Letter from the President
Stephan Haggard, The University of California, San Diego

This year I not only had the pleasure of being elected to lead the comparative democratization section but of chairing the section's book prize committee as well. I was struck by the normative commitment in much of the submitted work. We study democracy in part because we wish it well; we want it to succeed. Given the excitement of the democratic uprisings in the Middle East, it is hard not to feel expectant. Is it warranted?

Worry might be more appropriate. At a conference I attended over the summer, Larry Diamond painted one of his typically-useful global portraits. On the plus side of the ledger, nearly 60 percent of all countries are democratic. Democracy appears reasonably consolidated (whatever that means!) in the ten Eastern European countries that have joined the EU and in Latin America. Most of the developing members of the G20 are democratic, including India, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey and South Africa; only Saudi Arabia and China—a not-so-small exception—are authoritarian.

But the number of democracies has declined marginally since a peak in the mid-2000s, and that decline masks substantial churning. Nearly a third of all democracies that existed during the third wave have broken down, some returning to democratic rule but others (continued on page 2)

Why Now? Micro Transitions and the Arab Uprisings
Ellen Lust
Yale University

Events that shook the Arab world since January 2011—variously termed the Arab Awakening (al-sahwah al-arabiyya), Arab Spring (al-rabyi’ al-arabi), Arab Revolution (a-thawra al-arabiyya), or the uprising (intifada)—are unprecedented, unparalleled, and unexpected.1 Never before have people across the Arab world taken to the streets in such numbers, demanding the end to deep-seated, autocratic regimes. Never before has the region experienced such transformation driven from within. Whatever the immediate outcomes of these movements, citizens have witnessed the almost unthinkable become reality, in turn expanding their horizons and increasing demands. And never before have scholars and close observers of the Middle East had to confront their own failure to predict that such momentous, widespread change would be realized at dizzying speed.2

1. I use the term ‘uprising’ rather than “Arab Spring” or “revolution,” since both suggest outcomes that have not yet been realized.
Letters

From the Editorial Board

You will notice a couple of new features in this issue. Our incoming section President, Stephan Haggard, has written a letter to the membership in which he comments on the state of the section and addresses what he sees as key issues on our agenda as a research community in the coming period. It is our hope that he will continue to address the membership as he sees fit; we will certainly make space available to him. We also are publishing our first book review, of Levitsky and Way’s Competitive Authoritarianism. The author of the review is Ivan Velinov, a Ph.D. student at the University of Florida. The editorial committee is open to book reviews, whether written by faculty or graduate students. Please contact us if you are interested in reviewing a book.

As in the last issue, we have a single article focused on a topic of contemporary interest. Due to the popularity of the Brownlee and Stacher piece from the last issue, we commissioned another piece on regime change in the Middle East from a leading scholar. Ellen Lust of Yale shares her thoughts on what the developments in the region mean to date. This issue’s thematic focus is “Experiments and the Study of New Democracies.” We have another set of rich essays authored by Macartan Humphreys, Joshua Tucker, Susan Hyde, Ana de la O, Kate Baldwin and Rikhil R. Bhavnani. Thanks are due to Kate Baldwin, the most recent addition to the faculty at the University of Florida, for her work in assembling this stellar cast, and providing constructive feedback to all the authors.

Finally, there will be some additional changes in the future. At the end of this academic year I will be stepping down as the Chair of the editorial board of the newsletter (though I will stay on the board). Staffan Lindberg and Ben Smith will replace me as co-Chairs. Those of you who know Ben and Staffan, and how dynamic they are, know that the newsletter will be in good hands. Finally, we will also be posting some of our content from each issue on the award-winning Monkey Cage blog (http://themonkeycage.org/). Thanks to Josh Tucker for proposing this.

On behalf of the board,
Michael Bernhard

Letter From the President, continued

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remaining authoritarian to this day. Nor are these derogations small cases, including Russia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Venezuela, Thailand, and Kenya to name just a few.

It is clear that the central preoccupations that drove this section from its inception—the conditions under which democratization occurs or is reversed—remain very much in play. This means that the comparative democratization section must continue to actively engage with “the other”: the complex and variegated nature of authoritarianism.

Thanks to the persistence of scholars like Barbara Geddes, Beatriz Magaloni, and Steve Levitsky and Lucan Way among others we have a much more refined conception of the variety of authoritarian rule. But to show the continuing analytic challenges, consider the five remaining Communist countries: China, Vietnam, North Korea, Laos, and Cuba. All are single-party autocracies, and all inherited a common institutional template. Yet these systems subsequently evolved in strikingly different ways. North Korea and Cuba became highly personalist autocracies while Vietnam and China developed institutions that restrained personalist power and represented key interests. Given these differences, can we believe the coefficient on a “single-party regime” variable in a large-n empirical model? Or more accurately, for what purposes? We still understand surprisingly little about personalism and the functioning of authoritarian institutions.

Beyond the validation of our core concerns, it is presumptuous of me to outline a research agenda. But following are a few issues that I suspect will preoccupy the field for some time.

Despite some striking gains in countries such as Brazil, it appears that many countries are becoming more unequal
now moving beyond “power-sharing” models to engage comparative politics more centrally. Many countries are grappling with how institutional design can both quell violence and provide durable mechanisms of accountability and representation. For political scientists, these bargains must be seen as endogenous, re-opening a long-standing tradition on negotiated transitions.

Finally, the external environment remains an important piece of the democracy puzzle. One of the most dynamic areas of research in international political economy over the last two decades has been on the effectiveness of foreign aid. This agenda now has legs within the study of democracy as well. Questions of election monitoring have received particular attention due to the careful attention to research design by Susan Hyde and others. But beyond elections are a whole host of other issues in which international actors have a stake, from the rule of law—which I have been pondering in think pieces with Andrew MacIntyre and Lydia Tiede—to the development of political parties and interest groups, on which international influences also operate quite powerfully. This area of research is of particular practical significance; it is crucial to know where outside actors can have an effect but also where they are unlikely to, or only at great cost. Good intentions are not enough.

It is sad that that our section has not proven a self-liquidating one. For some countries, the study of democratization can simply be folded into the larger study of democracy and comparative politics, and many members of this section work those important lines of inquiry. But for a surprising number of countries, that is not the world that we live in. Authoritarianism is robust and democracy fragile, which means that our section has plenty of work to do.

LUST, continued

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The Arab awakening thus raises once again a question at the heart of the study of comparative democratization: Why now? Why has the Arab world, which appeared so resistant to change, seen such widespread unrest and transformation? Specialists on Africa, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union engaged in the same soul-searching after similar transformations shook those regions. That this question animates discussions today, as it did then, reminds us that we have far to go before we understand the conditions promoting such significant ruptures in seemingly stable authoritarian regimes.

In this essay, I suggest the answer lies in shifting our focus from a search for immediate causal factors to a greater recognition of micro- and meso-level transitions—that is, gradual, interrelated changes in political, economic and social spheres that, like slowly moving tectonic plates, eventually create the conditions conducive to earth-shattering events. The point is not simply to recognize the incrementalism of change or unintended consequences of social, economic, and political reforms that have often been implemented in the region, but to urge us to pay greater attention to the “shifting web of conditions that define the terrain on which new institutions and actors arise, old actors activate or change their claims, and all pursue iterative contests.”

Attention to these factors does not pinpoint precisely the emergence of uprisings across the Arab world, but it certainly makes them less surprising.

The essay begins by exploring how gradual, interrelated changes in political, economic, and social spheres contributed to the current uprisings. Given space constraints, it cannot

provide an exhaustive discussion of the dynamics at play or delineate in detail important differences in the on-going struggles across the region. Rather, by sketching the broad outlines of these changes, it demonstrates how focusing on interrelated transitions can contribute to a better understanding of the current uprisings and, as discussed in the conclusion, of comparative democratization more generally.

WEAKENED POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
The Middle East is populated primarily with “sultanistic dictatorships,” or as Jack Goldstone noted recently, “paper tigers” which often appear fiercer than they are. Yet, explaining the Arab awakening requires us to explore why seemingly invincible, more cohesive regimes became the embattled “paper tigers” they are today. We need to consider the possibility (and I would argue, probability) that the regimes were not as fragile two decades ago as they were today. What processes were at play that undermined these regimes?

To examine these interrelated processes, let us start by recognizing how inevitable life-cycles of long-standing dictators weakened the regimes in recent years. The majority of Arab regimes gained power by the early 1970s, with many morphing from then until now from military/single party systems toward increasingly entrenched personalistic regimes. By 2010, most thus faced leadership crises, in some cases because elderly rulers who had held office for decades were nearing the end of their natural lives, and in other cases, because relatively young, inexperienced rulers had just succeeded their fathers.

The impending succession crisis associated with elderly leaders appears to have made regimes most vulnerable to challenge. Indeed, where such rulers were in power at the end of last year—Ben Ali in Tunisia, Mubarak in Egypt, Salih in Yemen, and Ghaddafi in Libya—regimes met stiff opposition early. This is not entirely surprising. Age raises the specter of succession, making palpable a vision of the regime without its leader. At the same time, this generation of leaders was especially invested in grooming their progeny for office. Controversy over potential contenders heightened conflict among elites, contributing to moments in which, as O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead would remind us, critical elite defections are likely.

The new generation of leaders may be slightly more secure, but they too have reason to fear. The relatively young and inexperienced rulers who inherited their positions (e.g., Bashar al-Asad of Syria, Abdullah II of Jordan, Mohammad VI of Morocco) have not yet weathered the challenges their fathers faced, nor gained reputations as invincible. Even regime elites may thus question whether the regime can survive the crisis, and thus be more likely to defect to the opposition. Of these cases, only Syria’s Bashar al-Asad has faced serious challenges. There, most elites within the regime have not defected—in stark contrast to what we have witnessed in Libya and Yemen. Yet, this may be due as much to the minority basis of the regime which limits exit options for elites, a less professionalized military, or incomplete state development, as it is to the belief that regime survival is assured.

The brittleness induced by succession crises can only be fully understood in the context of the development of political institutions. Indeed, the development of sultanistic autocracies went hand-in-hand with the underdevelopment of political institutions. Elites basing their rule on personalistic, patronage politics were best served if political parties, parliaments and other institutions remained weak. Yet, while weak political institutions buoyed these leaders in their heyday, they could do little to shore up the regime in their decline.

Even in dominant party states, ruling elites weakened political parties to the point that they were of limited use in either settling elite conflict or mobilizing effectively against the opposition. Egypt’s ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) had lost the organizational strength to control its slate in parliamentary elections, let alone to mobilize in defense of the regime. The same was largely true in Tunisia, where the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) was dissolved even before former regime loyalists were removed from power. Syrian and Yemeni ruling parties appear to play a greater role—at least in rubber-stamping regime offers of reform, but even there the party is not a primary locus of political struggle or defending the regime. Opposition parties, too, are of limited use in either averting or navigating crises. Indeed, even where agreements between opposition


patronage distribution, prompted the playing field led to declining often counterproductive; constraining opposition. However, such efforts were and limited seats that went to the field. To maintain elite cohesion and above, the regime narrowed the playing areas.10 Second, and partly in response to the political pressures discussed above, the regime narrowed the playing field. To maintain elite cohesion and undermine opposition forces, governing elites constrained parties’ participation and limited seats that went to the opposition. However, such efforts were often counterproductive; constraining the playing field led to declining participation, limited the reach of patronage distribution, prompted disaffection of political elites and at times the formation of broad boycott coalitions, and undermined legitimacy.11

The 2011 parliamentary elections in Egypt provide an excellent example of these dynamics. Anticipating the 2012 presidential elections, for which it was widely rumored Gamal Mubarak would be his father’s favored contender, Hosni Mubarak sought to ensure the legislative elections returned a docile parliament. The ruling circle was taking no chances that the Muslim Brotherhood would win a substantial number of seats, as it had in the 2005 elections. It thus harshly repressed the Brotherhood, manipulated first round elections to effectively shut out the opposition, and then ridiculed the opposition as it united first to boycott second round elections and then to form a shadow parliament.12 This ultimately contributed to Mubarak’s downfall in four ways: 1) manipulating the elections heightened antipathy toward the regime; 2) eliminating the Muslim Brotherhood from parliament made it more willing to join the opposition forces that mobilized in January; 3) repressing the opposition prompted coordinated efforts that served as a dress rehearsal for the uprising;13 and 4) responding flippantly to their efforts only escalated opposition to the regime.

Thus, elections in the Arab World were not a focal point for revolution (as they were for the Colored Revolutions of Eastern Europe), but they did provide a catalyst for the uprisings. Across the region, elections have become increasingly constrained, opposition parties frustrated by constraints have often boycotted in response, and citizens have remained skeptical about the entire exercise. By constraining the electoral playing field more tightly in an attempt to hold onto power, leaders unwittingly undermined their regimes.

Domestic political challenges coincided with a changing international environment.14 As Jason Brownlee and Joshua Stacher noted in the last newsletter, the Arab world may suggest a rethinking of the relationship between linkage and leverage. Yet while linkage may not create pressures for democratization, in a world of increasing communication, it may limit repression. Close ties with the West did not put pressure on Ben Ali and Mubarak to democratize, but they may have helped tie their hands in the face of increasing unrest. In contrast, one reason that regimes in Syria and Libya found it easier to fight their opponents so harshly has been that calls from the White House to refrain from using force are relatively inconsequential.

