominate the political arena is of both academic and policy interest. Pork barreling, clientelism and corruption receive considerable attention in academic writing, policy debates, and the media, sometimes to the extent that one is led to believe that no positive development takes place at all. To better understand how, and the extent to which, such practices affect people's lives, it is important to analyse their impact on overall long-term development outcomes. The recent trend in the study of politics and economics of focusing in on cleanly identifying causal effects has led us to many important findings, but may have resulted in too much of a focus on fairly inconsequential marginal effects rather than on overall and long-term development patterns. Our analysis shows that there has been a dramatic improvement in literacy rates across India in recent decades, and that these changes have by-and-large been unrelated to the political alignment of elected politicians.

The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we discuss our theoretical expectations. We then introduce our empirical strategy and data in section 3. Section 4 presents the results of our empirical analysis, associated robustness checks, and explores mechanisms. Section 5 concludes.

2 Context and expectations

A central concern in the study of political economy is how, and under what circumstances, politicians use state resources strategically for political gain. The theoretical literature on distributive politics has focused on understanding who (voters versus non-voters, core versus swing voters, voters with different identities, etc.) politicians should logically be trying to

court in order to be reelected [see 38, 21, 7, 41, and others]. Consistent with these works, the empirical literature has found considerable evidence that governments across the world use fiscal transfers and government programs to strategically channel resources for political gain [e.g. 12, 1, 48, 33, 14, 35, 20, 46].

Building on these works, a growing literature has shown that there are benefits to being politically aligned with those in power. Khemani [32], Bhavnani and Lacina [10] and Rodden and Wilkinson [45] show that India’s central government distributes more resources to states with governments that are politically aligned with the centre. Asher and Novosad [2] find that areas with MLAs aligned to the ruling state government attract more private sector jobs. Members of Parliament have been found to spend consistently more of their discretionary funds in areas with an aligned member in the legislative assembly [13], and more in villages that voted for them in higher numbers in the previous election [30]. There is also evidence that village-level politicians use their power to distribute resources to supporters of their party [23, 31].

But what do the highly visible manipulations of resources that have been documented in the literature cumulate to? In the long run, voters arguably care about government outputs such as literacy, rather than government inputs, such as spending. Do the tactical manipulations in government spending well-documented in the literature reflect small manipulations on the margins or the larger-scale and consequential channeling of resources to favored constituencies? On the one hand, the politicised distribution of funds observed in published studies may affect development patterns—perhaps not in the very short run, but definitely after some years. On the other hand, the politicised distributions observed by researchers may be relatively minor, such that the targeting that we observe might not affect development outcomes, and/or the choice to prioritise one area may be evened out by other forms of spending or different allocation choices at another point in time. Our main question, then, is whether political alignment improves long run development outcomes.

To answer this question we focus in on primary education. This is something voters care deeply about. Surveys have shown that members of disadvantaged groups see education as offering the most promising chance for a better life for their children [22]. As a result, spending on primary education is also something politicians care about. Consistent with this, Jensenius and Chhibber [30] show that repairing or constructing school buildings is among the most common ways for politicians to spend their discretionary development funds.

Still, MPLADS spending constitutes a very small part of spending on primary education. According to Khemani [34, p. 37], 21% of India’s state budgets between 1980 and 2005 were allocated for education. During the period we look at (1971–2001), state resources played a critical role in increasing literacy rates. At the start of the period, the literacy rate was 29%. This was to a large part due to a dearth of schools. In the three decades since the 1970s, massive efforts were made to construct new schools as well as to train and hire teachers, with the constant pressure of a growing demand due to a rapidly growing population. As a result, literacy increased with an average of 25 percentage points between 1971 and 2001.³ With such large changes taking place, efforts to prioritise some areas over others might result in visible differences over a 30-year period.

One may ask whether politicians actually have any influence over the investments in primary education. The answer is that they probably could if they wanted to. It is commonly believed that individual politicians have considerable influence over resource allocation to their constituencies, and that being in power in the state is critical to affecting the distribution of all types of resources. In one-on-one interviews, several Indian Members of Legislative Assemblies (MLAs) stated that they felt powerless when they were in opposition and that there would be no development in their constituency until their party was back in power.⁴

³In recent years, a vibrant literature has emerged about the prevalence of teacher absenteeism in India and how this prevents further growth in literacy despite the fact that most regions now have schools and teachers on paper [see 36, 4]. However, during the years we look at it was the construction of schools that was the main priority for improving education.

⁴The authors conducted interviews with high-level civil servants, MPs, MLAs, and village-level politicians on multiple field trips across India between 2009 and 2012. The bulk of the interviews were conducted in the Northern states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh.

One experienced MLA in India's largest state Uttar Pradesh argued that being in power was essential for getting anything done in his constituency, that when his party had been in power they failed to listen to the opposition, and now (February 2011) the party in power did not listen to members of his party.⁵ Similarly, a senior party official of the Samajwadi Party said that members of the opposition never get anything done because the bureaucracy does not listen to them, for fear of being transferred by the ruling coalition to a less attractive posting.⁶

However, as alluded to above, there are also reasons to believe that the targeted distribution of resources is limited. First, there is the question of electoral incentives. Highly visible projects implemented with MPLADS funds might plausibly yield greater electoral benefits than less visible investments through other government funds. Second, evidence suggests that the electoral gains from the allocation of funds accrue to politicians upon the *announcement* of big projects rather than from their implementation. For example, Wilkinson [50] describes how central funds for infrastructure projects are used strategically to gain political support at the time of elections, but that many of these announced projects are not properly implemented afterward. Third, as much as people talk of the arbitrary nature of the political system, India has a large and a comparatively well-functioning bureaucracy that implements development projects [43]. While bureaucrats are often accused of being corrupt and inefficient, the higher bureaucracy is thought to be staffed by intelligent and hard-working civil servants, who could potentially insulate developmental projects from political meddling. Finally, India has been a well-functioning democracy for decades and as such it might be unacceptable to implement blatantly politicised and unfair development plans. Whatever political influence occurs is likely to be marginal, and is unlikely to have major effects on people's lives. Consistent with this account, Burgess et al. [15] find that the ethnic favouritism in Kenya's road building program is restricted to periods of autocratic

⁵Interview by Jensenius, February 2011.

⁶Interview by Jensenius, November 2010. Indian civil servants have strong job security, but threats of transfers to undesirable locations and positions are frequently cited as a way in which politicians try to influence them.

rule. They conclude that democracy, however imperfect, works to constrain the political leadership from blatant favouritism. The same might be true in India.

We have just presented anecdotal evidence suggesting that we might see long-term effects of the politicisation of the distribution of investments in education in India, but also several arguments for why we do not expect to see such effects on a large scale. Data scarcity and issues of endogeneity have made it hard to establish whether such systematic patterns exist. In the two studies that most closely relates to ours, Banerjee and Somanathan [3] and Jensenius [28] find no evidence of religious or ethnic targeting of resources, but rather that socio-economic outcomes in constituencies converged over time. However, these study did not test for the possible effects of electing members of the ruling coalition (alignment effects) or of having specific parties in power. Using a fine-grained dataset (more than 3,000 state assembly constituencies as compared with 499 parliamentary constituencies in Banerjee and Somanathan [3]) and an empirical strategy to explicitly rule out reverse causality, we show that electing members of the ruling coalition has not improved constituencies' socio-economic outcomes.

3 Empirical strategy and data

In this paper we investigate whether having political representatives in the state ruling coalition affected the change in literacy in state assembly constituencies across India in the three decades from 1971. A naïve model of this relationship could be estimated with OLS regressions of the following form:

$$L_{i,2001} = \alpha + \delta L_{i,1971} + \beta P_i + \gamma \mathbf{X}_{i,1971} + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where the literacy rate (L) of constituency i in 2001 is modelled as a function of the literacy rate in 1971 and the proportion of time (P) between 1971 and 2001 the constituency was

represented by an MLA in the ruling coalition, and \mathbf{X} is a vector of observable pre-treatment constituency characteristics from 1971.

The key challenge to obtaining an unbiased causal estimate of the effect of political alignment on literacy (β) is that the election of member of the ruling coalition is endogenous to the performance of politicians in office, and therefore to our main outcome variable. In other words, changes in literacy in one election period might affect who gets voted into the ruling coalition in following elections. This means that our estimate of β might be biased.

To account for this, we take advantage of the fact that the selection of some MLAs into the ruling coalition occurred quasi-randomly, in close elections. In close elections, constituencies are arguably *as if randomly* assigned to one politician or another [see 37]. While there have been intense discussion about whether this design is valid in the study of US elections [25, 17], studies of Indian data have provided evidence that elections with a smaller margin of victory than 5% can be interpreted as close to randomly assigned to one of the competing political candidates [49, 24]. Building on this result, we instrument the proportion of times an MLA was in the ruling coalition with the proportion of close elections between candidates from the ruling coalition and the opposition that were won by the candidate from the ruling coalition. Given that the outcome of each of these close elections is determined by something close to an independent, random draw, the average across these close elections can also be considered random. A similar but not identical research design has previously been used to instrument for the proportion of female MLAs in India’s administrative districts [44, 19].

Our first-stage regression instruments for the proportion of time that a constituency was represented by a member of the ruling coalition (P_i) by estimating the following equation:

$$P_i = \phi + \pi L_{i,1971} + \zeta I_i + \eta \mathbf{x}_{i,1971} + \vartheta_i \tag{2}$$

where I_i , the instrument, is the proportion of close elections between ruling coalition and opposition candidates won by members of the ruling coalition. Since I_i is a component of

P_i , it is mechanically correlated with P_i . The exclusion restriction for I_i is satisfied by the fact that it probably only affects literacy through P_i .