Ironically, at the same time as ties with the West (and particularly the US) may have constrained the regimes, it is likely that the apparently declining role of the US in the region encouraged the opposition. Floundering American Studies (forthcoming).

engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq suggested that the Americans were overextended and incapable of fully controlling events in the region. This expectation seemed confirmed as events in Egypt unfolded; despite early attempts to emphasize that Mubarak was a close ally and portray him as a dedicated reformer, the US lost the bid to contain unrest in the region. This does not explain events in Tunisia and Egypt, of course, but it did contribute to the spread of the uprising across the region.\(^{15}\)

**ECONOMIC REFORMS AND TRANSFORMATIONS**

Long-term economic transformations, closely linked to the political pressures discussed above, also contributed to the intifadah. They did so more than abject conditions or economic shocks. Indeed, GDP per capita (which is higher than that in Africa and South Asia and only slightly behind Latin America and East Asia) has been increasing steadily over the past two decades. Economic growth has not been limited to the oil-wealthy states; Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Sudan saw economic growth rates nearing 6 percent from 2005–2010, while Libya, Syria and Tunisia enjoyed 5 percent average growth.\(^{16}\)

The growth may have been spurred partly by economic reforms of the last two decades, which had earned many of these governments international kudos (Egypt and Tunisia were among the celebrated reformers). Yet, the neoliberal reforms followed an increasingly familiar path: autocratic elites, seeking to shore up their regimes, found in the reform process an “opportunity to transfer welfare responsibilities to the private sector, establish new patterns of patronage by favoring selected clients during bidding processes and privatization schemes, and enrich their military allies by granting them access to major businesses and investments.”\(^{17}\)

Thus, despite economic growth, popular dissatisfaction rose significantly. Several factors appear to explain this. First, despite the growth, in many cases economies had failed to rebound to pre-crisis levels. Second, and related, economic conditions thus failed to meet expectations, particularly for the ever-larger population of educated youth who sought to do not only as well, but better, than their parents had before them.\(^{18}\) As Davies noted long ago, it is the failure of conditions to meet rising expectations, rather than the conditions per se, that often generates unrest.\(^{19}\) Finally, the political insecurity of existing regimes increased elites’ incentives to funnel economic opportunities to their supporters, only exacerbating inequality. In countries such as Egypt, the little progress that had been made in the 1990s to reduce poverty, malnutrition and youth unemployment appears to have reversed.\(^{20}\) Reforms that enriched upper classes while failing to solve the problems facing the vast majority of citizens created a general outrage against inequality.


The result has been a gradual ratcheting up of protest against the regime, often in the form of strikes and demonstrations. Egypt saw 19 labor strikes in 2001 and 46 in 2005, which rose to 122 in 2008;\(^{21}\) Tunisia saw 380 strikes in 2001, 466 strikes in 2005, and 382 in 2007.\(^{22}\) Even Jordan, the relatively quiet, stable kingdom of less than 6 million citizens, witnessed at least 140 workers’ strikes in 2010.\(^{23}\) Egypt and Tunisia also witnessed increasing resistance from non-blue collar workers, in both rural and urban areas.\(^{24}\)

**RESHAPED OPPOSITION LANDSCAPES**

Another meso-level transformation fostering the Arab uprisings is found in the changing nature of civil society and social movements, more generally. Formal civil society organizations appeared to play a minor role in the uprisings. Unions, professional associations, and social movements (including most notably the Muslim Brotherhood) mobilized in Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen, but they were almost non-existent in Libya and Syria. This is not entirely surprising; many have questioned the necessarily transformative role that such organizations would play in challenging regimes and promoting the initiation of democratization.\(^{25}\)


25. See for examples, Amaney Jamal, Barriers to Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Francesco Cavatorta and Vincent Durac, Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World (New York: Routledge, 2010). David Lewis argues that formal NGOs often overstated their roles in transitions of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Philippe Schmitter suggests their roles may be
However, more gradual but transformative social changes took place, largely under the radar, which facilitated the uprisings. A growing network of activists engaged in new movements – at the national, international and, to a lesser extent, regional level. In many cases, they formed cross-ideological, fluid networks with little organizational structure or central leadership, and fluid, overlapping memberships. This helped to sustain the oppositions in spite of heavy-handed repression and also shifted the focus of contestation. As Maha Abdelrahman notes, “These activists have taken ‘politics’ outside the confined spaces of political parties and institutions which have time and again failed the masses. More significantly, they have been trying to re-appropriate political activism for the general masses from the clutch of professionals, or what della Porta calls the ‘emphasis of participation (versus bureaucratization), the attempt to construct values and identities (versus managing existing ones’).”

Technological advances facilitated this, but their role should not be exaggerated. Some have suggested that these technologies have fundamentally altered relationships between states and societies, and within societies as well, by widening the public space through which debates take place and demands are made, by giving activists tools by which they can link with each other and the outside world more effectively, and by creating a generation of youth who not only believe that they are smarter than their parents (as perhaps all youth do), but have also developed superior technological skills and thus shouldered new responsibilities for their parents. Others have argued that the role of technology is exaggerated – that it is used by a small percentage of the population, is as much a tool in the hands of regime elites as it is in the oppositions’. Possibly a more accurate position is that Facebook, Twitter, Al-Jazeera, cell phones, and other technologies contributed to gradual, changing dynamics of states and oppositions, but they are not responsible for the change. They are part of the symbiotic interchange of resources and skills between activists on the ground and bloggers, and then increasingly between the lower and middle classes, who brought their individual skills and tools together to challenge the regime.

An equally critical transformation was the gradual construction of bridges between Islamists and secularist oppositions, and the diminishing fear of the “Islamist threat.” The fear that emerged among many secularists (and was promoted by the regimes) was that Islamists would hijack a political opening by using elections to push a rigid theocratic agenda. “One person, one vote, one time” – echoing the fear that Islamists would use elections to create an Iranian-style Islamist theocracy—mobilized international and domestic support for the abrupt halt to the 1990 Algerian elections where the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) had been leading. This threw Algeria into a long, bloody civil war, also cooling enthusiasm for change.

Yet, in the past decade, fear of Islamists has diminished for several reasons. The radical jihadi movement lost some steam, while public opinion polls consistently showed that on many issues – including attitudes toward democracy –Islamists and secularists were not significantly different. Islamist parties were also given more room to participate in the political system in many cases (e.g., Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen) and Islamist-secularist coalitions have formed with increasing frequency and strength over a range of issues. Whether this contributed to the moderation of Islamists remains to be seen, but certainly these groups and their leaders became known entities, which diminished secularists’ fear.


As one Egyptian secularist activist noted shortly after the revolution, “We just got to know, trust and like each other, even—believe it or not—the Brothers.”

**BROADER LESSONS**

Exploring the political, economic and social micro- and meso-level transitions helps us understand how widespread uprisings emerged in 2011. The Arab awakening was not produced by dramatic shocks, but rather by gradual, interlinked, dynamic processes that produced small but significant changes. These existed at the levels of elites and average citizens, in what are often (but artificially) differentiated into political, economic and social realms. Together, they undermined existing regimes, bolstered opposition and eventually created a sea change in behaviors and beliefs across the region.

Importantly, the lessons from this discussion are not limited to understanding the Arab uprising, or “refo-lutions,” as Assef Bayat called them. We should pay renewed attention to the interlinked, micro- and meso-level transformations that often converge to affect fundamental change. This is not only true of events leading to rupture, but also should guide us as we study the continued reform in the Arab world, as well as when we address similar questions elsewhere.

The uncertainty and fluidity in the processes at hand should also caution us about studying political unrest, revolution, military coups, regime change and democratic transitions as separate types of events. Indeed, the on-going dispute over whether we are looking at uprisings, revolution, an awakening or an Arab Spring demonstrates how parsing them into separate categories to be studied independently may be misleading. There is no question that distinctions between the conditions of emerging transitions are important in affecting subsequent dynamics, as are the endpoints at which they arrive. Yet, we must guard against arbitrarily separating studies of protest, revolution and democratization—often driven by processes that are indistinguishable from each other—as if they are fundamentally different events.

Most importantly, we should adjust our expectations for the region today, and for democratization more broadly. The events at hand are part of long-term processes. The vast majority of authoritarian regimes that fall do not become democratic overnight; it usually takes a great deal of time and often several attempts for democracy to take root, when it does. Nevertheless, the uprisings do put in place new transformations which—as those before them—may alter coalitions, shape new expectations, create possibilities of further change, and potentially contribute to major shifts. If today’s efforts to create thriving democracy do not pan out in the near run, we should not be surprised. Neither, though, should we read it as an inherent contradiction between Arab, Muslim societies and democratic politics. Rather, we should turn our attention to the micro- and meso-level changes that will continue shaping political transformations in the region today.

Ellen Lust is an associate professor of political science at Yale University and an associate editor of the new journal, Middle East Law and Governance. She has published a number of books and articles, including Structuring Conflict in the Arab World (Cambridge University Press, 2005) and most recently The Middle East, an edited textbook (CQ Press, 2010). The author would like to thank I gratefully acknowledge Lisa Anderson, Emily Beaulieu, Eva Bellin, Michael Bernhard, Tabitha Decker, Rabab El-Mahdi, Amaney Jamal, Tarek Masoud, Stephen Ndegwa, Philippe Schmitter, Benjamin Smith, and Leo Villalon for insightful comments and assistance.

SURVEY EXPERIMENTS: WHAT THEY ARE, WHAT THEY CAN DO, AND WHY THEY ARE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT IN NEW DEMOCRACIES

Joshua Tucker
New York University

I have three goals for this essay. First, as the field of experimental political science continues to expand, I think it is increasingly important that we are clear what it is we actually mean when we label a form of analysis as an “experiment” and then further qualify that as either a lab, survey, or field experiment. Second – in line with the topic of this symposium – I make an argument about why survey experiments are a potentially valuable tool for the study of comparative politics generally and new democracies in particular. Finally, I discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the different methods of conducting survey experiments, namely the trade-offs involved between face-to-face paper and pencil interviews as opposed to internet-based surveying.

DEFINING SURVEY EXPERIMENTS

In a chapter for a edited volume on experiments that was written over a year ago but will probably appear in print after this newsletter, Ted Brader and I lay out a classification scheme for distinguishing laboratory, field, and survey experiments; in this section I both summarize and build on the arguments made in that chapter. To begin with, experiments include at least two critical features. First, researchers manipulate the extent to which participants are exposed to some potential causal factor (a “treatment”) in a controlled manner. In many experiments, some participants are not exposed to the variable of interest at all; these participants are commonly referred to as the “control group”. Second, researchers randomly assign participants to the treatment and control conditions. They do so to ensure, to the greatest extent possible, that participants are identical across conditions on all observed and unobserved variables other


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ANYBODY’S LUCK? NATURAL EXPERIMENTS IN DEMOCRATIZATION

Susan D. Hyde
Yale University

As scholars of democratization, we study many complicated relationships, and are familiar with problems of selection and endogeneity in our research. Yet like many other scholars, my work is driven by substantive interests that are informed by and related to real world problems. I choose my empirical methods after identifying research questions.

As many of us argue when giving advice, the research question should drive the method, and the method should not drive the research question.

Yet causal inference is, to much of the field, also a primary goal, and some methods have a better track record in establishing causal relationships than others. Although researchers often highlight the testing of causal relationship as an objective of their research, over and over again, they conclude that they cannot uncover the perfect empirical test (or the perfect identification strategy), and instead turn to empirical implications and methods that fall short of establishing a causal relationship. Of course, correlation can be interesting, and correlations combined with a persuasive discussion of why alternative explanations are inadequate are often the best we can do (and certainly the best I can do) in specific fields.

Other scholars have discussed these issues at length with greater expertise. My contribution to this newsletter is intended to be somewhat more personal. First, let me be clear that the majority of my research is not experimental. In my own work I have often wished for better ways to test my argument. In my large-n work, more clever identification strategies would have often helped, and in


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Field experiments have great potential to advance our knowledge of politics by allowing us to separate cause from effect in natural settings. For many scholars, however, the research method may seem daunting, due to the high costs involved in terms of time and money. Young scholars may feel especially deterred.

However, as experimentation becomes more common in the social sciences and policy evaluation, opportunities abound for political scientists to use previous experiments conducted by other scholars to study new outcomes. Such opportunities are plentiful for at least two reasons. First, much experimental social science has been pioneered by economists, leaving political questions understudied. And second, prominent funders of experimental impact evaluations in developing countries, such as the World Bank and regional development banks, are supposed to be “apolitical,” and are therefore constrained in their ability to study many political phenomena, including democratization. Thus, a large number of experiments have been completed that probably have hitherto unstudied political effects. In this essay, we aim to highlight the breadth of opportunity for secondary analyses of field and natural experiments, while also addressing some methodological and ethical challenges specific to conducting such research.

THE SECONDARY ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENTS
Secondary experimental analyses leverage previous randomizations to identify the effects of these interventions on new outcomes. They

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ETHICAL CHALLENGES OF EMBEDDED EXPERIMENTATION
Macartan Humphreys
Columbia University

Consider a dilemma. You are collaborating with an organization that is sponsoring ads to inform voters of corrupt practices by politicians in a random sample of constituencies. The campaign is typical of ones run by activist NGOs and no consent is sought among populations as to whether they wish to have the ads placed on billboards in their neighborhoods. You learn that another NGO is planning to run a similar campaign of its own in the same area. Worse (from a research perspective) the other organization would like to target “your” control areas so that they too can make an informed decision on their elected representatives. This would destroy your study, effectively turning it from a study of the effect of political information into a study of the differences in the effects of information interventions as administered by two different NGOs. The organizations ask you whether the new group should work in the control areas (even though it undermines the research) or instead quit altogether (and in doing so, protecting the research but possibly preventing needy populations from having access to important information on their representatives). What should you advise? Should you advise anything?

Consider a tougher dilemma. You are interested in the dynamics of coordination in protest groups. You are contacted by a section of the police that is charged with deploying water cannons to disperse protesters. The police are interested in the effectiveness of water cannons and want to partner with a researcher to advise on how to vary the use of water cannons for some random set of protest events (you could for example propose a design that reduces the use of water cannons in a subset of events and examine changes to group organization). As with the first dilemma there is clearly no intention to seek consent from the subjects—in this case the protesters—as to whether they want to be shot at. Should you partner with the police and advise them on the use of water cannons in order to learn about the behavior of non-consenting subjects?

These seem like impossible choices. But choices of this form arise regularly in the context of a mode of “embedded” experimentation that has gained prominence in recent years in which experimental research is appended

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Comparative Democratization

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EXPERIMENTAL TURN IN THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIZATION
Ana L. De La O
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Our understanding of the determinants of democratic consolidation remains incomplete. The third and fourth waves of democratization have shown that elections in young democracies are rife with corruption, inscrutable candidates, disengaged voters and, most tragically, violence. While some countries exhibit rapid progress in the consolidation of the basic components of a democracy, such as free and fair elections, freedom of speech, and an active press, other countries are trapped in vicious cycles. As the field progresses toward a richer understanding of these social and political phenomena, experimentation—where subjects (or units) of analysis are randomly assigned to different treatments—becomes an attractive research tool. Experimental work that takes place in naturally occurring settings shares many of the well-known advantages of field research. Its added value is that it allows researchers to circumvent common challenges to causal inference such as simultaneity, reverse causality, unobserved selection patterns and measurement error. Thus, experimentation complements the tool kit available to researchers to shed light on the factors that promote or hinder the development of democracy.

Experimentation in the field of democratization has taken several forms: the increasingly popular field experiments that take place in a naturally occurring setting; laboratory experiments and laboratory-in-the-field experiments; survey experiments, which involve an intervention delivered by means of an opinion survey; and, finally, natural experiments, where interventions of interest are assigned at random, not by researchers, but by other agencies. Throughout this essay, I review a range of ongoing and published work that illustrates how experimentation in its various forms has made important contributions to the field. I start by describing recent work on the relationship between institutions and democracy that gets around the everlasting problem of institutional endogenity by randomizing at the sub-national level different mechanisms of representation. Then, I review work on clientelism, violence during elections, and accountability that addresses problems of reverse causality and measurement error via experimentation. Finally, I present work that uses

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than the treatment. Thus, experiments allow researchers to draw conclusions about the causal effect of variables without worrying about endogeneity and selection bias.

Three general types of experiments are particularly prevalent in political science. In laboratory experiments, subjects interact with members of the research team and sometimes one another, typically in a pre-set location—quite often an actual dedicated “lab” space—and as a consequence often know that they are part of a study. Lab experiments afford researchers tight control over what happens during the experiments. Moreover, in most lab experiments participants receive compensation, both for participating and sometimes based on their choices during the experiments.

In contrast, a key feature of field experiments is that subjects participate in the experiment as part of their natural environment. These are experiments introduced into actual political or social processes: treatments are the real actions of citizens, groups, or governments, and effects are assessed in terms of actual behaviors or other outcomes of interest. In many cases, such as get out the vote experiments, participants are never even aware that they are part of a study at all; treatments are simply introduced into their environment (e.g., a post-card in the mail) and actions (e.g. voting) can be observed from public records. In other cases, a survey may be employed to measure the dependent variable in question, in which case respondents may be aware of the fact that they are part of a study, but not at the time during which the treatment was administered. When ethical and logistical barriers can be overcome, field experiments offer an unrivaled opportunity to observe treatment effects in a natural environment.

Survey experiments, in turn, lie somewhere between these two options. These are experiments embedded in surveys and manipulations typically consist of slight alterations in the wording or order of questions or response options. Indeed, survey experiments have been used to improve survey design itself, though political scientists also use similar research designs to mimic public debate or other
elements of the political process. 2

Table 1 provides a concise comparative summary of some of the more important characteristics of each type of experiment.

As Brader and I note, survey experiments have a number of strengths that make them attractive research tools for political scientists:3 First, they allow us to situate our experiments in studies of the broader public, where it is possible to use scientific sampling procedures to produce a representative sample of either the general population or else particular subpopulations of interest. Second, by embedding experiments within surveys, we can also collect a rich collection of covariates which we can use to monitor the effects of our experiment across (or controlling for) different individual level characteristics. Third, the prevalence of professional survey organizations the world over is making it easier and easier to administer survey experiments in an increasingly wider variety of contexts. Closely related to this point is the fact that the startup costs of adding a survey experiment to an already-planned or regular survey are relatively low compared to many other forms of research, a point I return to in the final section of this essay. Economies of scale can also drive down the costs of survey experiments by allowing multiple researchers to draw on a single survey. The Timesharing Experiments in the Social Sciences (TESS) program in the United States is an excellent example of such a program.4 While we lack something analogous outside of the United States, it is possible to imagine comparative international survey programs such as the World Values Survey or the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems someday opening up space for experiments. Finally, though survey respondents are aware that they are participating in a study, they typically do not face the same "unnatural" environment as a computer lab -- most survey respondents are answering questions in their own home or online -- nor are they usually even aware that an experimental condition is being manipulated. Indeed subjects in survey experiments are more likely to believe that the interviewer is merely interested in their opinion and the treatment manipulations should seem like just another inconspicuous part of the interview.

My first point boils down to the following: survey experiments can be feasibly implemented by just about any researcher in any context. Survey experiments do not require a random sample. Of course the external validity of the study will be greater if a wider cross-section of the population participates in the study, but as long as participants are randomly assigned to the treatment and control groups, we can make inferences about causal validity. (As an aside, this points out one particularly useful way to employ survey experiments, which is to test the direction of the causal arrows from correlational relationships we already know exist across a large population (ie., have external validity) based on pre-existing surveys. Thus the survey that someone else may have carried out can supply the external validity, while your survey experiment -- on some subsection of the population -- can provide evidence about the direction of the causal effect.) Similarly, survey experiments require many fewer respondents than traditional survey analysis. In many cases, as few as 50 respondents per treatment can provide enough power to provide conclusive evidence. Taken together, this means that survey experiments can be conducted for much, much lower costs than representative national surveys of 2,000 respondents. Costs can be contained in the thousands of dollars as opposed to tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands. Indeed, with the advent of Amazon's Mechanical Turk (https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome), survey experiments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant Awareness?</th>
<th>Lab</th>
<th>Survey</th>
<th>Field</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control over Procedures?</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample Resembles Population?</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artificiality of Environment?</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to Monitor Behavior</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table also appears in Brader and Tucker 2011.
can now even be conducted for hundreds of dollars. This means that graduate students armed with NSF dissertation improvement grants can conduct survey experiments as easily as well funded faculty. It also means that survey experiments can be used by faculty from universities (and countries) where less research funding is available. Moreover, researchers who are really hard pressed for funding can, with enough time, recruit their own subjects and administer the instrument themselves.

At the same time, survey experiments do not require nearly the investment in infrastructure as do lab experiments. These days, most lab experiments involve the use of computers; many involve the use of dedicated computer labs. Even for lab experiments that simply rely on paper and pencil, there is still the need to establish a physical "lab" where games can be played. Field experiments may not require dedicated equipment, but often involve costs in terms of both money and time related to introducing stimuli into the environment. Again, by comparison, the startup cost of a survey experiment is much lower.

But the advantages of survey experiments in new democracies go beyond mere logistical concerns. In addition to the standard advantages of experimental analyses in isolating causal factors, survey experiments can offer ways around other research challenges; here I highlight a particular useful feature of survey experiments for the comparative study of democratizing countries. Often in new democracies we are interested in testing the viability/importance of concepts from more established democracies. Unfortunately, in many cases we then face the question of whether these concepts actually mean the same things in different countries. Partisanship is a good example. We have observational measures of partisanship on surveys that are carried out cross-nationally – such as the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) – but do we really know if “are you close to party” is identifying the same phenomenon in different countries and contexts? For examples, the CSES indicates that Hungary has as many self-proclaimed partisans as the U.S. (78% vs. 79%), while Slovaks claim stronger party ties than either the Germans or Dutch. Now this may actually turn out to be the case, but we really have no way of knowing whether these conclusions are warranted simply on the basis of observational data.

Survey experiments, however, offer us a way around this dilemma. If we think, for example, that one effect of partisanship is that respondents should be more likely to support a policy position endorsed by their party, then we can conduct survey experiments to see whether this effect is as prevalent in one country as another. Moreover, we can also study whether the effect is correspondingly more prevalent among self-proclaimed partisans in each country. This is exactly what Brader and I do in a forthcoming Comparative Politics article. We examine the effects of party cues on public opinion formation using survey experiments that we conducted in Great Britain, Hungary, and Poland. As expected, we find that these effects are strongest in Great Britain, the most established democracy of the three. However, we also find a substantial difference in the strength of party cues on public opinion formation in Hungary, the post-communist country with the most stable (at the time of our experiments) party system, and Poland, where the party system essentially imploded in 2001. In fact, the results of our experiments in Hungary actually looked more similar to the experiments in Great Britain than those we conducted in Poland, thus suggesting that the development of strong partisanship effects may take years or decades as opposed to generations. More importantly from the standpoint of this essay, we are able to get away from merely self-reported measures of partisanship to actual measures of the strength of partisanship through the use of survey experiments.

DESIGNING SURVEY EXPERIMENTS: FACE-TO-FACE VS. INTERNET SURVEYS

In the final section of this essay I turn to a more logistical question. While a newsletter symposium is of course not the appropriate forum for the myriad of issues that go into designing a successful political sciences experiment, I want to take this opportunity to highlight one particular issue involved in the construction of survey experiments, which is the mode of the survey itself. In Table 2, I lay out a number of the trade-offs between employing face-to-face surveys (usually prohibitively expensive in established democracies, but still the dominant mode of survey analysis in many democratizing countries) versus employing internet based surveys (spreading throughout democratizing countries faster than you think!). I leave phone-based surveys – quite popular in established democracies – out of the discussion because my sense is that in new democracies – at least in the countries I have studied – we are moving from face-to-face interviews straight to internet polling without the intermediary step of phone-based polling. For those

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7. For an excellent treatment of this topic, see Rebecca Morton and Kenneth C. Williams, Experimental Political Science and the Study of Causality (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

8. For example, firms such as YouGov (www.yougov.com) offer internet-based surveys in many Middle Eastern and Northern African countries; it is also possible to conduct internet-based surveys in many post-communist countries now as well; Brader and I are preparing to field one in Bulgaria as I write this.
Tucker

**Table 2—Face to Face vs. Internet Modes of Survey Experiments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Internet</th>
<th>Face to Face</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experimental Manipulations</td>
<td>Easy</td>
<td>More complicated without CAPI*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control over Procedures</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of Video, Pictures</td>
<td>Always Easy</td>
<td>Difficult w/o CAPI*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum Length of Survey</td>
<td>Shorter</td>
<td>Longer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coverage</td>
<td>More focused (\rightarrow) cost ↑</td>
<td>More coverage (\rightarrow) cost ↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative Samples</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Per Subject Cost</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Higher</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*CAPI = computer assisted personal interviewing; this involves an interviewer with some sort of portable computer

interested in phone based surveys, though, they for the most part have the same advantages and disadvantages as the face to face surveys, with the notable exception that it is impossible to employ any visual cues (e.g., video, pictures, cards) and the experimenter has less control over procedures.

Face-to-face surveys offer three major benefits to researchers. First, they allow the maximum amount of control over procedures that can be attained in a survey format. For example, if you want to know how long someone spends looking at a card, having someone in the room watching them while they look at the card is the gold standard. Second, face-to-face surveys can contain a large number of questions. While there are always costs to having someone focus on the same task for extended periods of time, having an interviewer in the room with the respondent is a fairly good guarantee that the respondent will stay focused on the task at hand, and face-to-face interviews are often as long as an hour or even more. Finally, face-to-face interviews are compatible with selecting a highly representative sample. There is no better way to track down a randomly selected respondent then to have a person go out and find that person in their home.

The downside of face-to-face surveys is that they tend to be expensive. To the extent that labor is the most costly part of the endeavor, each additional respondent is likely to be just as expensive as the previous one. Moreover, you will likely need to pay more for greater geographical coverage. Face-to-face surveys employing pencil and pen technology (i.e., an interviewer asking questions and writing down respondents’ responses) also creates additional complications for survey experiments due to the need to randomly assign respondents to treatment groups. While it is theoretically possible to design a survey questionnaire with multiple versions of questions and then roll a die to determine which question to ask each respondent as the interviewer comes to it, the reality of the matter is that logistical concerns will usually push you to just create different survey instruments and then randomly distribute the different instruments to the interviewers. This in turn creates two complications. First, every experimental manipulation you want to include in your study increases the number of instruments you need multiplicatively.