Although the outcomes of the close elections in each constituency are *as if* random, whether a constituency has one or more close elections is not random. The vector of controls, \mathbf{X} , therefore includes controls for the proportion of close elections in constituencies over the study period, along with other observable confounders. Following Clots-Figueras [19], we define an election as close if it had a margin of victory of less than 3.5%.⁷ We also include first-, second-, and third-order polynomial controls for the mean winning vote margin during the study period in the close elections in each constituency.

To implement this empirical strategy, we draw on state election data from Bhavnani [8]. We supplement this with data on government formation developed by Bhavnani [9] and extended by Jensenius [29]. These data allow us to construct our key explanatory variable of interest—the proportion of time that a constituency’s representative was in the ruling coalition—and also to code the proportion of time that a constituency’s representative was a minister, as well as the effective number of parties and turnout across constituencies. All of these variables are calculated as averages for 1977–2001, since state constituency boundaries were fixed during this period.⁸ These, and other key variables, are summarized in Table 1. As we can see in the table, some constituencies had an MLA from the ruling coalition throughout the period under study, while others never had an MLA from the ruling coalition. On average, a constituency had an MLA from the ruling coalition 65% of the time.⁹

To study long-term development trends across Indian constituencies, we focus on the change in literacy rates between 1971 and 2001.¹⁰ We look both at overall literacy rates and

⁷As reported below, our results are robust to redefining close elections as those with margins of victory of less than 1% and 5%.

⁸In some states they were actually fixed after 1974, but only came into effect in a few states before 1977. Starting in 1977 also allows us to side-step India’s turbulent time under “Emergency” rule, an authoritarian interlude during which elections were suspended.

⁹Similarly, some constituencies had an MLA in the state cabinet, as a minister, throughout the period, but the average constituency had an MLA in the state cabinet 11% of the time.

¹⁰We do not use 1981 census data here, as the definitions of several variables in the 1981 census were different from those employed in other years [3].

literacy rates of Scheduled Castes (SCs). SCs—also known as *dalits* or former “untouchables”—are a particularly disadvantaged minority in India. They form approximately 16% of the country’s population and are generally poorer and less literate than others. Ruling coalitions in India have been particularly committed to improving the literacy rates of SCs [3, 26, 27], and SCs have seen greater improvements in literacy than the rest of the population (in the constituencies that we study, the overall literacy rate increased by about 25 percentage points between 1971 and 2001, while the SC literacy rate increased by 31 percentage points). Since political parties have made special efforts to raise the living standards for SCs, and the increase in their literacy and other socio-economic indicators has been more rapid than among the rest of the population, we may be more likely to observe a pattern of asymmetric distribution of resources by looking at the SC community in particular.¹¹

The main challenge with looking at the relationship between who is in power in a political constituency and changes in literacy, is that the authorities do not collect literacy data for these geographic units. The census instead releases literacy data for the country’s blocks (also called tehsils, taluks, mandals, firkas, police stations or development blocks), which can be mapped onto the political constituencies. We conducted this exercise manually for the 1971 data and with the help of GIS maps for 2001 (see Data in Brief). This yields estimates of the literacy rates and the demographics of approximately 3,000 state assembly constituencies in 1971 and 2001. For robustness tests and an examination of mechanisms, we also conducted this exercise for 1991 (see Section A in the Online Appendix).

The resulting constituency-level estimates of census variables are summarised in Table 1. As suggested earlier, the data show that the country experienced a massive increase in literacy between 1971 and 2001, from 29% to 54%. Literacy rates for SCs started off at 16% in 1971 and increased to 47% in 2001. Thus, although SCs still lagged behind the rest of the

¹¹SCs have reserved seats in politics, and a common assumption is that having SC politicians in power would either result in less development overall or more development for SCs in particular. However, there is no evidence of a development effect of having more SCs in power at the state level [42] or reservations for SCs at the constituency level [28].

population in 2001, the gap had narrowed substantially during this period.¹² Figure 1 shows state-wise box plots of the constituency-level change in literacy between 1971 and 2001. Here we see that although the average growth in literacy was high across all states, there was considerable variation both across states and within states, with some constituencies experiencing almost no increase and others a very high increase.¹³ In the following sections we examine the degree to which this variation may be explained by the party affiliation of the politician in power in an area.

4 Findings

Figure 2 plots the bivariate relationship between the proportion of time between 1977 and 2001 that constituencies were represented by members of the ruling coalition and change in overall and SC literacy rates across India’s constituencies between 1971 and 2001. The figures suggest that voting for the winning coalition is associated with improvements in literacy rates, for both the overall population and for SCs. These patterns provide some weak support for an asymmetric resource distribution, but we cannot draw strong conclusions from such bivariate plots, as we have not controlled for possible confounders, or for the possibility of reverse causality.

Table 2 presents multivariate regressions for the determinants of 2001 literacy rates, for the entire population and separately for SCs. The regressions control for the outcome variables in 1971, thereby controlling for initial conditions. In regressions 1 and 4, which im-

¹²In 1971, the number of literates in the Indian census were counted out of people who were five years of age or older. The official literacy rate published from the census therefore used the population that was five years and older as the denominator. In 2001, this was changed to seven years and older, and the official literacy rate used the population recorded as seven years and older as the denominator. Lacking data for the proportion of the population that was five years and above in our 1971 dataset, we use the total population as the denominator for both 1971 and 2001. This is intended to make the analysis more consistent, but also means that the literacy rates we report are somewhat lower than the official ones published in 2001 census reports.

¹³While state fixed effects can explain approximately 50% of the variation in literacy across constituencies, district fixed effects can explain another 26% of variation across constituencies, leaving 24% of constituency-level variation in literacy to be explained. These figures are the *R*-squared statistics for regressions with state and district fixed effects.

Table 1: Summary statistics

	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Overall literacy rate, 2001	54.25	12.92	19.53	86.75
Overall literacy rate, 1971	28.52	13.04	2.74	78.29
Scheduled caste literacy rate, 2001	47.10	14.44	11.81	82.84
Scheduled caste literacy rate, 1971	16.30	11.15	1.97	66.89
Number of primary schools, 2001	189.00	102.25	0.00	965.00
Number of primary schools, 1991	153.23	81.39	0.00	620.00
% of rural pop. with access to medical facilities, 2001	60.77	25.73	0.00	100.00
% of rural pop. with access to medical facilities, 1991	55.46	29.11	0.00	100.00
% of rural pop. with access to communication facilities, 2001	71.66	23.64	0.00	100.00
% of rural pop. with access to communication facilities, 1991	54.30	25.54	0.00	100.00
% of rural pop. with access to paved roads, 2001	74.16	22.79	0.00	100.00
% of rural pop. with access to paved roads, 1991	61.68	26.98	0.00	100.00
Prop. of time in ruling coalition	0.65	0.23	0.00	1.00
Prop. of time minister	0.11	0.15	0.00	1.00
Effective no. of parties	2.85	0.67	1.71	6.81
% turnout	60.38	10.71	24.15	85.52
Prop. of seats won by coalition members in close elections against opposition	0.07	0.11	0.00	0.67
Prop. of coalition v. opposition elections	0.80	0.19	0.00	1.00
Prop. of close coalition v. opposition elections	0.12	0.15	0.00	0.81
Vote margin in close coalition v. opposition elections	8.42	8.24	-28.75	57.50
Vote margin squared	138.84	199.37	0.00	3306.38
Vote margin cubed	2528.55	6377.32	-23766.05	190120.20
% SC, 1971	15.15	8.04	0.22	63.04
% ST, 1971	6.99	15.81	0.00	95.04
Dummy for whether constituency reserved for SCs	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00
Dummy for whether constituency reserved for STs	0.08	0.27	0.00	1.00
Log male/female ratio, 1971	0.06	0.08	-0.29	0.66
Log no. of houses, 1971	10.11	0.27	8.20	11.59
Log households, 1971	10.21	0.30	6.76	10.88

Notes: Variables without years are averaged over 1971–2001.




Figure 1: State-wise box plots of changes in overall (upper plot) and SC (lower plot) literacy rates at the constituency level between 1971 and 2001

plement equation 1, we control for the main explanatory variable of interest—the proportion of time the constituency’s representatives were in the ruling coalition. As in the bivariate plots, the proportion of time the MLAs were in the ruling coalition emerges as positively




Figure 2: The bivariate relationship between politics and the percentage point change in overall and SC literacy between 1971-2001 (local polynomial smooths with 95% confidence intervals)

associated with the literacy rate in 2001 and the SC literacy rate in 2001. Regressions 2 and 5 additionally control for several possible confounders: constituency demographics in 1971 (the percentage of SCs and STs,¹⁴ the log male/female ratio, and the log number of households in each constituency) and the reservation status of the constituency (a dummy for whether the constituency was reserved or set aside for SCs or STs during this period).¹⁵ These regressions also include district fixed effects, thereby controlling for district-invariant confounders. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.¹⁶ After these adjustments, it no longer appears that electing a representative to the ruling coalition boosts the literacy rate in a constituency. For both the overall and SC literacy rate, the coefficients for the proportion of time in ruling coalitions are attenuated and are no longer statistically significant.