So, for example, if you have a single 2x2 experiment, you need four versions of your instrument. However, if you add a second 2x2 experiment, you actually need 16 versions of your instrument. And if you then want to add one more 2x1 experiment, you will suddenly need 32 versions of your instrument. Moreover, if you have hired a survey firm, then you also face a compliance issue in ensuring that whomever you are paying to do your polling for you actually is distributing the instruments randomly to interviewers. And again, the more versions of your instrument you have, the more logistically complicated it is to make sure they are randomly distributed. The bottom line is that pen and paper face-to-face experiments severely constrain the number of experiments you can carry out in a given survey. Moreover, this format also constrains the content of the experiments you can carry out, most specifically by making it much harder to use video and media in your experiments.

Internet-based surveys, in contrast, make the random assignment of respondents to treatment groups relatively simple (provided you are working with a firm that employs quality software). This in turn allows you to include as many experiments as you want in a given study (or at least as many as you think are theoretically, as opposed to technically, feasible). Internet-based surveys also make it much easier to use video or pictures in your experiments. Furthermore, the additional per subject cost of internet surveys is likely to be much lower than for face-to-face surveys, because most of the work is in the design of the instrument as opposed to its administration (although this is not likely to be the case if you are recruiting your own subjects for the study through something like Facebook). Interestingly, it has been my experience that what internet survey firm charge more for is getting more focused groups (e.g., 24-35 year old male engineers) than for more subjects generally. While higher prices for
targeted demographics may be a problem for consumer marketing firms, it is much less likely to be a concern for political scientists, and therefore this actually works to our advantage.

Internet-based surveys, of course, also have their drawbacks. One is simply that it is much harder to control what subjects are doing when they are filling out your survey. So for example, if you are trying to gauge the effect of supplying information about a particular policy issue on public opinion formation, you really don’t know if your respondent has decided to flip over to a local news website and get more information about the issue on her own. In a closely related vein, internet surveys usually also need to be shorter (30 minutes at the most, from my experience), precisely because the longer they are, the more likely the respondent is to just stop taking the survey. Internet-based surveys also are much less likely to provide you with a truly representative sample – at least for now – because not everyone has equal access to the internet. That being said, it is again worth emphasizing that representative samples are in fact much less important for survey experiments than they are for surveys generally. As long as subjects are randomly assigned to the control and treatment groups, inferences about causality do not depend on the use of a random sample. 9 Remember, most lab experiments in political science rely solely on university students, so a cross-section of even the portion of the population with internet access is still likely to be a valuable step forward in that regard.

* * *

Taken together, survey experiments offer researchers in the study of democratization a powerful, cost-effective tool. They can easily be added to existing surveys

9. Although of course claims of external validity still will.

Hyde, continued (continued from page 9)

my case study work, I wish circumstances would have allowed me to exercise more rigorous control. At this point in the field of comparative democratization, multiple methods, including but not limited to natural experiments, allow researchers to more completely understand and evaluate their research topics.

I was invited to contribute to this newsletter in part because I have been fortunate to stumble upon a natural experiment in my own work on international election observation, which became one of my first publications and the foundation for opportunities to also engage in field experimentation. This study is published in World Politics as “The Observer Effect in International Politics: Evidence from a Natural Experiment.”2

ADVENTURES IN FINDING A NATURAL EXPERIMENT

Since I began presenting this study as a working paper, one question came up over and over again. How did I find it? Or, how does one go about identifying a natural experiment? In this article I will describe the process I went through to “find” this project and what I learned along the way about how I (and others) might look for similar experiments in the future. There are a number of other excellent studies that also use natural experimental methods in related areas,3 and Thad Dunning provides two thoughtful overviews of many of these studies, so I do not repeat his efforts here.4 Instead, I focus on the process of identifying my own natural experiment.


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on election day, then observed polling stations should be equivalent to unobserved polling stations, and any difference should be attributable to the presence of observers. Because election fraud conducted on the day of the election should increase the vote share of the candidate conducting the fraud, differences in election results can be used to test for an observer effect on fraud. Using data from the 2003 presidential elections in Armenia, the article shows that observers reduced election-day fraud at the polling stations they visited. The unusual advantage of experiment-like conditions for this study offered unique causal evidence that international actors can have direct, measurable effects on the level of election-day fraud and, by extension, on the democratization process.

This project is referred to as a “natural” experiment because I did not supervise the randomization process, but the process by which observers were assigned to polling stations was very close to random assignment, and highly unlikely to be correlated with the outcomes of interest in any meaningful way.

The as-if randomization that is the foundation of a natural experiment is not always obvious, and may be difficult to document. The degree to which a natural experiment approximates true randomization is related to the degree to which the relationship can be perceived as causal. How can a researcher know that an event in a real-world setting approximates randomization?

The first step for any researcher who suspects the assignment of a variable could approximate randomization would be to document all available information about the process by which the “treatment” variable, or the independent variable of interest, was assigned to the relevant units in the study. Sometimes natural experiments involve actual lotteries or meticulously documented randomization, as in the Bhavnani (2009) study cited above. In other cases, the as-if randomization is not intentional, but results from what might be termed accidental or inadvertent randomization. Once as-if randomization is suspected (and documented in a persuasive manner), a researcher should attempt to confirm the as-if randomization by examining background covariates. If the “treatment” and “control” groups created by the natural experiment are in fact differentiated by a randomized process, then the two groups should be statistically equivalent across other covariates that should not be influenced by the treatment.

How did I find a natural experiment? As the title of this piece suggests, luck had something to do with it, but does not tell the entire story. I began studying the global diffusion of international election observation while I was a graduate student at the University of California, San Diego. This work started as a paper for a course, grew into the seminar paper required for qualifying exams, and eventually became my dissertation prospectus. I thought I had a nice empirical puzzle focused on the fact that many sovereign leaders were inviting international election observers and cheating in front of them. The topic also fit nicely with my existing research interests in how international actors influence domestic politics.

Yet when presenting this work to my professors and fellow graduate students, I quickly ran into a persistent problem. What if election observation is costless to all types of leaders? What if the answer to my puzzle was simply that the decision to invite international election observers was entirely inconsequential?

It is difficult to answer this question with cross-national evidence. I can show that elections that are observed are likely to be more competitive than those that are not, but I cannot show that this difference is caused by international observers. Clean elections that are clean because they were internationally observed are observationally equivalent to clean elections that would have been clean regardless of the presence of international observers. It is also difficult to evaluate whether leaders are more likely to invite observers when they know they are not going to commit election fraud.

So, in the course of preparing my dissertation prospectus, I was left with a problem that I initially found intractable: how could I evaluate whether election observation “mattered” in a way that would be persuasive to skeptical political scientists? How could I test whether election observation was costly to governments that tried to manipulate their elections?

After weeks of despairing and normal graduate student stress, one of my dissertation committee members asked me how observers are assigned to polling stations. I promptly documented that as of 2003, they are usually not randomly assigned to polling stations. I began calling and emailing observer organizations to ask whether they had ever tried random assignment, and if not, whether they could tell me exactly how they chose which polling stations were visited on election day. For the most part, I was ignored. Some individuals who wrote me back told me to go read their organization’s website, where, of course, I reconfirmed that this information was not documented. Extremely helpful individuals at several organizations, especially the National Democratic Institute and the Carter Center, confirmed that they did not recall cases in which they had randomly assigned international observers.

After speaking to a number of observers and reading individual accounts of observation missions, it is clear that the method of assigning observers to polling stations varied enormously within most missions, and establishing any kind of pattern would be extremely difficult.

At this point, I was not looking for a natural experiment. I was simply hoping to find a mission in which observers had
been assigned in a manner that was clearly documented, and not left up to every individual team of observers to make up as they went along. I could then learn something about the likely direction of the bias produced by the selection of polling stations, and perhaps still learn something about the effects of observers. I was also on the lookout for cases that possessed two other necessary conditions: detailed polling-station level election results, and blatant election day fraud.

This is where the luck came in. After many cold calls, many ignored emails, and several helpful conversations with election observation professionals who gave me contact information for still other election observation professionals, I found “my” natural experiment. A senior official from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) responded positively to one of my emails pleading for a detailed description of how their missions selected polling stations on election day. He put me in touch with one of their statisticians, who suggested the Armenia case.

Before long, it was clear that the 2003 presidential elections in Armenia were relatively unique in terms of how the short term observers were assigned to polling stations. Checks on background covariates confirmed the equivalence of the experimental groups. The case also met my other criteria: the 2003 presidential elections were extremely fraudulent by all accounts and the government had posted precinct-level election results on the election commission’s website, which I promptly downloaded. Much to my surprise, my new contact at the OSCE/ODIHR had suggested a case that would turn out to be much more than I had hoped. Although the OSCE/ODIHR mission did not assign observers using an explicit randomization process, the method that the delegation employed would have been highly unlikely to produce a list of assigned polling stations that were systematically different from the polling stations that observers were not assigned to visit. Each team’s assigned list was selected arbitrarily from a complete list of polling stations. I confirmed that those making the lists did not possess information about polling station attributes that would have allowed them to choose polling stations according to criteria that could have predicted voting patterns.

The entire process took about four months, beginning with my initial investigation into how observers were assigned to polling stations, and including the collection of the precinct level election results. Although at the time success seemed impossible, it now seems like time well spent.

**GENERAL LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

What did I learn from this process for future natural experiments? For other scholars interested in the use of natural experiments in the field of comparative democratization, I can highlight six related lessons.

First, do not start with a method in search of a topic. I started with a research question that I found to be interesting, and I think this was the reason why I was able to identify a natural experiment that was substantively interesting to a broader audience. Had I not started with a topic that I found substantively interesting, I’m not sure I would have had the motivation to persist in looking for sub-national evidence for so long, and it would have been highly unlikely that I would have uncovered this opportunity for a natural experimental study.

Second, most natural experiments are not labeled as such. The payoff for keeping one’s eyes open for such opportunities may be huge in terms of causal inference, but I do not expect any future natural experiments to fall into my lap. I was looking for the best method I could identify given my research question, and ended up with something better. I now frequently see graduate students dismissing research topics that they find interesting in part because they cannot immediately think of an outstanding research design. I acknowledge that my experience may be unusual, but it does demonstrate that the research design can be uncovered long after the question.

Third, luck has something to do with it, but so does perseverance. I was often frustrated, and had I not spent weeks pestering many individuals, I would not have found this natural experiment. In addition, the natural experiment later gave me the opportunity to conduct my first field experiment in the same substantive area.

Fourth, the interesting thing about experiments, and one of their central advantages, is that they sometimes yield surprising results. One piece of the story that I omitted above is that I (foolishly) waited for months before analyzing the Armenian data because I was afraid that it would prove my skeptics right, and support the thesis that election monitoring was useless. When I finally analyzed it, I could hardly believe my eyes. The results of the natural experiment in Armenia were all the more satisfying without the lingering uncertainty about the results due to problems that I normally face in large-N cross-national research. Unlike many other forms of research, experimental evidence can reveal relationships that the researcher was not looking for, and sometimes these relationships can lead to other interesting research questions.

Fifth, even if a treatment variable in a natural experiment is identified, outcome variables (dependent variables) may also be difficult to obtain. Many scholars conducting field experiments focus on surveys to measure behavioral or attitudinal change, but in the case of natural experiments, the intervention has usually already happened, and finding the necessary data can be difficult. Elections results are, in my view,
underexploited as outcome variables, as many variables that are hypothesized to influence democratization may be reflected in election results, and disaggregated election results are increasingly available. The advantage of election results is that they are collected for an entire country, they are usually made available for free, and in some countries election results are reported by gender, which may be of theoretical interest to some democratization scholars.

Election results can serve as proxies for other problems. For example, areas in which election results are never reported may point to other problems with government capacity. Other possible outcome measures are proliferating as data collection becomes easier. The most clear cut example is the crowd-sourced reports of election violence or other citizen complaints about democracy.\(^5\) These measures should be used with caution, particularly when citizens may have the incentive to misrepresent the information they are reporting, but they still offer much potential.

Finally, my experience underscored the idea that natural experiments exist in areas where they are not always obvious, and they can be used to study questions that researchers in comparative democratization find interesting. Future natural experiments are more likely to be useful to the field if scholars first pursue research that is substantively interesting, but keep their eyes out for things that could have been introduced to the world in a manner that approximates randomization.

In the field of comparative democratization, explicit efforts by actors to influence democratization, for better or worse, are areas in which natural experiments might already exist. I suspect that all natural experiments will involve some attempt to change politics, so if a scholar is interested in explaining stability rather than in explaining change, I have difficulty imagining many likely natural experiments. International involvement in democracy promotion is one of these possible areas for field experiments, as it already represents a clear form of intervention intended to bring about improvement in specified areas of democratization. Any natural experiment will require detailed knowledge of specific cases, but it is possible that a number of interventions by democracy promoters have already happened in a near-random manner. There are a number of possibilities that I can think of, but that I have not investigated, and should therefore be taken with a grain of salt. For example, information (about electoral reforms, candidate quality, candidate behavior, how to participate in politics, new laws, increased enforcement of existing laws, etc.) is often phased in across a country by domestic or international actors in a way that could approximate randomization. Sometimes the effect of information may be the area of interest. In other cases, citizen knowledge about information could act as a substitute for the effects of the actual change. The allocation of funding for various programs attempting to encourage democratization may use a formula based on perceived need or some other criteria. To the extent that these criteria are clearly defined, opportunities for natural experimental designs (perhaps including regression discontinuity) may exist. Documenting the small details of specific programs is crucial.

Experiments (natural and field) may be more likely to involve subnational, rather than cross-national evidence. Natural experiments may therefore best address one component or one implication of a more general research question. Additionally, ideas for field experiments and ideas for natural experiments can be cross-fertilizing. If a researcher has an idea for a field experiment, a related natural experiment may have already taken place, and could be less expensive. Thus, starting with a research question, scholars interested in looking for a natural experiment might begin by visualizing how one aspect of their research question could be studied with a field experiment, and then investigate how potential treatment variables have been assigned within cases of interest. Discussing such ideas with practitioners in the field of democracy promotion or bureaucrats within a specific country may also be fruitful, as they are often the individuals that are best equipped to comment on the details of specific policy interventions across a relatively large number of countries.

All of these recommendations are made cautiously, as I am well aware that I have only been lucky enough to identify one natural experiment. In the future, I look forward to seeing how creative scholars are able to identify other natural experiments, ideally combined with other methods, in order to advance the study of comparative democratization.

\textit{Susan D. Hyde is an assistant professor of political science and international affairs at Yale University. Her research focuses on evaluating how international actors bring about change in other countries, particularly in the developing world.}
require the secondary scholar to collect data on new outcomes for the original treatment and control groups. While randomization by others is the defining characteristic of secondary analyses, such analyses are also typified by a time lag between the intervention and the new analysis, and by the fact that an outcome that was not of direct interest to the original investigators is usually being examined.

One of the first examples of this type of research was conducted by Joshua Angrist, who took advantage of the Vietnam draft lottery to study the effects of military service on lifetime earnings. Robert Erikson and Laura Stoker have also used these draft numbers to study the impact of draft vulnerability on political attitudes. In another example of this type of study, Rachel Sondheimer and Donald Green used randomized educational programs implemented by policy makers in the United States to estimate the impact of education on voter turnout.

Scholars who study democratization increasingly have opportunities to conduct secondary analyses of experiments. In our own research, we have used previous experiments to identify the effects of interventions on representation and accountability in new democracies. Rikhil took advantage of a policy experiment in India—in which the government decided to “reserve” randomly chosen seats in local legislatures for women—to identify the effects of reservations on support for female candidates after reservations were removed. Kate has used the randomized evaluation of a NGO’s activities in Ghana to estimate the impact of service provision by NGOs on electoral support for incumbent politicians. Another contributor to this symposium, Ana De la O, exploited an experiment in which the Mexican government randomized communities that received PROGRESA, its largest anti-poverty program, to examine the effect of social spending on support for the incumbent.

All of these studies are secondary experimental analyses in so far as the researchers took advantage of pre-existing randomized interventions conducted by other scholars or policy makers. Secondary analyses include both “downstream” experiments (which, per Green and Gerber, use the original randomized variable as an instrument to identify the effect of the original outcome on another variable of interest) and analyses that consider the direct effect of the original treatment on new outcome variables.

In general, there are two reasons why programs may have been randomized. The first is for reasons of fairness. In cases where it is not possible to distribute a benefit (or a cost) to all, randomization avoids discrimination by giving everyone the same chance of being chosen. This was the rationale for drafting men to Natural Experiment, American Political Science Review 103 (February 2009): 23-35.

5. This is research-in-progress, and is being conducted in conjunction with Dean Karlan and Christopher Udry.
7. For the article that coined the term “downstream” experiments, see Donald Green and Alan Gerber, “The Downstream Benefits of Experimentation,” Political Analysis 10 (November 2002): 394-402. There are some analytic issues specific to analyzing “downstream experiments” related to instrumental variable estimation, which we do not discuss in this essay. For a review, see Rachel Milstein Sondheimer, “Analyzing the Downstream Effects of Randomized Experiments,” in Druckman, J.N., D.P. Green, J.H. Kuklinski, and A. Lupia, (eds) Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science (New York:Cambridge University Press, 2011).
8. President Johnson stated in a special message to Congress prior to the establishment of the Vietnam draft, “The paramount problem remains to determine who shall be selected for induction out of the many who are available... I have concluded that the only method which approaches complete fairness is to establish a Fair and Impartial Random (FAIR) system of selection which will determine the order of call for all equally eligible men.” Quoted in Stephen E. Fienberg, “Randomization and Social Affairs: The 1970 Draft Lottery,” Science 171 (Jan 22, 1971): 255-261.
CHALLENGES OF CONDUCTING SECONDARY EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSES

While secondary analyses of experiments are a new and exciting frontier for research, they are subject to a number of challenges. Some of these challenges are shared by experimental analyses in general (including compliance and spillover problems) and are well-covered in standard texts. We limit ourselves to discussing challenges that are particular to (or particularly large when) conducting secondary analyses of pre-existing randomizations.

Matching Social Scientific Questions and Randomizations

A first challenge for the scholar interested in conducting a secondary analysis of an experiment is to find a pre-existing randomization that speaks to a social scientific question in which they are interested. Unlike scholars conducting primary analyses of experiments, who generally develop their experiment to answer specific questions, researchers doing secondary analyses may stumble upon a randomized intervention before they have clearly articulated their research question of interest, or they may start with a research question but then find only an imperfect match between the pre-existing experiments that exist and their ability to answer that question. In either case, a clear question that speaks to theoretical debates needs to be fashioned. This is the first order of business, and demands creativity.

Once a new question has been matched to a randomized intervention, scholars have to ensure that the randomization is valid. Doing so entails investigating the integrity of the original randomization (did people see the lottery occur?), and inquiring whether the resulting treatment and control groups really are, in fact, balanced in terms of pre-treatment covariates.10 While the original research may have reported balance on the pre-treatment covariates most pertinent to the initial experiment, the switch to a new outcome measure in secondary analyses will typically suggest new pre-treatment covariates on which to check for balance. Care also needs to be taken to understand the degree to which actions in the intervening period affect the original randomization. Panel attrition poses a well-known threat to randomization, but so do new interventions explicitly conditioned on the original intervention. Studies of the effect of randomized military deployment, for example, will have difficulty separating the effects of military deployment from the effects of receiving veterans health care, because the two interventions are “bundled.” One way around this is to reframe the paper as investigating the effect of the bundle of interventions (in this example, military service and veterans health care), or, even more honestly (since we oftentimes do not know the entire contents of the “bundle”), as the effect of the original lottery itself (the Vietnam draft).

Lastly, scholars should consider the statistical power of the original intervention to identify effects on the new outcome of interest. The effects of the randomized variable on the new outcome may be anticipated to be smaller or larger than the effects in the initial study, and so the statistical power of the study to identify the relevant effect size is likely to be different.

Collecting Information on the Randomization Scheme

A second major difficulty for scholars hoping to conduct a secondary analysis of an experiment is to collect details on the randomization. Scholars need to know the probability of each unit receiving the treatment and the treatment each unit was actually assigned. When there are problems of non-compliance (which might be greater as the time lag between the original intervention and the new outcome being measured increases), details on compliance will also need to be collected.

In Rikhil’s study, this was facilitated by the fact that every electoral district had an equal probability of being selected to be reserved for women. Having documented this, he also needed to retrieve information on which electoral districts elected female candidates with and without reservations. The situation is more complicated in randomized evaluations where the probability of receiving treatment varies across different communities, in which case this will need to be documented and accounted for in the analysis.

In some cases, confidentiality agreements employed by the original studies may prevent the primary researcher from sharing the randomization scheme. Sharing data may be easier if the scholar conducting the secondary analysis contacts the individuals responsible for the original study before it is complete. In Kate’s case, she contacted the scholars conducting the initial experiment early on, and they were able to submit a proposal to the Institutional Review Board (IRB) indicating certain data would be shared with her.

Accessing the randomization scheme is likely to be particularly tricky when the initial treatment is randomized at the individual level for fear of breach of confidentiality. It is noteworthy that in the case of the Vietnam draft lottery, secondary analysis has only been possible because randomization was not truly at the individual level. Instead, participants were called by randomly chosen birthdates that are publicly available.

There are some exceptional cases where scholars have been able to obtain data on individual-level assignment from organizations. Program administrators may be willing to share this data if the secondary researcher signs an agreement...
not to contact the participants and to keep the participants’ information confidential. For example, Rachel Sondheimer and Donald Green were given information on the names and treatment assignment of participants in two educational experiments in the United States after signing confidentiality agreements. They were then able to match participants’ names to public voting records. In situations where information on the outcome variable is available for the entire population from which the original sample was drawn, another solution is to have the original investigator merge the data file containing the new outcome with the data file containing participants’ names and assignment information. However, confidentiality concerns often make secondary analyses of individual-level randomizations impossible.

Measuring Outcomes
Another challenge is to measure the outcome(s) of interest in the secondary analysis. Given the time lag between the original experiment and the secondary analysis, this often takes significant leg work. For example, in order to conduct their study of the impact of educational experiments from the 1960s and 1980s on voter turnout in 2000, 2002 and 2004, Rachel Sondheimer and Donald Green did “years of detective work tracking down the subjects in these studies.”

Furthermore, oftentimes the outcome in which the scholar conducting the secondary analysis is interested is measured in a different unit than the unit of randomization. For example, in Ana De La O’s study of the electoral impact of PROGRESA, the randomization was conducted at the village level, but her outcome of interest – support for the incumbent – was available only at the polling precinct level. Kate has faced similar difficulties in analyzing the effects of NGO activities on electoral results in Ghana.

The difficulties here are greater than figuring out how the units at which randomization occurred and those at which secondary outcomes are observed line up with each other, which by itself is often a time-intensive undertaking. The problem is that treatment and control units in the secondary study may not be “balanced,” because this was not the level at which randomization occurred. For example, in Ana De La O’s study, all of the villages in the PROGRESA experiment had the same probability of being part of the treatment group. However, the polling precincts – the units at which election results were observed – contained different numbers of villages in the PROGRESA experiment (most contained one village from the PROGRESA study, but some contained two) and different numbers of non-experimental villages. Thus, the probability of a polling precinct being exposed to different treatment doses differed depending on the number of experimental villages in the precinct. Furthermore, the inclusion of villages not included in the original PROGRESA study potentially created imbalance across the secondary units.

At least two solutions to the imperfect overlap problem are possible. First, one could use surveys to collect data on the secondary outcomes at the level at which the treatment was randomized. However, this will not always be possible (or perhaps even desirable for some types of data, given recall biases). An alternative solution would be to take into account the characteristics of the secondary units that condition their probability of exposure to the treatment. Researchers could

In conclusion, scholars need to do a great deal of work to match previous experiments to unexplored social scientific questions, to collect data on the randomization scheme, and to measure the new outcomes. In general, this will be easier where the previous experiments under consideration have been recently administered and randomized at the group level. The final section of this essay discusses steps primary researchers can take to facilitate subsequent secondary analysis of their experiments, while also highlighting the responsibilities of secondary analysts to maintain the integrity of the primary scholar’s research design.

NORMS OF EXPERIMENT SHARING
Experimental interventions change the histories of treated individuals and communities. As a result, just as no individual or organization monopolizes the right to conduct studies in a particular community, no individual or organization monopolizes the right to conduct research that uses the randomization to identify an effect. In order for the academic community to maximize the returns from experiments, it needs to develop norms of experiment sharing.
There are a number of steps primary scholars can take to facilitate the subsequent use of their experiments to identify secondary effects. First, they can register their research designs with organizations such as the Experiments in Politics and Governance (EGAP) network and publicize their results even if they are not statistically significant, activities that are good practice for multiple reasons. The registration of experiments would help scholars setting up secondary analyses, since it would provide them with centralized databases of experiments from which to start their search. This would be particularly useful in flagging studies that are usually hard to find, including ones in-progress, and those that have not been published, perhaps because the primary results were not “surprising” or the effects on the initial outcome were not sufficiently large.16

In addition, primary scholars should consider the potential value of their experiment to future researchers when applying for IRB clearances, and following up with respondents. For example, scholars generally stop tracking compliance with their interventions once they have finished measuring the primary outcome of interest; however, their experiment will be of greater value to future researchers the longer they document this. In addition, researchers seeking IRB approval for their research might promise to keep all data confidential in the hopes that this will result in faster approval. But promises to remove all identifiers before publishing the data make the research less valuable to future scholars. In particular, the benefits of the research to the academic community will be greater if the randomization scheme can be shared.

Secondary scholars also have a responsibility to ensure that their analyses do not interfere with the primary experimentalists’ goals. The primary researchers will typically have invested considerable time and resources into their experiment. In order to avoid undermining the primary analysis, scholars conducting secondary analyses of experiments should start by informing the primary researcher of their proposed research, and sending them a full set of protocols. It is important for the two researchers to discuss at length any risks the second study poses to the initial experimental analysis.