The multivariate OLS models that include controls for several possible confounders do not provide conclusive evidence that constituencies do not benefit from having a representative from the ruling coalition. These results may be an artefact of endogeneity, as the performance of incumbents in office can affect vote choice. To control for this possibility, we employ the close-election instrumental variable analysis described in the previous section. In regressions 3 and 6, we instrument for the proportion of time in the ruling coalition with the proportion of close elections won by a member of the ruling coalition. Following Clots-Figuera [19], close elections are defined as those with a vote margin less than or equal to 3.5% (as discussed below, the results are robust to alternative definitions of close elections), where an MLA who would be inducted into the ruling coalition won against someone who would not have been included in the ruling coalition. The first-stage results, reported in Table 2, indicate that the instrument is positively and statistically significantly associated

¹⁴Scheduled Tribes, another minority that forms approximately 8% of the population.

¹⁵This is an important control since reserved constituencies tend to be less competitive, with fewer candidates running for election and lower turnout [see 29]. In regressions 7 and 8 of Tables 1 and 2 in the Online Appendix we show that the alignment effects do not look different in reserved and non-reserved constituencies.

¹⁶Districts are an administrative unit below the state and above the assembly constituency levels. In our data there is an average of 9.7 assembly constituencies in a district.

Table 2: Determinants of overall and SC literacy rates in 2001

	% Literates						% SC literates						
	1		2		3		4		5		6		
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	1st stage	2nd stage	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	1st stage	2nd stage	
Prop. of time in ruling coalition	1.226** [0.487]	0.121 [0.402]						1.764*** [0.599]	0.0416 [0.408]				-0.568 [1.001]
Initial value of DV	0.862*** [0.00871]	0.689*** [0.0291]	0.0004 [0.000550]	0.689*** [0.0275]	0.330*** [0.0290]	0.689*** [0.0275]	1.089*** [0.0125]	0.733*** [0.0541]			-3E-04 [0.000640]	0.932*** [0.0289]	0.734*** [0.0509]
Prop. of seats won by coalition members in close elections against opposition			0.398*** [0.0211]		0.398*** [0.0211]						0.397*** [0.0210]		-0.207 [0.660]
Prop. of coalition v. opposition elections			-0.569*** [0.0227]		-0.569*** [0.0227]						-0.570*** [0.0226]		-0.426 [0.513]
Prop. of close coalition v. opposition elections			0.0254*** [0.00119]		0.0254*** [0.00119]						0.0254*** [0.00119]		0.0417 [0.0287]
Vote margin in close coalition v. opposition elections			-0.000278*** [0.000105]		-0.000278*** [0.000105]						-0.000277*** [0.000105]		-0.00251*** [0.000899]
Vote margin squared			-4E-06 [0.00000338]		-4E-06 [0.00000338]						-4E-06 [0.00000339]		1E-05 [0.0000197]
Vote margin cubed													
Controls?	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District fixed effects?	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,137	3,137	3,137	3,137	3,137	3,137	3,135	3,135	3,135	3,135	3,135	3,135	3,135
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.76	0.92	0.75	0.92	0.75	0.92	0.71	0.71	0.93	0.75	0.75	0.93	0.93
1st stage <i>F</i> -stat. for time in ruling coalition						1,030							1,042

Notes: Controls include the proportion of the population that was scheduled caste (SC) in 1971, the proportion of the population that was scheduled tribe (ST) in 1971, dummies for whether the constituency was reserved for SCs or STs, the log male-female ratio, and the log number of houses and households in each constituency. Standard errors in brackets. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

with the endogenous variable. The first stage F -statistic is 1,030, well above 10, which is the conventional threshold for a strong instrument. The F -statistic is so high because the instrument is highly correlated with the endogenous regressor ($\rho > .9$). To control for the fact that the proportion of close elections in a constituency might be endogenous, regressions 3 and 6 also control for this variable. In line with the normal practice in the use of a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, and following Clots-Figueras [19], controls are also included for the proportion of coalition-versus-opposition races, and the margin of victory (defined as the mean difference between the vote share of the winner and runner-up), its square and its cube.

The second-stage results again suggest that electing representatives from the winning coalition does not boost overall or SC literacy rates. The coefficients for both overall literacy and SC literacy are, in fact, negative, but also statistically insignificant. The coefficients for the margin of victory are also statistically insignificant in the second stage of these models, suggesting that constituencies that are more competitive do not experience higher growth in literacy than other constituencies. We therefore find no evidence of constituencies benefiting from electing members of the ruling coalition, nor from being more competitive. It is important to note that our sample size of over 3,000 observations ensures that our null-finding is not driven by underpowered tests. Moreover, the 95% confidence interval for the effect of a standard deviation increase in the proportion of time a constituency is represented by the ruling coalition (0.23) on the change in overall literacy is narrow -0.5 to 0.3 , and the 95% confidence interval for the increase in SC literacy due to alignment is a similarly narrow -0.6 to 0.3 . The upper bounds of these confidence intervals are particularly small given that the overall and SC literacy rates respectively increased by an average of 26 and 31 percentage points over this period.

4.1 Robustness checks

In this section, we show that our results are robust to examining the effects of alignment on other outcome variables, as well as to several alternative model specifications. To start with, it is possible that the estimated null effect of alignment 1971–2001 was driven by our choice of literacy as the main outcome variable. To see whether this is the case, we examine the effects of alignment between 1991 and 2001 on three other development outcomes: the proportion of rural residents with access to medical facilities, communication facilities, and roads (we use 1991 rather than 1971 data due to data limitations). The results—presented in Table 3—confirm (using OLS, OLS with controls, and 2SLS with controls) that alignment fails to have statistically significant effects on these alternative development outcomes.¹⁷

We next examine whether the estimated null-effect of alignment on overall and SC literacy are robust to the use of alternative specifications. Table 4 presents these results with overall literacy as the outcome variable; Table 5 presents the results with SC literacy as the outcome variable. In both tables, regression 1 examines whether our results are robust to the use of the *change* in the literacy rates between 1971 and 2001 as the dependent variable, in case the use of the lagged dependent variable as a control in the main regressions leads to Nickell bias. Regression 2 in each of the tables includes a squared term for the proportion of time in the ruling coalition (to account for a possible non-linearity in the relationship between literacy and being included in the ruling coalition), and regression 3 calculates the time in the ruling coalition between 1977 and 1996, thereby excluding the last five years of the period, to allow for some (arbitrary) time-lag for any effects of being in power on literacy.¹⁸ Our core results remain unaffected by these changes.

¹⁷In the Online Appendix, we provide a number of other robustness checks, including looking for evidence of effects being underestimated due to migration, effects of alignment with the central government, effects of alignment with the most influential party in the state, probing for differences across core and swing areas, and controlling for the winning margins for each election separately.

¹⁸Our main specifications do not account for such a lag since efforts to improve education can arguably boost literacy for near-literates quickly.

Table 3: Determinants of alternative dependent variables in 2001

Estimator:	Dependent variables: % of rural population with access to			medical facilities			communication facilities			paved roads		
	OLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	7	8	9
Prop. of time in ruling coalition	9.469*** [1.337]	0.564 [0.790]	1.469 [1.753]	4.773*** [0.867]	-0.209 [0.656]	-0.174 [1.446]	1.053 [0.740]	-1.207 [0.799]	1.422 [1.517]			
Initial value of DV	0.368*** [0.0151]	0.310*** [0.0286]	0.310*** [0.0269]	0.703*** [0.0112]	0.412*** [0.0383]	0.412*** [0.0360]	0.694*** [0.00905]	0.364*** [0.0279]	0.364*** [0.0263]			
Prop. of coalition v. opposition elections			0.158 [1.203]			0.86 [0.923]			-0.722 [0.992]			
Prop. of close coalition v. opposition elections			0.0793 [0.960]			-0.841 [0.842]			-1.059 [0.762]			
Vote margin in close coalition v. opposition elections			0.0213 [0.0650]			0.0117 [0.0491]			-0.110** [0.0553]			
Vote margin squared			-0.00056 [0.00172]			-0.00095 [0.00102]			0.00191** [0.000887]			
Vote margin cubed			-0.00003 [0.0000395]			-8.6E-06 [0.0000209]			-1.8E-06 [0.0000249]			
Controls?	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
District fixed effects?	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	2834	2834	2834	2834	2834	2834	2834	2834	2834	2830	2830	2830
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.18	0.83	0.83	0.59	0.86	0.86	0.68	0.84	0.84	0.68	0.84	0.84
1st stage <i>F</i> -stat. for time in ruling coalition			1126			1124						1122

Notes: Controls include the proportion of the population that was scheduled caste (SC) in 1971, the proportion of the population that was scheduled tribe (ST) in 1971, dummies for whether the constituency was reserved for SCs or STs, the log male-female ratio, and the log number of houses and households in each constituency. Standard errors in brackets. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