If the primary researchers are contacted while their data collection is still on-going, they may be open to collaborating with the secondary analyst to study the second outcome. Collaboration mitigates the risk the primary scholar has accepted by investing their time and research funds in the randomized intervention, because it provides additional opportunities for publication based on the experiment. The possibility for co-authorship with secondary analysts gives primary scholars incentives to implement their data collection in a way that facilitates further analysis. Collaboration also allows primary and secondary researchers to pool resources, which might permit both sets of scholars to collect more information than either could on their own. In our own experience, scholars are often receptive to collaborating in this way, so long as the secondary project is well-specified and does not interfere with the primary analysis. If collaboration is out of the question, the secondary analyst will typically have to wait until the primary researchers’ data collection is complete before embarking on their project.

Eventually, it may make sense to establish a formal organization to regulate the sharing of experiments. But for now, we hope that with good sense and mutual respect, young scholars can cooperate with established academics to take advantage of the exciting opportunities for secondary analysis created by the completion of earlier generations of field experiments.

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to independent interventions by governments, politicians, NGOs, or others, sometimes with large humanitarian consequences.

The particular problem here is that the researcher is taking actions that may have major, direct, and possibly adverse effects on the lives of others. As discussed below, in these embedded field experiments, these actions are often taken without the consent of subjects; a situation which greatly magnifies the ethical difficulties.

In this essay I discuss the merits and demerits of “embedded” experimentation of this form that is undertaken without subject consent. I compare the approach to one in which researchers create and control interventions that have research as their primary purpose and in which consent may be more easily attained (in the terminology of Harrison and List these two approaches correspond broadly to the “natural field experiment” and the “framed field experiment” approach).

The issues that arise from the embedded approach are multiple and complex and extend well beyond what is generally covered by Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) that provide a form of ethical approval for research. They are also practical questions and my discussion here should be read as the sometimes pained reflections of a researcher knee deep in these issues rather than as the considered views of a moral philosopher. The view from the trenches is quite grim in that the core questions demand answers but still seem to me largely unanswered and unanswerable.

I try to do five things in this essay. In section 1 I seek to clarify the advantages and disadvantages of embedded field experiments. While embedded field experiments introduce ethical complexities, there may also be strong ethical reasons for employing them.

In section 2, I argue that common permissive arguments (specifically arguments based on scarcity and ignorance) that embedded field experiments do no harm are often not plausible. Not only do these experiments often involve risks of harm (as well as benefits), they may do so in ways that are beyond the purview of institutional review boards. I argue that in such cases researchers need to be able to argue for substantive benefits from the research that can trade off against risk if they are to satisfy a beneficence test. Of course, unless basic knowledge trades off against welfare in this calculation, the beneficence criterion, as usually applied, then places limits on what questions can be addressed using experimental interventions. I highlight that while there are often good reasons to expect important benefits from such research, in general this calculation is difficult because of the lack of a shared value metric.

In section 3, I articulate an argument—which I call the “spheres of ethics” argument—that provides grounds for collaborating in partnerships in which subjects are exposed to risks to an extent not normally admissible in research communities. The basic idea of the spheres of ethics argument is that if the intervention is ethical for implementing agencies with respect to the ethical standards of their sphere—which may differ from those of researchers—and if those agents are ethically autonomous from researchers, then responsibility may be divided between researchers and implementers, with research ethics standards applied to research components and partner standards applied to manipulations. The argument in favor of the approach is simple and strong, though thoroughly utilitarian: if the intervention may be implemented ethically by the implementer, and if the intervention with a research component is at least as good as the intervention without, then the implementation with the research component is ethical also, even if, when undertaken by researchers alone, it violates ethical standards of the research community. In the water cannon example above, the argument would be that if a police force is employing water cannons anyway, it is arguably better to know what their effects are and this might in turn justify a partnership in which the researcher is learning from the behavior of human subjects without their consent. I highlight two prior questions to be addressed if this argument is to be employed—partner autonomy and partner legitimacy. Without partner autonomy (for example if the researcher is also the de facto implementer wearing a different hat), there is a risk that the spheres of ethics argument could simply be used to bypass standards of the research community. Without partner legitimacy the spheres of ethics argument could be used to justify the kinds of experimentation that research ethics were specifically intended to prevent. Despite the attractiveness of the argument, I note that the spheres of ethics argument is incomplete insofar as addressing partner legitimacy requires a solution to the metaethical problem: that researchers have grounds to deem that actions that are ethical for the partner’s sphere of action are indeed ethical.

In section 4, I consider other implications of the requirement of beneficence for researchers conducting embedded experiments including implications for relations with partners and the fact that if beneficence is claimed on the basis of the value of learning from the research, this adds an ethical imperative to the professional imperative to produce high quality research.

Finally, adopting the view that ethical principles are constructed by and for
Humphreys

communities I use the opportunity here to introduce a set of guidelines that have been recently proposed and endorsed by the Experiments in Governance and Politics (EGAP) network of researchers; while they do not provide answers to the deeper questions they do provide some sort of benchmark for worried researchers.  

In what follows, in order to make progress in thinking about research ethics, I try insofar as I can to sidestep the metaethical problem of why one should take ethics seriously or on what basis one can even begin to claim that one action is more ethical than another. Instead I simply assume that researchers subscribe to the family of principles described in the Belmont report and in particular that they seek to respect the broad (if somewhat crudely defined) principles of beneficence, respect for persons, and justice as described in that report. We will see, however, that for some purposes—in particular the employment of a partner legitimacy test—the attempt to sidestep these issues fails.

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST EMBEDDED EXPERIMENTS

Let us begin with a description of the kinds of experiments of interest. Embedded experiments are experiments in which researchers form partnerships with other agents who introduce random variation into their projects to allow researchers to learn about the effects of the interventions. Often these experiments are “natural field experiments” in the sense described by Levitt and List:

“Natural field experiments are those experiments completed in cases where the environment is such that the subjects naturally undertake these tasks and where the subjects do not know that they are participants in an experiment. Therefore, they neither know that they are being randomized into treatment nor that their behavior is subsequently scrutinized. Such an exercise is important in that it represents an approach that combines the most attractive elements of the lab and naturally-occurring data: randomization and realism.”

In many political science applications the naturalism arises from the fact that the intervention is implemented by a political actor—a government, an NGO, a development agency. In these cases especially, the term “randomized control trials” can be misleading since often the research only exists because of the intervention rather than the other way round. There are now many such field experiments of this form in the area of the political economy of development. This approach can be contrasted with a “framed field experiment” in which the intervention is established by researchers for the purpose of addressing a research question and done in a way in which participants know that they are part of a research experiment.

In practice, of course, the distinction between these two types of experiment is not always clear. An intervention may be established for non-research reasons, but varied for research reasons; an implementing organization may in practice be dependent on researchers, in which case researchers may be the de facto designers. A framed experiment may be implemented without knowledge of subjects and of course many experiments implemented by third parties may be undertaken with knowledge of participants that they are part of an experiment. In what follows, however, I focus on the particular problems that are manifest when both of the characteristics above are present, that is, on embedded natural field experiments that are implemented by a third party without informed consent.

Arguments for Embedded Natural Field Experiments

There are a number of benefits of the embedded natural field experimental approach relative to the framed experiment.

First there is an internal validity benefit to the fact that participants do not know that they are in an experiment – specifically the removal of Hawthorne effects. Second, there may also be an external validity benefit from the fact that the researcher did not determine many elements of the design but that these are set at levels determined “by nature”—at least insofar as the natural levels are more likely to be representative of the population of interest. Moreover, the removal of randomization biases arising from individuals refusing to take part in a study allows less problematic assessments of population effects. Third there are enabling benefits in that this form of experimentation may not be possible for researchers without partnerships. Partnerships may reduce costs and allow operation at a scale that is not normally feasible for researchers establishing their own interventions. Moreover, as in the watercannon example, partners may be able to implement manipulations that would be illegal for researchers. Fourth, there may also be epistemological benefits from the fact that the intervention is not just like the class of environments of interest, but that it may in fact be an environment of interest; that one might not just learn about elections in general but also be able to address questions about particular elections of importance.
Finally, there is a positive and a permissive ethical reason for employing natural field experiments. The positive ethical argument is a strong one: that interventions—especially those with major consequences—should be informed by the most reliable evidence and not understanding the effects of these interventions is a failing. The permissive ethical argument (which I return to below) is that, unlike framed field experiments, the interventions in question may happen anyway, independent of research, and that interventions that are accompanied by research that allow us to assess their impacts are surely better than interventions that are not.

**Arguments Against Embedded Natural Field Experiments**

Before noting the ethical concerns of natural field experiments, it is worth noting two other problems. The first is that these experiments may be risky for researchers (in that interventions may collapse or variations introduced in ways that are beyond the control of researchers); the second is that compromises in control may be considerable (resulting in variations that are either too complex or too modest to produce findings of significance).

The ethical complexities arise from the fact that experiments of this form risk violating all three of the ethical principles described in the Belmont report: beneficence, respect for persons, and justice; and they often do so without informed consent.

In a way, the lack of consent is the crux of the matter. A benefit of the principle of consent is that it instantiates respect for persons, but it also results in a sharing of responsibility with subjects, which is especially important when the benefits of an intervention is in doubt. But for many natural field experiments informed consent may be very incomplete. Informed consent is routinely sought for measurement purposes, for example when survey data is collected. It is sometimes sought at least implicitly for interventions, although individual subjects may often not be consulted on whether for example they are to be exposed to particular ads or whether a school is to be built in their town. But consent is often not sought for participation in the experiment per se, for example subjects are often not informed that they were randomly assigned to receive (or not receive) a treatment for research purposes, nor, often, is there a debriefing afterwards. The common absence of consent makes the question of beneficence especially difficult for researchers because the responsibility for determining beneficence cannot be shared with subjects.

Evidently, if informed consent is possible in the context of a natural field experiment, it should be employed as this would mitigate many of the concerns raised here. However there are at least three arguments for why consent might not be sought in natural field experiments. The first is that the intervention is naturally occurring the need for consent is obviated. For example, if in the normal course of events a politician airs a variety of ads on the radio that a voter might listen to, then a systematic altering of which ads are aired when, operates within the sphere of activities to which the subject has implicitly consented. The second is that because the intervention is naturally occurring an attempt to gain consent would be especially damaging. In the last example it is precisely because listening to the ad is a routine event that preceding the ad with an announcement that the ad is being aired to understand such and such an effect will have particularly adverse consequences. A third, more difficult reason, is that the withholding of consent may not be within the rights of the subjects. Consider for example a case where a police force seeks to understand the effects of patrols on reducing crime; the force could argue that the consent of possible criminals (the subjects in this case) is not required for the force to decide where to place police. This third argument is the most challenging here since it highlights the fact that consent is not even notionally required by all actors for all interventions, even if it is generally always required of researchers for subjects.

**ESTABLISHING BENEFICENCE IN EMBEDDED NATURAL FIELD EXPERIMENTS**

Researchers are often advised that manipulations should “do no harm” (note, not no net harm, but no harm at all). Two arguments are commonly used for why randomized assignment does no harm. The _scarcity argument_ is that randomized assignment takes place in the context of scarcity and so randomization only affects _which_ individuals of a set of equally deserving individuals are allocated benefits _not how many_. Moreover in such settings a random assignment is an _ex ante_ equitable way of assigning scarce resources. The _ignorance argument_ is that _ex ante_ it is often not known whether a treatment is beneficial or not, indeed establishing this may be the purpose of the research in the first place.

But neither of these arguments holds up nearly so well in practice as in theory. The scarcity argument runs into problems when there are low marginal costs – such as interventions that provide information of various forms. It also comes under stress when goods are divisible. For example a cash allocation of $100 per person may be optimal from a beneficence perspective, but to generate stronger effects, a $200 allocation to half as many beneficiaries may be optimal from a design perspective. Factorial designs in which some subjects receive multiple benefits while others receive none seem also to give the lie to the scarcity argument. Moreover the idea that all individuals are equally needy is something of a fiction in many actual settings. Finally the introduction of randomization may itself increase scarcity.
For example, if an allocation of benefits as determined by a randomization scheme is more expensive to deliver than that from a purposive scheme.

The ignorance argument is also often hard to defend. While it is certainly true that we in general cannot be certain whether a given treatment is beneficial or not, we nevertheless generally have prior beliefs, and in the context of many natural field experiments, the prior beliefs, at least on the side of implementing organizations, are often very strong.6

In practice then we generally cannot claim that experiments do no harm, even if this is sometimes the case. This does not mean however that they do not do more good than harm; or conversely, it may still be that although they may do harm, not doing them may do more harm than good. The problem here is that while the “do no harm principle,” being a negative injunction, is compelling at first blush, it is exceptionally restrictive. Almost all research carries some imaginable risk of harm; we are always in a world of tradeoffs, measuring risks against possible benefits.7 Thus researchers may often need to make a more direct case for possible benefits and not just absence of harm.

This brings us to the first question for researchers:

Q 1 The beneficence test: Is there value in answering the research question and can that value trade off against harm?

6. In some variants ignorance arguments focus on the uncertainty of the researcher, on others on the uncertainty of the research community. In some statements the requirement is that there should be some uncertainty about which treatment is best—a condition which is generically satisfied in social science settings; in other statements the condition is that there should be exact indirection—a condition that is generically not satisfied if researchers have informative priors. See Freedman, B. “Equipoise and the ethics of clinical research.” The New England Journal of Medicine, 317 (July 1987):141-145.
things be arranged such that the ethical responsibility for embedded experiments can be shared with partners?