Table 4: Robustness tests for the determinants of overall literacy rates in 2001

Dependent variable:	% Literacy, '71-'01									
	Δ % Literacy, '71-'01	$\leq 3.5\%$ 1	$\leq 3.5\%$ 2	$\leq 3.5\%$ 3	$\leq 3.5\%$ 4	$\leq 3.5\%$ 5	$\leq 3.5\%$ 6	$\leq 3.5\%$ 1st elec. 7	$\leq 1\%$ 8	$\leq 5\%$ 9
Close election definition:										
Prop. of time in ruling coalition	-1.201 [1.105]	-25.12 [30.65] 19.71 [24.51]			-0.578 [0.929]	-0.398 [0.942]	-1.721 [1.175]	1.708 [1.794]	-0.563 [0.851]	-1.559 [5.564]
Prop. of time in ruling coalition squared										
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, until 1996				-0.466 [0.829]						
% non-workers					0.0753** [0.0354]					
% agricultural laborers					0.0656 [0.0478]					
Prop. of time minister										
Effective no. of parties										
% turnout										
Initial value of DV										
Prop. of coalition										
v. opposition elections	-0.194 [0.685]	0.697*** [0.0287]	0.690*** [0.0275]	0.685*** [0.0310]	0.685*** [0.0310]	0.704*** [0.0264]	0.829*** [0.0537]	0.687*** [0.0274]	0.689*** [0.0275]	0.690*** [0.0281]
Prop. of close coalition	-0.531 [0.544]	0.811 [1.762]	-0.358 [0.609]	-0.545 [0.628]	-0.545 [0.628]	-0.653 [0.644]	-1.655* [0.961]	-1.394 [0.867]	-0.448 [0.612]	-0.107 [2.164]
v. opposition elections	0.353 [0.325]	-0.415 [0.530]	0.022 [0.454]	-0.314 [0.493]	-0.314 [0.493]	-0.384 [0.496]	-1.335** [0.570]	-0.935 [0.820]	-0.436 [0.451]	-0.415 [0.521]
Vote margin in close coalition	0.00125 [0.00145]	0.132 [0.132]	0.0187 [0.0231]	0.0356 [0.0268]	0.0356 [0.0268]	0.0371 [0.0268]	0.0516 [0.0400]	-0.024 [0.0478]	0.0351 [0.0260]	0.0613 [0.144]
v. opposition elections	-0.00125 [0.00145]	-0.0079 [0.00893]	-0.000965 [0.000853]	-0.00128 [0.00118]	-0.00128 [0.00118]	-0.00136 [0.00121]	-0.00265** [0.00110]	-0.000708 [0.00125]	-0.00139 [0.00119]	-0.0016 [0.00191]
Vote margin squared	5.92E-07 [0.0000295]	8E-05 [0.000112]	7.67E-06 [0.0000110]	3.19E-06 [0.0000240]	3.19E-06 [0.0000240]	7E-06 [0.0000251]	3.7E-05 [0.0000270]	1.46E-05 [0.0000257]	4.8E-06 [0.0000245]	-2E-06 [0.0000363]
Vote margin cubed										
Controls?										
State/district fixed effects?										
Observations	3,137	3,137	3,137	3,137	3,137	3,137	3,137	3,137	3,137	3,137
Adjusted R -squared	0.64	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.85	0.92	0.92	0.92
1st stage F -stat. for time in ruling coalition	1,046	559	1,161	1,022	1,022	982	2,566	240	1,671	15

Notes: Controls include the proportion of the population that was scheduled caste (SC) in 1971, the proportion of the population that was scheduled tribe (ST) in 1971, dummies for whether the constituency was reserved for SCs or STs, the log male-female ratio, and the log number of houses and households in each constituency. Standard errors in brackets. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

Table 5: Robustness tests for the determinants of SC literacy rates in 2001

Dependent variable:	% SC literacy, '01									
	Δ % SC literacy, '71-'01	$\leq 3.5\%$ 1	$\leq 3.5\%$ 2	$\leq 3.5\%$ 3	$\leq 3.5\%$ 4	$\leq 3.5\%$ 5	$\leq 3.5\%$ 6	$\leq 3.5\%$ 1st elec. 7	$\leq 1\%$ 8	$\leq 5\%$ 9
Close election definition:										
Prop. of time in ruling coalition	-1.065 [1.082]	-33.19 [35.80]	-0.8 [1.004]		-0.588 [1.016]	-2.562** [1.203]	1.076 [1.869]	-0.268 [0.844]	-4.726 [6.530]	
Prop. of time in ruling coalition squared		26.16 [28.55]								
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, until 1996				-0.789 [0.923]						
% non-workers					0.184*** [0.0501]					
% agricultural laborers					-0.00708 [0.0514]					
Prop. of time minister						0.763 [0.526]				
Effective no. of parties						0.284 [0.200]				
% turnout						0.403 [0.0264]				
Initial value of DV							0.738*** [0.0512]	0.733*** [0.0510]	0.734*** [0.0509]	0.734*** [0.0507]
Prop. of coalition	0.203 [0.701]	1.555 [2.021]	-0.074 [0.624]	0.694*** [0.0529]	-0.15 [0.655]	-0.218 [0.669]	-0.832 [0.908]	-0.838 [0.875]	-0.287 [0.639]	1.433 [2.558]
v. opposition elections	-0.678 [0.553]	-0.493 [0.551]	-0.188 [0.453]	-0.35 [0.507]	-0.527 [0.517]	-0.527 [0.517]	-1.327** [0.616]	-1.517* [0.835]	-0.421 [0.484]	-0.628 [0.589]
Prop. of close coalition	0.0527* [0.0306]	0.172 [0.151]	0.0339 [0.0248]	0.0438 [0.0289]	0.0419 [0.0287]	0.0419 [0.0287]	0.0858** [0.0434]	-0.00172 [0.0498]	0.0338 [0.0254]	0.15 [0.170]
v. opposition elections	-0.00257*** [0.000938]	-0.0113 [0.00984]	-0.00209*** [0.000678]	-0.00243*** [0.000871]	-0.00223** [0.00158]	-0.00223** [0.00158]	-0.00521*** [0.00158]	-0.00211** [0.000938]	-0.00250*** [0.000873]	-0.00362* [0.00203]
Vote margin squared	3.98E-06 [0.0000206]	0.00011 [0.000118]	0.0000166* [0.00000914]	0.000014 [0.0000190]	0.000014 [0.0000190]	8.4E-06 [0.0000195]	0.00005 [0.0000309]	2.09E-05 [0.0000219]	1.5E-05 [0.0000197]	-9E-06 [0.0000401]
Vote margin cubed										
Controls?		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State/district fixed effects?		District	District	District	District	District	State	District	District	District
Observations		3,135	3,135	3,135	3,135	3,135	3,135	3,135	3,135	3,135
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared		0.75	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.84	0.93	0.93	0.93
1st stage <i>F</i> -stat. for time in ruling coalition		1,049	568	1,176	1,025	987	2,652	243	1,680	15

Notes: Controls include the proportion of the population that was scheduled caste (SC) in 1971, the proportion of the population that was scheduled tribe (ST) in 1971, dummies for whether the constituency was reserved for SCs or STs, the log male-female ratio, and the log number of houses and households in each constituency. Standard errors in brackets. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

Regression 4 includes controls for additional pre-treatment socio-economic variables: the percentage of non-workers and agricultural labourers in each constituency in 1971. The former is positively associated with literacy, but the main results remain unchanged. In regression 5, we control for political variables: the proportion of the period the constituency was represented by a minister, the effective number of parties in the constituency, and the percentage turnout in the constituency. Our main results are robust to these additions to the model. Interestingly, turnout emerges as strongly positively associated with growth in literacy. Although this is consistent with the possibility that an active electorate leads to better provisioning of public goods, it would be incorrect to interpret this correlation in a causal manner. Endogeneity remains a concern here.

In regression 6, we substitute district fixed effects for state fixed effects (and also cluster the standard errors at the state level), in case the district fixed effects “over-control” for confounders. Again, our results remain robust to this change.

In regression 7, we employ an alternative instrument for the proportion of time in the ruling coalition: using an indicator for whether the *first* election in our political dataset was a close election between a member of the ruling coalition and opposition (rather than using all elections between 1977 and 2001). This alternative instrumentation strategy takes into account the possibility that a close election influences subsequent close elections (however, recall that the results of each close election are quasi-randomly determined), by using only the results of the first election. Although substantially worse than before, the F -statistic for the new first-stage regression remains above 10, and these results remain consistent with those presented previously. Lastly, in regressions 8 and 9, we re-define close elections as those that were won with margins of 1% and 5%, instead of the 3.5% cutoff used in the main analysis. These results are also consistent with the main findings.

Altogether, the empirical analysis fails to provide any evidence for constituencies benefiting from voting in representatives who are members of the ruling coalition at the state level. Although the bivariate plots suggested a weakly positive relationship between the election of

an MLA from the ruling coalition and the growth in literacy and SC literacy, these patterns disappear once we control for important confounding variables, as well as for endogeneity.

4.2 Explaining the null-effect

The evidence that we have presented thus far suggests that electing members of ruling coalitions fails to affect literacy rates in the long run. We consider several possible reasons that this could be the case.

First, ruling coalitions might improve literacy under particular circumstances—when certain pro-poor parties are in power, in party strongholds, in some states or when mechanisms of accountability (such as the media) are strong. These possibilities could be consistent with the estimated overall null-effect. To assess whether this is the case, we explore heterogeneous treatment effects in Table 6.

We start by examining whether voting for ruling coalitions led by the Indian National Congress or the Communist Party of India (Marxist)—parties associated with the poor—have boosted literacy rates.¹⁹ To assess this possibility, we control for the proportion of time a constituency was represented by INC and CPI(M) ruling-coalition members (regressions 1 and 6 of Table 6), and instrument for these terms in a manner analogous to our main identification strategy. Neither of the estimated effects of statistically significant.

We next explore if ruling coalitions are particularly likely to invest in constituencies that are party strongholds. We coded “strongholds” as constituencies that elected the same party more than 50% of the years under study. By this definition, 29% and 7% of the constituencies were strongholds for the INC and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) respectively (in contrast, only 1% of constituencies were strongholds for the Bharatiya Janata Party). We then examined whether quasi-randomly electing ruling coalition members from these strongholds boosted literacy rates (regressions 2 and 6). It was not found to do so.

¹⁹While constituencies were on average in ruling coalitions for 65% of the time studied, they were in INC ruling coalitions for 32% of the time, and in CPI(M) ruling coalition 7% of the time.

Table 6: Heterogeneous treatment effects

	% Literates			% SC literates						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Prop. of time in INC ruling coalition	3.528 [4.107]					2.154 [3.475]				
Prop. of time in Communist ruling coalition	-17.69 [19.34]					-10.15 [16.23]				
Prop. of time in ruling coalition		-4.375 [10.51]		-0.755 [0.928]	-7.295 [8.054]		-1.389 [3.634]		-0.946 [1.080]	3.587 [8.813]
Prop. of time in ruling coalition X INC stronghold		-1.066 [19.14]					5.462 [7.659]			
Prop. of time in ruling coalition X Communist stronghold		76.77 [275.4]					-10.29 [84.31]			
INC stronghold		1.006 [13.30]					-3.479 [5.172]			
Communist stronghold		-52.88 [188.2]					7.909 [58.13]			
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, Andhra Pradesh			-39.12 [72.63]					-60.58 [110.6]		
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, Bihar			-2.035 [6.501]					4.505 [8.255]		
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, Gujrat			1.416 [8.923]					-4.472 [8.828]		
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, Karnataka			-1.029 [3.550]					-2.51 [6.093]		
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, Kerala			1.504 [3.980]					-0.88 [6.937]		
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, Madhya Pradesh			8.485 [9.862]					9.596 [13.25]		
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, Maharashtra			2.647 [8.967]					-2.363 [12.69]		
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, Orissa			-0.821 [111.0]					51.95 [167.3]		
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, Punjab			8.016 [6.628]					10.95 [8.842]		
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, Rajasthan			4.696 [8.957]					1.728 [10.81]		
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, Tamil Nadu			2.11 [4.783]					3.533 [6.783]		
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, Uttar Pradesh			-3.645 [6.033]					-5.259 [8.777]		
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, West Bengal			12.82 [33.58]					8.119 [39.26]		
Newspaper coverage X Prop. of time in ruling coalition				-2.591 [1.992]					-3.860** [1.828]	
Governance measure X Prop. of time in ruling coalition					0.739 [0.858]					-0.462 [0.941]
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3137	3137	3137	3069	3069	3135	3135	3135	3067	3067
Adjusted R-squared	0.91	0.81	0.87	0.92	0.92	0.93	0.93	0.83	0.93	0.93

Notes: Controls include the proportion of the population that was scheduled caste (SC) in 1971, the proportion of the population that was scheduled tribe (ST) in 1971, dummies for whether the constituency was reserved for SCs or STs, the log male-female ratio, and the log number of houses and households in each constituency. Standard errors in brackets. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

Next, we ask whether ruling coalitions in particular states boosted literacy rates (regressions 3 and 7). Here too, none of the coefficients are statistically significant.²⁰ No state seems to have had ruling coalitions that were systematically prone to privileging their own supporters.

Finally, in regressions 4 and 8 we interact a state-level newspaper coverage variable (from Besley and Burgess 6) with the proportion of time in ruling coalition.²¹ As studies of accountability indicate that informed voters are more able to hold ruling coalitions to account [6, 47], we might expect this interaction term to be positive. But the point estimates are, in fact, negative. However, these results should be interpreted with caution, as the newspaper circulation variable is at the state level, not at the constituency level. Overall, our exploration of heterogeneous treatment effects fails to uncover political motivations behind the change in literacy between 1971 and 2001.

A second explanation for the null finding could be that ruling coalitions may attempt to improve literacy by building schools, but that these efforts do not increase literacy because of teacher absenteeism or other local-level factors. To evaluate this possibility, we investigated whether ruling coalitions built more primary schools in areas where they won elections. Table 7 presents the results. The specifications are the same as in our main analysis, with the outcome variable specified as the number of primary schools per capita in each constituency in 2001, as calculated from the Census of India’s village directory. Since this source is published for rural areas, observations are restricted to rural areas. Also due to data constraints, the initial value of the dependent variable is from 1991.²² The results fail to suggest that ruling coalitions boost the number of primary schools per capita. It therefore does not seem to be the case that the state governments make efforts to boost literacy in constituencies they won by building more schools there.

²⁰These results should be interpreted with caution, since the disaggregation of the ruling coalition variable into 13 components degrades the first-stage F -statistics substantially.

²¹The uninteracted measure of newspapers is absorbed by the district fixed effects.

²²The school data is part of the village directory, which we had access to from 1991 and 2001, but not from 1971. In this case the proportion of time in ruling coalition is calculated for the years 1991 to 2001. See Section A in the Online Appendix.

Table 7: Determinants of the number of primary schools per capita in 2001

	1	2	3	
	OLS	OLS	2SLS	
			1st stage	2nd stage
Prop. of seats won by coalition members	-0.0111 [2.740]	-1.652 [2.152]		0.145 [5.053]
Initial value of DV	1.096*** [0.0111]	1.092*** [0.0243]	-3E-05 [0.0000599]	1.092*** [0.0229]
Prop. of seats won by coalition members in close elections against opposition			0.914*** [0.0265]	
Prop. of coalition v. opposition elections			0.367*** [0.0235]	-4.922 [3.670]
Prop. of close coalition v. opposition elections			-0.540*** [0.0232]	2.639 [2.834]
Vote margin in close coalition v. opposition elections			0.0273*** [0.00116]	-0.174 [0.177]
Vote margin squared			-0.000130** [0.0000509]	0.00614 [0.00429]
Vote margin cubed			-0.00000752*** [0.00000206]	3.4E-05 [0.0000944]
Controls?	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
District fixed effects?	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,074	3,074	3,074	3,074
Adjusted R -squared	0.76	0.90		0.90
1st stage F -stat. for time in ruling coalition				1,187

Notes: Controls include the proportion of the population that was scheduled caste (SC) in 1971, the proportion of the population that was scheduled tribe (ST) in 1971, dummies for whether the constituency was reserved for SCs or STs, the log male-female ratio, and the log number of houses and households in each constituency. Standard errors in brackets. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

Third, it might be that growth in literacy is insulated from political influences by the bureaucracy responsible for implementing educational policies. The Indian bureaucracy is an influential elite institution inherited from British rule in India. The upper civil service—the Indian Administrative Service—is often referred to as the “steel frame” of India [43]. Our interviews with civil servants, one of which was cited previously, suggested that some civil servants feel pressured to follow instructions from the political leadership out of fear of being transferred to a less favourable posting. One might think that the bureaucracies in states with better governance structures should be less susceptible to such pressures. To explore this hypothesis, we interact our independent variable of interest with a state-level governance measure due to Mundle et al. [39]. Regressions 5 and 10 of Table 6 presents the

results of this exercise, and do not suggest that variation in governance standards mediates the impact of politics on literacy.²³

In this section, we have found three broad explanations for our findings wanting. One possibility that we are left with is that ruling coalitions do not try seek to improve overall development patterns in constituencies where they won the election in a consistent way. Our findings are subject to a number of caveats, which we discuss in the concluding section.

5 Conclusions

Evidence from across the world has shown that the distribution of state resources is frequently politicised. Resources tend to be spent in areas that support ruling coalitions, particularly on easily targetable goods that result in quick electoral payoffs. In this paper, we have investigated whether political alignments affect a key development indicator, literacy, in the long run.

Over a 30-year period, we find no evidence that constituencies that voted for members of state ruling coalitions in India differentially improved their literacy rates. This bodes well for the state of India's democracy. Although politicians may try to divert some state resources for political gain, this does not result in voters being systematically punished for voting for the opposition.

Further, we found that the change in literacy rates between 1971 and 2001 is strongly positively correlated with the electoral turnout in a constituency. This pattern is not statistically identified and could be the result of reverse causality, but it also may point to an important relationship between political mobilisation and development patterns, and as such could be an important topic for future research.

Our results are subject to several important caveats. First, they are largely specific to the outcome (literacy) and context (India) that we have considered. That said, we have some reason to believe that our results might generalise across development outcomes as literacy is

²³The uninteracted governance measure is absorbed by the district fixed effects.

positively correlated with other forms of public goods provisioning in India [3]. Our findings were also corroborated using three other development outcomes for a shorter time period.

Second, having focused our attention at the constituency level, we cannot rule out the possibility that governments geographically target areas within constituencies. Examining development patterns at a disaggregated level of analysis merits future study.

Third, although the empirical strategy employed here has the benefit of allowing us to estimate the causal effect of being represented by governing coalitions, the estimates so recovered are local average treatment effects. More specifically, the estimates calculated here might particularly obtain in close elections. If governments target constituencies that they win by large margins for improved public goods provisioning, our focus on close elections will have made us to underestimate the effect of being represented by ruling coalitions. However, this concern is mitigated by the fact that the estimated effect of alignment using OLS—which does not just focus on close elections—yields similar results.

Our findings advance the literature on the politicised distribution of state resources. The evidence presented here suggests that the extensive politicisation of the provision of resources in India does not differentially affect overall development trajectories at the constituency level in the long run. Any assessment of the consequences of the politicisation of resource distribution in India ought to take this into account. The common observation that governments systematically reward their supporters and punish others has its limits.

Acknowledgements

We thank Adam Auerbach, Kanchan Chandra, Herbert Kitschelt, Gareth Nellis, Philip Oldenburg, Neelanjan Sircar, Pavithra Suryanarayan, Adam Ziegfeld and participants at the APSA annual meetings and the South Asia Conference for discussions and comments on previous versions of the paper. We are also deeply grateful to Ishwari Bhattarai, HiTech

Outsourcing Services and 14 research assistants at University of California, Berkeley for help in assembling the data.

Disclosure statement

The authors declare that we have no relevant material or financial interests that relate to the research described in this paper.

Funding

This research has been made possible by support from the National Science Foundation, Stanford University, the University of Wisconsin–Madison and the Norwegian Research Council (project number 225905, “Politics and Development in India”).