Above I assumed heroically that there is basic agreement among researchers about appropriate standards of research. Say now, still more heroically, that there are other standards of behavior for other actors in other spheres that are also generally accepted. For NGOs, for example, we might think of the INGO Accountability Charter; for governments we might think of international treaty obligations. One might think of these ethical principles in different spheres as stemming from a single theory of ethics, or as simply the possibly incompatible principles adopted by different communities. In either case, these different standards may specify different behaviors for different actors. Thus, for example, a researcher interviewing a genocidaire in Rwanda should inform the prisoner of the purpose of the questioning and stop questioning when asked by the subject; a government interrogator could act ethically and ignore such principles, even if other behavior, such as torture, is eschewed. Here the ethical constraints on the researcher seem stronger; but there may be stronger incompatibilities if constraints are not nested. For example, a researcher may think it unethical to give over information about a subject suspected of criminal activities while a government official may think it unethical not to.

For the spheres of ethics argument, the question then is whose ethical principles to follow when there are collaborations? One possibility is to adhere to the most stringent principle of the partners. Thus researchers working in partnerships with governments may expect governments to follow principles of research ethics when engaging with subjects. In some situations, discussed below, this may be a fruitful approach. But as a general principle it suffers from two flaws. The first is that in making these requirements the researcher is altering the behavior of partners in ways that may limit their effectiveness; this runs counter to the goal of reducing the extent of manipulation. The second is that, as noted above, the constraints may be non-nested: the ethical position for a government may be to prosecute a criminal; but the researcher wants to minimize harm to subjects. In practice this might rule out appending research components to interventions that would have happened without the researcher and that are ethical from the perspective of implementers; it could for example stymie the use of experimental approaches to study a large range of government strategies without any gain, and possibly some loss, to affected populations.

An alternative approach is to divide responsibilities: to make implementers responsible for implementation and researchers responsible for the research. The principle of allocating responsibility of implementation to partners may then be justified on the grounds that in the absence of researchers, partners would be implementing (or, more weakly, that they could implement) such interventions anyhow and are capable of bearing ethical responsibility for the interventions outside of the research context.

As a practical matter researchers can do this in an underhand way by advising on interventions qua consultants and then returning to analyze data qua researchers; or by setting up an NGO to implement an intervention qua activist and then return for the data qua researcher. But this approach risks creating a backdoor to simply avoiding researcher responsibilities altogether.

Instead, by appealing to spheres of ethics, researchers collaborating with autonomous partners can do something like this in a transparent way by formally dividing responsibility. Although researchers play a role in the design of interventions it may still be possible to draw a line between responsibility for design and responsibility for implementation. Here, responsibility is understood not in the causal sense of who contributed to the intervention, but formally as who shoulders moral and legal responsibility for the intervention. Researchers hoping to employ such an argument need to be able to answer Question 2:

Q.2 Is there clarity over who is ethically responsible for the intervention?

The first of five principles endorsed by the EGAP network addresses this question:

**Principle 1:** [...] In cases in which researchers are engaged alongside practitioners, an agreement should state which party, if either, has primary responsibility for the intervention. Researchers should disclose the role that they play in the design of interventions implemented by practitioners or third parties.

There are two critical difficulties with the spheres of ethics approach however. The first is the autonomy concern: that in practice implementers may not be so autonomous from the researchers, in which case the argument may simply serve as a cover for avoiding researcher responsibilities. The second is deeper: the argument is incomplete insofar as it depends on an unanswered metaethical question: it requires that the researcher have grounds to deem actions that are ethical from the partner’s perspective are indeed ethical—perhaps in terms of content or on the grounds of the process used by partners to construct them. This is the partner legitimacy concern. A researcher adopting a spheres of ethics argument may reasonably be challenged for endorsing or benefitting from weak ethical standards of partners. Indeed a version of this argument could otherwise serve as ammunition for doctors participating in medical experimentation in partnership with the Nazi government.
Given the incompleteness, researchers may still seek to use design to ensure beneficence even if responsibility for the intervention is borne by a partner. Design choices have implications for beneficence. For example in cases where selection effects may not be strong but there is clear variation in need or merit, a regression discontinuity design may be better than a fully randomized design. In some cases variation on the upside rather than on the downside of treatments may improve participant beneficence (for example in the water cannon case, variation in the use of cannons can be introduced by reducing the use of water cannons rather than increasing it; the former would be less harmful for subjects, but perhaps more harmful for third parties).

The question for researchers then is:

**Q 3 Have variations that reduce risks and costs to subjects been examined?**

The question is especially salient at a time when the recognition given to randomized experimentation in the discipline may provide professional incentives for researchers to employ it beyond what is merited by the problem at hand.

**BENEFICENCE BEYOND HUMAN SUBJECTS**

Embedded field experiments raise a set of ethical questions around partner relations and research results that factor into beneficence calculations but that are not present in other approaches and are not covered by standard Institutional Review Board considerations. Broadly these process concerns stem from extending the Belmont principles for subjects to partners and to users of research findings.

**Partner Matters**

Engaging in field experimentation can be very costly for partners. And if they do not have a full understanding of the research design, partners can sometimes be convinced to do things they should not. On various points of design, partners and researchers may have divergent interests.

One of these is with respect to statistical power. For a partner, an underpowered study can mean costly investments that result in ambiguous findings. Underpowered studies are in general a problem for researchers too with the difference that they can still be beneficial if their findings can be incorporated into metaanalyses. Researchers may also be more willing to accept underpowered studies if they are less risk averse than partners and if they discount the costs of the interventions. Thus, to account for global beneficence researchers need to establish some form of informed consent with partners and address the question.

**Q 4 Do your partners really understand the limitations and the costs of an experiment?**

Sharing (and explaining) statistical power calculations is one way of ensuring understanding. Another is to generate “mock” tables of results in advance so that partners can see exactly what is being tested and how those tests will be interpreted.  

A second concern relates to the researchers’ independence from partners. The concern is simply that in the social sciences, as in medical sciences, partnering induces pressures on researchers to produce results that make the partner happy. These concerns relate to the credibility of results, a problem I return to below. The problems are especially obvious when researchers receive remuneration but they apply more generally and may put at risk the quality of the research.

**Q 5 Can you demonstrate independence of the research from the implementation?**

The third and fifth principles endorsed by the EGAP group propose guidelines for ensuring and demonstrating independence.

**Principle 3: Rights to Review and**

**Publish Findings.** In collaborations between researchers and practitioners it should be agreed in advance, and not contingent upon findings, what findings and data can be used for publication. In cases in which such agreement is not made in advance, and unconditional on findings, this fact should be noted in publications.

**Principle 5: Remuneration.**

Researchers should normally not receive remuneration from project implementers whose projects such issues are studying. In cases in which researchers receive remuneration from such agencies, this fact should be disclosed in footnotes to publications.

**Users: Quality of Research Findings**

Finally, part of the consideration of beneficence involves an assessment of the quality of the work and the lessons that can be drawn from it. If an argument in favor of a research design is that the lessons from the research produces positive effects, for example by providing answers to normatively important questions, then an assessment of beneficence requires an expectation that the design is capable of generating credible results.

There are clearly many aspects to the quality of research but here I would like to point to one area in which basic standards are not at present being met. The question for researchers is:

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8. We used this approach in our Congo study. See: http://cu-csds.org/2011/03/drc-design-instruments-and-mock-report/.

9. This line of reasoning is contestable, although it appears important to claim beneficence. Arguably researchers should not be in the business of trying to estimate the outcome costs and benefits of the impact of their work beyond the participation and process costs and benefits. Thus for example the injunction to go where the truth leads scorns such weighing of costs and benefits, on the optimistic presumption that the truth is in league with the good. (For a classic articulation see Thomas Jefferson on the University of Virginia: “This institution will be based on the illimitable freedom of the human mind. For here we are not afraid to follow truth wherever it may lead, nor to tolerate any error so long as reason is left free to combat it.” Cited in Andrew Lipscomb and Albert E. Bergh, eds. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson. Washington, D.C.: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association of the United States, 1903-04. 20 vols.
Two EGAP principles seek to address these concerns:

**Principle 2:** Transparency: To maintain transparency and limit bias in reporting, researchers should seek to register research designs, hypotheses and tests in advance of data collection and analysis. In presentation of findings, researchers should distinguish between analyses that were planned ex ante and those that were conceptualized ex post.

**Principle 4:** Publication of Data: In collaborations between researchers and practitioners, researchers and practitioners should agree in advance that data used for analysis will be made publicly available (subject to masking of identifiable information) for replication purposes within a specified time period after data collection.

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Q 6 Are you really testing what you say you are testing?

The question seems obvious but in fact post hoc analysis is still the norm in much of political science and economics. It is almost impossible to find a registered design of any experiment in the political economy of development (for an exception see the work of Casey and colleagues on Sierra Leone10). This raises the serious concern that results are selected based on their significance, with serious implications for bias.11 It is obvious but worth stating that research designs that create risks cannot claim beneficence on the basis of their potential findings when those findings are not credible.

For the political information problem, the first option, in which the research is essentially abandoned may seem ethically the most defensible option. It seems most faithful to the injunction to do no harm. This is the option that I and my colleagues have advised when confronted with problems like this in the past. But I am not sure that we were always right to do so: sacrificing the research in this way may not be ethically the best option. It effectively assumes that the research is of no ethical import, which, if true, puts the ethical justifiability of the original research plan in question. The second option brings direct costs to populations of a form not covered by normal human subjects considerations. Done without their consent however the principles of beneficence and justice normally suggest that this option would require that the lessons from the research plausibly produce effects that are commensurable with these costs; a hard calculation. The comparison of options then requires a calculation for which researchers are unlikely to have defensible metrics.

The second dilemma turns out to involve many similar considerations. In this case the research could not legally be implemented as a framed experiment, or without a partnership with government. The problem here however is not that the proposed modification reduces benefits to subjects—indeed under some designs it may reduce risks—but that even with these reductions, the collaboration involves learning from harmful manipulations to subjects that are undertaken without their consent. It is unlikely that the researcher can make a simple argument for beneficence for subjects in this case; even if there are benefits, these may accrue entirely to government and not to the subjects. The researcher might however employ a spheres of ethics argument in this case; but, assuming autonomy of government, engaging in the partnership shifts focus to the prior, and unanswered, question of the basis for the legitimacy of the police to decide whether to take actions of this form in the first place.

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**CONCLUSION**

Are we now in a better position to face the dilemmas I introduced at the beginning of this essay? I think both dilemmas remain hard but that the considerations here help focus on the key issues. The difficulty in both dilemmas is that design decisions have impacts on the lives of populations but the exposure of populations to different treatments is done without their consent. In both cases however there may be grounds for employing a spheres of ethics argument to justify researcher participation. This refocuses attention on the issues of partner autonomy—which may be especially important in the first case—and partner legitimacy—which may be especially important in the second.

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experiments to disentangle the causal mechanism behind established correlations such as that between ethnic diversity and the low provision of public goods. Hopefully, this selection of studies shows how, more than evaluating correlations, experimentation can help us rethink core assumptions and mechanisms that are central to our theories. The essay concludes with a brief discussion of the challenges I consider most pressing for the next round of experiments.

**INSTITUTIONS: CAUSES OR SYMPTOMS?**

A vast literature addresses the role of national-level institutions in the consolidation of democracy. Yet few studies question whether institutions are causes or symptoms of democratic development. The challenge to establish institutions as first order causes rests on the complex, and to some extent unobserved, process that characterizes institutional formation. Typically, cross national studies compare countries with similar demographics but with different institutions. The limitation of this approach is that variables unobserved by the researcher may lead countries to have both superior institutions and a consolidated democracy, in which case democracy is the result of those pre-existing differences across countries, not institutions. Recent studies that analyze randomly produced sub-national variation reveal that institutions are consequential only under some conditions.

For example, Olken explores the effects of plebiscites and community meetings on the type and location of infrastructure projects selected by villagers in Indonesia. All villages in the experiment followed the same agenda-setting process to propose two infrastructure projects – one determined by the village as a whole, and another decided only by women. The experiment randomly assigned villages to make the final decision regarding the projects either through a meeting or through a plebiscite. The results of the experiment paint a mixed picture. Whether there was a meeting or a plebiscite had little impact on the type or location of projects chosen by all villagers. However, the plebiscites led more of the women’s projects to be located in poorer areas of a village. Yet elites still influenced the type of project selected by women since the experiment left agenda setting unchanged.

Chattopadhyay and Duflo’s study of the quota system for women’s political participation and the provision of public goods in India is another example of the use of sub-national exogenous variation to study the effect of institutions. The natural experiment was facilitated by the 73rd Amendment, which required that one-third of Village Council leadership positions be randomly reserved for women. Chattopadhyay and Duflo find that the quota system effectively increased the number of women serving as chief in local village councils. In turn, having a female chief translated into substantive representation since female leaders invest more in goods that are relevant to the needs of local women.

Using a similar setup as Chattopadhyay and Duflo, Bhavnani explores whether randomly assigned quotas for women have an effect on women’s chances of winning elections even after a seat is no longer reserved. The study shows that the probability of a woman winning office in constituencies where the seat was reserved for women in the previous election is five times higher than the chance of a woman winning office in a district where the seat was not previously reserved for women. Bhavnani suggests that this effect is explained by parties’ experience of having women competing and winning elections. The evidence in these three studies partly confirms that institutions such as plebiscites or quota systems are consequential. Furthermore, classic claims of representative democracy, such as the relevance of the identity of representatives, hold true after experimental investigation. At the same time, however, experimentation shows that under some circumstances institutional change is not enough to reverse political inequalities.