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Online Appendix: “Voting for Development? Ruling Coalitions and Literacy in India”

In this Online Appendix we provide details about our data and present additional robustness checks for the paper “Voting for Development? Ruling Coalitions and Literacy in India” [update with publication information]. The data files and replication materials can be accessed at www.francesca.no and www.rikhimbhavnani.com.

A Dataset details

This appendix describes the census data used in the paper. Other data series are introduced in the main text.

Census Data 1971

By way of background, India is divided into states and administrative districts. Districts are divided into blocks (called tehsils, taluks, mandals, firkas, police stations or development blocks), which are in turn divided into villages (in rural areas) and cities or towns (in urban areas). Cities and towns are further divided into wards. In parallel to the administrative divisions described thus far, the country’s states are divided into single-member electoral districts (called constituencies), wherein Members of Parliament (MPs) and Members of Legislative Assemblies (MLAs) are elected to parliament and the state legislatures, respectively. India’s blocks are usually smaller than the country’s state-level political constituencies, and the former can be mapped onto the latter.

To create estimates of census variables at the state assembly constituency level for 1971, we started by scanning 1971 census publications with block-level census data for India’s 15 largest states (at the time). Optical character recognition software was used to digitise the data. Mistakes were flagged using logical tests (e.g., values for ‘male’ and ‘female’ should add

up to the ‘total’ values), and these were manually corrected. This resulted in an electronic version of the Primary Census Abstract (PCA) from 1971 for the general population and for the SC population for 3,261 blocks across 15 states. The data include demographic variables, the number of literate and illiterate persons, the number of non-workers, and the number of workers of various occupational categories. These variables are available for the whole population, for males and females, for SCs and for the rural and urban population in each block.

From this block-level dataset we created population-weighted estimates of the census variables for each state-assembly constituency in the same 15 states, based on the descriptions of which blocks fell into each constituency, as described in the 1976 Delimitation Report. Typically, there was approximately 1.5 blocks within each constituency. We acquired the total population of the constituencies in the 1970s from documentation in the Election Commission record room and we had the population of each block in the census data. Merging files were then created by calculating the proportion of the population of a block that fell into a constituency. For example, if the Delimitation Report listed that Constituency 1 (population 150,000) consisted of all of block A and part of Block B (each having a population of 100,000), then the census values for Constituency 1 was calculated as: Values for constituency 1 = $1 * (\text{values for Block A}) + 0.5 * (\text{values for Block B})$.

In a few cases, two or more constituencies consisted of parts of the same two blocks. In these cases the exact proportions could not be calculated on the basis of the population proportion. Most of these cases were solved by using information about the exact population proportions found in the records of the Delimitation Commission from the 1970s. In the handful of cases where we could not find written sources in the Commission records, we made estimates of the population based on the average population size of villages in that region and the number of villages in the constituency. Since the constituency-level estimates are population-weighted, they are approximate, with (we assume) as-if random errors.

Census Data 2001

Creating constituency-level estimates of the 2001 Census data was a slightly easier task, as block-level aggregates of the census series were available electronically. In order to merge census data and political variables in 2001, we started with GIS maps of the 4,208 blocks across the 15 major states in the 2001 Indian census, and overlaid them with maps of the 3,341 state assembly constituencies in those same states. We used these overlapping maps to create, using ArcGIS' intersect tool, a list of the blocks within each constituency, along with weights for each block, calculated as the proportion of the land area of the block that fell within a constituency. The data indicate, for example, that the state-assembly constituency of Ausa in Maharashtra was composed of 67% of taluk (block) Ausa, and 18% of taluk Nilanga. We used these weights to aggregate all block-level data from the 2001 census to the state-assembly constituency level.

Several checks were run to ensure the integrity of the data. First, the delimitation process ensured that all assembly constituencies fall entirely within states and the country's administrative districts. We checked to ensure that this was the case in our data as well.

Second, since all state assembly constituencies are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, we checked that all block weights across constituencies summed to one.

Third, and due to the imperfect overlap of boundaries that were the same across the assembly constituency and block layers, we ignored instances where less than 5% of a block fell within a constituency. A few cases in the cities had to be dropped because the maps were not detailed enough to allow for an accurate merge, but for the most part the blocks and constituencies mapped onto each other clearly. The estimates of the census variables for each state assembly constituency created this way relies on the approximate matching of regions. The major assumption behind this process is that the population is evenly distributed across the land mass of the split blocks.

Primary school, medical facility, communication facility, and paved roads data from 1991 and 2001

Estimates of the number of primary schools per capita were calculated by taking the average of primary schools per capita across constituencies' villages. Estimates of the percentage of the rural population with access to medical facilities, communication facilities and paved roads were calculated by taking the population-weighted averages of the underlying dummy variables at the village level. These underlying data are from the Village Directories of the 1991 and 2001 censuses, which were merged using link files created by the Census Office of India. Villages were then linked to constituencies by overlaying geo-coded maps with the location of villages in 2001 with constituency maps. A similar process was used to create the literacy data for 1991, used in the last robustness test reported below, although here we included both rural and urban areas in the constituency-wise estimates.

B Additional robustness tests

Migration

The first additional robustness checks we provide address the issue of migration. It is possible that citizens chose to move from one constituency seeking better schools for their children, this would confound our findings. Literature on migration in India suggests that internal migration is surprisingly low [40, 11]. Nonetheless, much of the migration that does occur in India is from rural to urban areas, raising the possibility that it is particularly illiterate populations who move to urban areas. The possibility of this confound underlines the value of our identification strategy, which should control for unobservables (migration at the constituency level is one such unobservable and the district is the lowest level at which the Census of India releases migration data). That said, to further address this concern, we examine whether our results obtain in more rural areas, where there are fewer migrants (for

completeness, we also examine urban contexts). To do so, we run separate regressions for constituencies that are more and less rural than average (we divide the sample at the median percentage of rural residents, which was 83% in 1971; see regressions 1 and 2 of Tables 1 and 2). In all four specifications, the proportion of time in the ruling coalition fails to affect literacy.

Alignment with the central government

Another possible confounder is that it is the alignment with the central government, not the state government, that matters more for outcomes. According to the constitution education is a “state subject”, meaning that Indias states have exclusive jurisdiction over primary and secondary education. The central government therefore does not have any direct way in which to respond to local funding deficits in education. Still, it is worth exploring whether the alignment with the central government may play a role. We explore this by controlling for the proportion of time that a constituencys Member of Parliament (MP) is aligned with the central government (regression 3 of Tables 1 and 2). Our results are robust to this modification.

Alignment with the most influential party in the state

Could it be that it is alignment with the most influential party in a state rather than any of the parties in the ruling coalition is what matters most? This is explored in regression 4 in Tables 1 and 2. The null effect remains in these specifications.

Core vs swing constituencies

Our IV strategy relies on close election, meaning that our estimation strategy yields an estimate of the local average treatment effect (LATE) of alignment that is particularly applicable to close elections—areas that may be considered swing areas rather than core areas for par-

ties. Could it be that the effect of alignment is larger in core constituencies? To look at this, we divide our sample into constituencies with small winning margins (of 8.4% or less; these are arguably “swing constituencies”) and those won by larger margins (these are arguably “core constituencies”), and examine whether alignment affects literacy in these samples. The results are in regressions 5 and 6 of Tables 1 and 2. We use OLS since the instrumentation strategy does not work with core constituencies. The OLS results suggest that the effect of alignment on literacy is small and insignificant across both types of constituencies.

Reservations

In India, a large share of constituencies are reserved for Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs), and these reserved constituencies are characterized by somewhat less political competition, fewer candidates, and fewer politicians holding cabinet positions [29]. To see whether the alignment patterns differ across reserved and non-reserved constituencies, we run our main specifications separately on unreserved constituencies and those reserved for SCs and STs (see regressions 7 and 8 of of Tables 1 and 2). The effect of alignment on literacy is small and insignificant across both types of constituencies.

Vote margins as a control

In our main regressions, we have calculated the margin of victory as the mean margin of victory across the elections in our study period. An alternative strategy would be to control for the winning margin in each election separately. This is made difficult by the fact that states have elections at different times and with different frequencies (recall that India’s states have parliamentary governments, wherein elections are held at least every five years but can be called earlier in case governments lose the confidence of the legislature; for example, West Bengal had five elections in the study period, while Uttar Pradesh had seven elections). Nonetheless, in Tables 3– 8, we reproduce the tables in the main text, separately controlling

for the winning margins for each of the first five elections since 1977 (and their higher order terms). The results are robust to this alternative strategy.

Possible short-term effects

In our main analysis, we estimated the causal effects of time in the ruling coalition over a 30-year period on 2001 literacy. Does political alignment affect literacy over shorter periods? To examine this question, we estimated constituency-level literacy levels for 1991 using 1991 census data as described above, and used these to explore the effect of political alignment over 10 and 20-year periods. A similar process was not possible for data from 1981, since these data (to our knowledge) have not been digitized. Regression 1 of Table 9 reports the main 2SLS estimate of our paper—over 30 years, the proportion of time in the ruling coalition does not increase literacy. In regression 2, we employ the same specification on the fewer constituencies for which we have 1991 data. In regression 3, we report the effects of alignment between 1971 and 1991 on 1991 literacy; regression 4 reports the effects of alignment between 1991 and 2001 on literacy in 2001. In all these cases, the causal effects of alignment remains statistically indistinguishable from zero.

Table 1: Additional robustness tests for the determinants of overall literacy rates in 2001

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	2SLS Rural const.	2SLS Urban const.	2SLS Nat'l alignment	2SLS Largest party	OLS Swing const.	OLS Core const.	2SLS Open const.	2SLS Reserved const.
Prop. of time in ruling coalition	0.0948 [1.150]	-1.671 [1.366]	-0.527 [0.924]	1.279 [1.322]	0.818 [0.601]	-0.02 [0.981]	-0.26 [1.049]	-4.68 [2.885]
Initial value of DV	0.657*** [0.0402]	0.599*** [0.0322]	0.690*** [0.0271]	0.693*** [0.0278]	0.675*** [0.0378]	0.711*** [0.0407]	0.674*** [0.0294]	0.722*** [0.0655]
Prop. of coalition v. opposition elections	-1.083 [0.879]	0.236 [0.873]	-0.511 [0.634]	0.411 [0.595]			-0.996 [0.777]	3.604** [1.627]
Prop. of close coalition v. opposition elections	0.448 [0.685]	-0.75 [0.621]	-0.37 [0.488]	-1.075* [0.639]			-0.586 [0.513]	-0.167 [1.370]
Vote margin in close coalition v. opposition elections	0.0241 [0.0362]	0.0584 [0.0459]	0.0344 [0.0266]	-0.059 [0.0671]			0.0322 [0.0297]	0.108 [0.120]
Vote margin squared	-1E-04 [0.00117]	-0.001 [0.00216]	-0.001 [0.00121]	0.0009 [0.00340]			-6E-04 [0.00133]	-0.008 [0.00581]
Vote margin cubed	-3E-05 [0.0000472]	-7E-06 [0.0000284]	4E-06 [0.0000247]	-5E-06 [0.0000461]			-7E-06 [0.0000244]	0.0001 [0.000120]
Prop. of time in national ruling coalition			0.234 [0.892]					
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1673	1464	3137	3099	1661	1444	2411	726
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.93	0.93	0.92	0.92	0.93	0.91	0.93	0.87
1st stage <i>F</i> -stat. for time in ruling coalition	404	364	1027	307			735	84

Notes: Controls include the proportion of the population that was scheduled caste (SC) in 1971, the proportion of the population that was scheduled tribe (ST) in 1971, dummies for whether the constituency was reserved for SCs or STs, the log male-female ratio, and the log number of houses and households in each constituency. Standard errors in brackets. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

Table 2: Additional robustness tests for the determinants of SC literacy rates in 2001

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS	2SLS
	Rural	Urban	Nat'l	Largest	Swing	Core	Open	Reserved
	const.	const.	alignment	party	const.	const.	const.	const.
Prop. of time in ruling coalition	-1.373 [1.246]	-0.6 [1.343]	-0.571 [1.003]	1.097 [1.315]	0.882 [0.683]	-0.46 [0.810]	-0.505 [1.133]	-1.191 [2.849]
Initial value of DV	0.791*** [0.0671]	0.622*** [0.0610]	0.735*** [0.0506]	0.732*** [0.0521]	0.659*** [0.0705]	0.827*** [0.0684]	0.697*** [0.0536]	0.882*** [0.0937]
Prop. of coalition v. opposition elections	0.637 [1.054]	-0.978 [0.847]	-0.196 [0.657]	0.455 [0.566]			-0.245 [0.797]	1.37 [1.513]
Prop. of close coalition v. opposition elections	0.103 [0.767]	-0.463 [0.717]	-0.441 [0.510]	-0.612 [0.692]			-1.056* [0.560]	2.158 [1.346]
Vote margin in close coalition v. opposition elections	0.0545 [0.0413]	0.0503 [0.0468]	0.0419 [0.0288]	0.0133 [0.0739]			0.0319 [0.0329]	0.0841 [0.101]
Vote margin squared	-0.00192** [0.000894]	-0.00236 [0.00212]	-0.00255*** [0.000911]	-0.00296 [0.00383]			-0.00207*** [0.00100]	-0.00386 [0.00439]
Vote margin cubed	-0.0000209 [0.0000446]	0.0000103 [0.0000281]	0.0000126 [0.0000200]	0.0000361 [0.0000547]			0.0000187 [0.0000213]	-0.0000225 [0.0000110]
Prop. of time in national ruling coalition			0.668 [1.133]					
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1673	1462	3135	3097	1661	1442	2410	725
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.94	0.94	0.93	0.93	0.94	0.92	0.94	0.9
1st stage <i>F</i> -stat. for time in ruling coalition	402	371	1,039	308			745	82

Notes: Controls include the proportion of the population that was scheduled caste (SC) in 1971, the proportion of the population that was scheduled tribe (ST) in 1971, dummies for whether the constituency was reserved for SCs or STs, the log male-female ratio, and the log number of houses and households in each constituency. Standard errors in brackets. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

Table 3: Determinants of overall and SC literacy rates in 2001, controlling for win margins for individual elections separately

	% Literates						% SC literates					
	1		2		3		4		5		6	
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS	2nd stage	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	1st stage	2nd stage
Prop. of time in ruling coalition	1.226** [0.487]	0.121 [0.402]			-0.572 [0.928]		1.764*** [0.599]		0.0416 [0.408]			-0.485 [1.008]
Initial value of DV	0.862*** [0.00871]	0.689*** [0.0291]	0.00017 [0.000523]		0.691*** [0.0273]		1.089*** [0.0125]		0.733*** [0.0541]		-0.0002 [0.000608]	0.732*** [0.0508]
Prop. of seats won by coalition members in close elections against opposition			0.926*** [0.0290]								0.927*** [0.0289]	
Prop. of coalition v. opposition elections			0.391*** [0.0213]								0.390*** [0.0213]	
Prop. of close coalition v. opposition elections			-0.570*** [0.0232]								-0.571*** [0.0232]	
Controls?	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District fixed effects?	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3137	3137	3134	3134	3134	3134	3135	3135	3135	3132	3132	3132
Adjusted R -squared	0.76	0.92			0.92		0.71	0.71	0.93		0.93	
1st stage F -stat. for time in ruling coalition						1022					1027	

Notes: Controls include the proportion of the population that was scheduled caste (SC) in 1971, the proportion of the population that was scheduled tribe (ST) in 1971, dummies for whether the constituency was reserved for SCs or STs, the log male-female ratio, and the log number of houses and households in each constituency. The 2SLS regressions additionally control for win vote margins (and their square and cube) for the first, second, third, fourth and fifth elections after 1976. Standard errors in brackets. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

Table 4: Determinants of alternative dependent variables in 2001, controlling for win margins for individual elections separately

Dependent variables: % of rural population with access to	medical facilities			communication facilities			paved roads		
	OLS 1	OLS 2	2SLS 3	OLS 4	OLS 5	2SLS 6	OLS 7	OLS 8	2SLS 9
Estimator:									
Prop. of time in ruling coalition	9.469*** [1.337]	0.564 [0.790]	1.808 [1.747]	4.773*** [0.867]	-0.209 [0.656]	-0.231 [1.440]	1.053 [0.740]	-1.207 [0.799]	1.446 [1.506]
Initial value of DV	0.368*** [0.0151]	0.310*** [0.0286]	0.311*** [0.0269]	0.703*** [0.0112]	0.412*** [0.0383]	0.411*** [0.0362]	0.694*** [0.00905]	0.364*** [0.0279]	0.362*** [0.0264]
Prop. of coalition v. opposition elections			-0.168 [1.226]			0.64 [0.949]			-0.881 [1.007]
Prop. of close coalition v. opposition elections			-0.0196 [0.932]			-0.572 [0.842]			-1.023 [0.785]
Controls?	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
District fixed effects?	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	2834	2834	2832	2834	2834	2832	2830	2830	2828
Adjusted R -squared	0.18	0.83	0.83	0.59	0.86	0.86	0.68	0.84	0.84
1st stage F -stat. for time in ruling coalition			877			878			876

Notes: Controls include the proportion of the population that was scheduled caste (SC) in 1971, the proportion of the population that was scheduled tribe (ST) in 1971, dummies for whether the constituency was reserved for SCs or STs, the log male-female ratio, and the log number of houses and households in each constituency. The 2SLS regressions additionally control for win vote margins (and their square and cube) for the first, second and third elections after 1990. Standard errors in brackets. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

Table 5: Robustness tests for the determinants of overall literacy rates in 2001, controlling for win margins for individual elections separately

Dependent variable:	Δ % Literacy, '71-'01									% Literacy, '01									
	$\leq 3.5\%$ 1	$\leq 3.5\%$ 2	$\leq 3.5\%$ 3	$\leq 3.5\%$ 4	$\leq 3.5\%$ 5	$\leq 3.5\%$ 6	$\leq 3.5\%$ 1st elec. 7	$\leq 1\%$ 8	$\leq 5\%$ 9										
Close election definition:																			
Prop. of time in ruling coalition	-1.215 [1.105]	-19.09 [23.33]		-0.621 [0.933]	-0.442 [0.949]	-1.849 [1.229]	1.535 [1.757]	-0.628 [0.854]	0.747 [5.006]										
Prop. of time in ruling coalition squared		14.93 [18.73]																	
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, until 1996			-0.456 [0.833]																
% non-workers				0.0753** [0.0360]															
% agricultural laborers				0.0646 [0.0480]															
Prop. of time minister					-0.0148 [0.518]														
Effective no. of parties					-0.223 [0.222]														
% turnout					0.0846*** [0.0236]														
Initial value of DV		0.697*** [0.0279]	0.690*** [0.0273]	0.686*** [0.0308]	0.705*** [0.0263]	0.828*** [0.0526]	0.689*** [0.0273]	0.691*** [0.0273]	0.690*** [0.0277]										
Prop. of coalition	-0.246 [0.717]	0.303 [1.302]	-0.434 [0.607]	-0.617 [0.646]	-0.783 [0.654]	-1.914* [1.012]	-1.385 [0.846]	-0.495 [0.640]	-1.093 [1.879]										
v. opposition elections																			
Prop. of close coalition	-0.511 [0.571]	-0.171 [0.582]	0.0657 [0.464]	-0.252 [0.524]	-0.267 [0.518]	-0.838* [0.490]	-0.842 [0.824]	-0.42 [0.495]	-0.242 [0.534]										
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes										
State/district fixed effects?	District	District	District	District	District	District	District	District	District	State	State	District	District	District	District	District	District	District	District
Observations	3,134	3,134	3,134	3,134	3,134	3,134	3,134	3,134	3,134	3,134	3,134	3,134	3,134	3,134	3,134	3,134	3,134	3,134	3,134
Adjusted R -squared	0.64	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.85	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.85	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92
1st stage F -stat. for time in ruling coalition	1,035	542	1,149	1,020	982	3,349	251	1,568	19										

Notes: Controls include the proportion of the population that was scheduled caste (SC) in 1971, the proportion of the population that was scheduled tribe (ST) in 1971, dummies for whether the constituency was reserved for SCs or STs, the log male-female ratio, the log number of houses and households in each constituency, and the win vote margins (and their square and cube) for the first, second, third, fourth and fifth state elections after 1976. Standard errors in brackets. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

Table 6: Robustness tests for the determinants of SC literacy rates in 2001, controlling for win margins for individual elections separately

Dependent variable:	Δ % SC literacy, '71-'01								
	$\leq 3.5\%$ 1	$\leq 3.5\%$ 2	$\leq 3.5\%$ 3	$\leq 3.5\%$ 4	$\leq 3.5\%$ 5	$\leq 3.5\%$ 6	$\leq 3.5\%$ 7	$\leq 1\%$ 8	$\leq 5\%$ 9
Close election definition:									
Prop. of time in ruling coalition	-0.991 [1.084]	-25.3 [27.42] 20		-0.716 [1.009]	-0.517 [1.027]	-2.676** [1.213]	0.964 [1.842]	-0.181 [0.856]	-2.52 [5.908]
Prop. of time in ruling coalition squared		[21.95]							
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, until 1996			-0.716 [0.938]						
% non-workers				0.186*** [0.0501]					
% agricultural laborers				-0.00892 [0.0515]					
Prop. of time minister					0.832 [0.524]				
Effective no. of parties					0.242 [0.204]				
% turnout					0.0395 [0.0268]				
Initial value of DV		0.737*** [0.0531]	0.731*** [0.0508]	0.691*** [0.0530]	0.735*** [0.0514]	0.885*** [0.0996]	0.731*** [0.0509]	0.731*** [0.0508]	0.732*** [0.0511]
Prop. of coalition	0.0756 [0.737]	0.898 [1.483]	-0.141 [0.623]	-0.209 [0.679]	-0.361 [0.683]	-1.239 [0.934]	-0.832 [0.868]	-0.349 [0.668]	0.484 [2.231]
v. opposition elections	-0.672 [0.585]	-0.255 [0.670]	-0.171 [0.472]	-0.378 [0.544]	-0.47 [0.547]	-0.657 [0.530]	-1.497* [0.846]	-0.47 [0.530]	-0.531 [0.597]
v. opposition elections									
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State/district fixed effects?	District	District	District	District	District	State	District	District	District
Observations	3,132	3,132	3,132	3,132	3,132	3,132	3,132	3,132	3,132
Adjusted R -squared	0.75	0.92	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.84	0.93	0.93	0.93
1st stage F -stat. for time in ruling coalition	1,037	546	1,157	1,019	982	3,274	252	1,578	19

Notes: Controls include the proportion of the population that was scheduled caste (SC) in 1971, the proportion of the population that was scheduled tribe (ST) in 1971, dummies for whether the constituency was reserved for SCs or STs, the log male-female ratio, the log number of houses and households in each constituency, and the win vote margins (and their square and cube) for the first, second, third, fourth and fifth state elections after 1976. Standard errors in brackets. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

Table 7: Heterogeneous treatment effects, controlling for win margins for individual elections separately

	% Literates					% SC literates				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Prop. of time in INC ruling coalition	1.784 [2.857]					1.154 [2.615]				
Prop. of time in Communist ruling coalition	-13.03 [14.52]					-6.009 [13.31]				
Prop. of time in ruling coalition		-4.203 [12.24]		-0.708 [0.868]	-7.198 [7.515]		-0.497 [6.142]		-0.815 [0.986]	4.816 [8.350]
Prop. of time in ruling coalition X INC stronghold		0.0399 [16.74]					6.662 [9.167]			
Prop. of time in ruling coalition X Communist stronghold		72.87 [321.5]					-32.99 [152.0]			
INC stronghold		0.228 [11.19]					-4.246 [6.071]			
Communist stronghold		-50.13 [220.3]					23.56 [104.4]			
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, Andhra Pradesh			-29.65 [44.66]					-46.16 [71.22]		
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, Bihar			-2.824 [7.386]					2.88 [14.67]		
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, Gujrat			-0.103 [9.551]					-6.678 [14.21]		
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, Karnataka			-1.284 [4.604]					-3.559 [11.04]		
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, Kerala			0.739 [4.543]					-2.897 [11.33]		
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, Madhya Pradesh			7.397 [8.784]					8.563 [16.36]		
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, Maharashtra			1.758 [11.32]					-7.669 [26.14]		
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, Orissa			0.139 [20.6]					75.82 [260.6]		
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, Punjab			7.469 [6.922]					9.055 [13.73]		
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, Rajasthan			3.077 [9.703]					-1.735 [18.55]		
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, Tamil Nadu			1.246 [6.050]					1.757 [12.55]		
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, Uttar Pradesh			-3.453 [6.071]					-5.527 [13.10]		
Prop. of time in ruling coalition, West Bengal			12.16 [40.61]					4.785 [62.01]		
Newspaper coverage X Prop. of time in ruling coalition				-2.444 [1.988]					-3.555** [1.761]	
Governance measure X Prop. of time in ruling coalition					0.724 [0.803]					-0.587 [0.891]
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3134	3134	3134	3069	3066	3132	3132	3132	3067	3064
Adjusted R^2 -squared	0.92	0.82	0.89	0.92	0.92	0.93	0.91	0.84	0.93	0.93

Notes: Controls include the proportion of the population that was scheduled caste (SC) in 1971, the proportion of the population that was scheduled tribe (ST) in 1971, dummies for whether the constituency was reserved for SCs or STs, the log male-female ratio, the log number of houses and households in each constituency, and the win vote margins (and their square and cube) for the first, second, third, fourth and fifth state elections after 1976. Standard errors in brackets. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

Table 8: Determinants of the number of primary schools per capita in 2001, controlling for win margins for individual elections separately

	1	2	3	
	OLS	OLS	2SLS	
			1st stage	2nd stage
Prop. of seats won by coalition members	-0.0111 [2.740]	-1.652 [2.152]		-0.445 [5.040]
Initial value of DV	1.096*** [0.0111]	1.092*** [0.0243]	-1E-06 [0.0000653]	1.093*** [0.0227]
Prop. of seats won by coalition members in close elections against opposition			0.920*** [0.0280]	
Prop. of coalition v. opposition elections			0.375*** [0.0236]	-5.434 [3.675]
Prop. of close coalition v. opposition elections			-0.552*** [0.0262]	3.51 [2.977]
Controls?	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
District fixed effects?	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3074	3074	3071	3071
Adjusted R -squared	0.76	0.9		0.9
1st stage F -stat. for time in ruling coalition				1081

Notes: Controls include the proportion of the population that was scheduled caste (SC) in 1971, the proportion of the population that was scheduled tribe (ST) in 1971, dummies for whether the constituency was reserved for SCs or STs, the log male-female ratio, and the log number of houses and households in each constituency. The 2SLS regression additionally controls for win vote margins (and their square and cube) for the first, second and third elections after 1990. Standard errors in brackets. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

Table 9: Determinants of overall literacy rates in the short and long terms

	1	2	3	4
Period studied	1971–2001	1971–2001	1971–91	1991–2001
Prop. of time in ruling coalition	-0.526 [0.924]	-0.469 [0.927]	1.141 [1.172]	-0.577 [0.573]
Initial value of DV	0.689*** [0.0275]	0.706*** [0.0264]	0.757*** [0.0389]	0.507*** [0.0211]
Prop. of coalition v. opposition elections	-0.514 [0.635]	-0.313 [0.644]	-0.483 [0.837]	-0.401 [0.410]
Prop. of close coalition v. opposition elections	-0.365 [0.490]	-0.302 [0.500]	0.36 [0.585]	-0.662* [0.358]
Vote margin in close coalition v. opposition elections	0.0344 [0.0266]	0.0339 [0.0273]	-0.0193 [0.0364]	0.0486** [0.0205]
Vote margin squared	-0.00129 [0.00120]	-0.00131 [0.00124]	8.38E-05 [0.00103]	-0.00017 [0.000492]
Vote margin cubed	3.34E-06 [0.0000244]	3.69E-06 [0.0000248]	-1.3E-06 [0.0000112]	-0.0000205** [0.0000102]
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3137	3023	3023	3023
Adjusted R -squared	0.92	0.92	0.88	0.91
1st stage F -stat. for time in ruling coalition	1030	1010	1274	1178

Notes: All regressions are 2SLS. Controls include the proportion of the population that was scheduled caste (SC) in 1971, the proportion of the population that was scheduled tribe (ST) in 1971, dummies for whether the constituency was reserved for SCs or STs, the log male-female ratio, and the log number of houses and households in each constituency. Standard errors in brackets. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.