**CLIENTELISM AND VIOLENCE**

Ideally, in a consolidated democracy, parties find ways to aggregate the preferences of their supporters (i.e. they create a platform) and they invest in party infrastructure. These two investments create the necessary conditions for programmatic linkages between parties and voters. In reality, however, clientelism is prevalent among young democracies. Despite great progress in our understanding of how politicians allocate their clientelist efforts, three questions remain unanswered. The first is related to the measurement of clientelism. Numerous qualitative studies portray clientelism as pervasive; however, surveys have consistently found little evidence of vote buying. Second, most studies assume that clientelism is effective, but we are far from understanding under which conditions institutional change is not enough to reverse political inequalities.
conditions this is actually the case. The third question relates to clientelism’s demise. If exchanging votes for cash and favors is as effective as most of the literature suggest, why do we see parties moving away from such a successful strategy? Experimentation has shed light on these three questions.

Behind the divergent assessment of the prevalence of clientelism lies a measurement problem that is more prominent in surveys. Trading votes for cash is illegal in most countries. Therefore, survey respondents are likely to underreport their participation in vote buying. Measurement error can mask the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of clientelism. Nickerson and coauthors conducted a survey-based list experiment to measure the frequency of vote buying in the 2008 Nicaraguan municipal elections. The innovation in the measurement is that the list experiment grants respondents a certain degree of anonymity when reporting vote buying. All respondents were provided with a list of activities and asked how many activities were carried out by parties during the elections. The control group was given a list of four activities, including typical campaign activities such as hanging posters, visiting homes, and placing advertisements in the media, as well as not-so-typical activities, such as making threats. The treatment group was given the same list, with the additional activity of vote buying. Then, respondents reported how many activities they witnessed but did not specify which. The proportion of respondents receiving a gift or favor in exchange for their vote was then measured as the difference in responses between the treatment and the control groups. The list experiment reveals substantively more vote buying than responses to typical questions about clientelistic practices.

In addition to the measurement problem, our understanding of clientelism has been hindered by the circular relationship between patrons’ disbursements and clients’ electoral behavior. Wantchekon’s study in Benin is an example of a field experiment conducted in collaboration with actual candidates to assess the effectiveness of clientelism. In the 2001 presidential election, villages were randomly selected to be exposed to purely clientelist or purely public policy platforms. The evidence in this experiment confirms that clientelism is a winning electoral strategy, but it also shows that clientelist appeals reinforce ethnic voting (not the other way around). The contribution of the randomized intervention in this context is to disentangle the circularity between clientelism and voters’ choices.

Regarding the question about the demise of clientelism, it is puzzling that under some circumstances we see parties move away from clientelism towards programmatic politics. A possible explanation for this transition is that some programmatic policies are also effective at fostering incumbents’ support. For example, recent studies suggest that conditional cash transfers (CCT) – an increasingly popular poverty relief strategy whereby cash transfers to the poor are contingent upon investments in children’s health and education — improve the electoral performance of federal incumbents.

The challenge, however, to uncover CCT’s pro-incumbent effects is that in countries where vote buying and clientelism are prevalent incumbent parties could allocate program benefits using unobserved electoral criteria that compromise causal inference.

To circumvent these inference problems, I reexamined the effects of the Mexican CCT program by taking advantage of the program’s randomized component originally designed by program officials in collaboration with the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) to evaluate program effects on schooling and health. The original experiment randomly assigned 320 villages to receive program benefits in September 1998 and 186 villages in January 2000. By the 2000 presidential election, villages in the early and late treatment groups had been enrolled in the program for twenty-one and six months, respectively. The exogenous variation in the duration of program enrollment together with aggregate data at the voting precinct level reveals that longer exposure to the Mexican CCT benefits led to substantive increases in turnout and incumbent vote share. The experimental data also shows that opposition parties were unaffected by longer exposure to program benefits. Thus, these results provide evidence of the Mexican CCT’s mobilizing effects in the 2000 election, which contrast with the conclusions of previous work that suggests that CCT persuade recipients to vote for a party different from their preferred choice.
The experiment also helps elucidate the mechanism behind CCT’s influence on elections. Since benefits were randomly assigned, the differences in the incumbent’s electoral performance cannot be attributed to a manipulation of program resources. Moreover, since all households in the experiment received program benefits, it is unlikely that CCT’s effects are explained by common clientelist practices, such as threats of program discontinuation. Instead, the experimental evidence suggests that CCT’s mobilizing effects are compatible with retrospective voting because longer exposure to program benefits led to an overall improvement in recipients’ well being.

Beyond clientelism, experimentation has shed light on other facets of elections. For example, Collier and Vicente’s study explores the use of violence in the 2007 election in Nigeria. In collaboration with an international NGO, they randomized a campaign against the use of violence. Their study shows that the campaign substantively decreased violence. Surprisingly, however, they find that turnout and incumbent vote share increased in the locations where the campaign took place. These findings suggest that violence as an electoral strategy is mostly perpetrated by weak challengers, and may not be particularly effective.

ACCOUNTABILITY AND CORRUPTION
Theorization of the importance of alternative sources of information for the consolidation of democracy has a long tradition. However, only recently has there been some empirical testing of this conjecture. The evidence thus far is encouraging. For instance, researchers have found that media promotes government responsiveness and contains opportunistic behavior in India. Similarly, there are instances where information prevents widespread theft of public resources. The growing literature on the role of information is cognizant of potential problems of inference that arise because granting access to information is ultimately a governmental choice, thus a correlation between access to information and better governance could reflect that these two outcomes are jointly determined. Fortunately, research that seeks to understand the effects of information on democratization is amenable to experimentation.

Ferraz and Finan make use of a natural experiment to study the effects of the disclosure of corruption on incumbents’ electoral performance in Brazil’s 2004 municipal elections. The research design takes advantage of Brazil’s anticorruption program, whereby the federal government randomly selects municipal governments to be audited on their use of federal funds. To promote transparency, the outcomes of these audits are disseminated publicly. A comparison of the reelection rates of mayors audited before and after the 2004 elections shows that, conditional on the level of corruption exposed by the audit, incumbents audited before the election fared worse than incumbents audited after the election, particularly among municipalities with local radio stations. This finding is in line with previous studies that show how important access to information is to discipline incumbents.

For all its succinctness, the argument that access to information promotes accountability conceals several untested assumptions. To mention just one, studies typically assume that informed voters are more likely to participate in elections. In countries where voting is mandatory for most groups, such as Brazil, electoral retribution is more likely to take the form of discontented voters voting for the opposition. Yet in countries where voting is not mandatory, electoral retribution can also take the form of discontented voters abstaining from voting. I explore this question together with Alberto Chong, Dean Karlan and Leonard Wantchekon through a field experiment in the 2009 municipal elections in Mexico. The experiment shows that information regarding extensive corruption suppresses turnout. The reduction in total votes translates into decreases in support both for the incumbent and the challenger parties. Thus, this experiment shows that, in some instances, information about corruption disengages voters from elections. More work in this area is needed to fully understand how access to information can leverage democratic consolidation.

SOCIAL ATTITUDES AND ATTRIBUTES
Although it is well established that democracies need social checks and balances, the causal mechanism that links social attributes to democratic consolidation is less understood. Disentangling this mechanism is particularly pressing if we are to understand

the factors that hinder democracy in countries devastated by civil war and split by ethnic conflict. Experimentation enables researchers to adjudicate among complex mechanisms that in observational work would be confounded. For example, Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, and Weinstein conducted a laboratory-in-the-field experiment to study the mechanisms that link high levels of ethnic diversity to low levels of public goods provision in Uganda. In this study, subjects were naturally exposed to high ethnic diversity on a daily basis. Thus, the conclusions drawn from the dictator, puzzle, network, and public goods games played by Ugandan subjects speak directly to the social phenomenon of interest. Habyarimana and coauthors find that ethnic diversity leads to lower provision of public goods, not because coethnics have similar tastes or are more altruistic, but because people from different ethnic groups are less linked in social networks. Therefore, the threat of social sanction for people that do not cooperate is less credible.

Paluck and Green’s study in Rwanda is another example of the use of experimentation to study the complex mechanisms by which democratic social attitudes are formed. In particular, they measure the causal effect of listening to a radio program aimed at discouraging blind obedience and reliance on direction from authorities, and at promoting independent thought and collective action in problem solving in post-genocide Rwanda. Over the course of one year, the radio program or a comparable program dealing with HIV was randomly presented to pairs of communities, including communities of genocide survivors, and imprisoned genocidaires. Although the radio program had little effect on many kinds of beliefs and attitudes, it had a substantial impact on listeners’ willingness to express dissent and the ways they resolved communal problems.

**EXPERIMENTATION GOING FORWARD**

The rise of experiments as one of the most prominent empirical strategies has led to new advances in the study of democratic consolidation. So far, some experimental results have confirmed previous arguments, such as the effectiveness of clientelism as a mobilization strategy and the prevalence of political and social inequalities despite institutional innovations. Other experiments have revealed relationships that only a randomized control trial could uncover, like the fact that clientelist appeals reinforce ethnic voting and not the other way around. Finally, some experiments are revolutionizing the measurement of core concepts in the field. For example, we now know that vote buying measured experimentally is more prevalent than what observational studies suggested.

Going forward, field experiments in collaboration with policy makers, governments, and NGOs are a promising line of research because such alliances make research more realistic. The next round of experiments, however, faces considerable challenges. First, researchers must find creative ways to design interventions that are attractive to potential partners but that still speak convincingly to theoretically relevant questions. In doing so, researchers must pay special attention to internal validity issues. After all, the interpretation of an experimental result depends not only on the randomization but on the overall design and execution of the experiment. Second, future experimental work needs to find ways to enable the accumulation of knowledge. To do so, a more analytic approach would help guide the design of experiments that could incrementally test various angles of a theory. Third, experimentation faces a similar trade-off as field work between depth of knowledge that comes from studying a particular population and the generalizability of the findings. To ameliorate challenges to external validity, the context of an experiment needs to resemble the context of the social phenomenon of interest. In particular, researchers need to study the subset of the population that is theoretically relevant and need to design interventions that resemble the variables of interest. Finally, as the scope of experimentation expands, ethical concerns will become more salient. Although there is no consensus on the set of questions that are amenable to experimentation, researchers should always make a thorough assessment of the direct and indirect costs to subjects of participating in an experiment (see Macartan Humphrey’s contribution to this symposium, which discusses the ethics of field experiments).

Despite these challenges, experimental research on democratic consolidation is a productive and exciting endeavor. As insightful as the experimental research has been up until now, numerous substantive questions remain unanswered. Hopefully, the selection of studies covered in this essay illustrates how experiments can be used as a research tool to study broader and more central questions about democratic consolidation.

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Some of the most influential work in comparative politics has involved the categorization of regime and patterns of regime change. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way have produced what appears to be another major contribution to this scholarship. The authors of *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War* argue that existing conceptualizations and theories are ill-equipped to capture the essence and peculiarities of a new political phenomenon. The culmination of a decade of work on the issue, the book aims at much more than a description of a regime subtype, which emerged after the end of the Cold War. The major goal is to explain why such regimes have followed quite divergent paths in the last 20 years.

The authors first introduced us to competitive authoritarianism in 2002 and they are once again convincing in their justification of this new term. The already saturated field of regime typologies elsewhere in the literature fails to accommodate an increasingly common regime type with distinct characteristics. Competitive authoritarianism does not fit among existing subtypes of democracy, be it illiberal, electoral or managed. In fact, the authors caution against seeing such regimes as partial democracies, on the path towards eventual full democratization. The focus on democracy, elections and transitions – in policy and scholarship alike – is not only misguided, but also at least partly to blame for the rise of competitive authoritarianism. The reliance on conditionality, the West’s emphasis on elections, its loosened criteria for democracy and belief in its inevitability often allowed post–Cold War autocrats to strengthen their grip while putting up an electoral façade.

Similarly, Levitsky and Way find that the many adjectives used to qualify authoritarianism result in categories too broad or inaccurate to describe a regime type characterized by meaningful but unfair competition, a precarious dynamic which entails specific strategies and tactics. Having defended the necessity, utility and preciseness of their term, the authors lay out a theory tailored to explaining the different outcomes of competitive authoritarianism. Not only is this a theory of hybrid regimes, but also a hybrid theory, reminiscent of Theda Scocpol’s theory of social revolutions, in its blend of international and domestic factors.

Once again, the authors compare their argument to popular theories of regime change, from those favoring modernization and inequality to the ones emphasizing institutional design and leadership. None of these are convincing, they argue. Frequently, the outcomes run opposite to what these theories would lead us to expect. For instance, many of the regimes which democratized suffered from high inequality, underdevelopment and weak civil societies – hardly prerequisites for or even correlates of democratization. Surprisingly, regimes often persisted during economic crises and collapsed in times of prosperity. For their part, institutional arrangements were unstable and frequently manipulated rather than constraining. And, although in many cases leaders such as Mečiar, Milošević and Chavez were important, structural factors played a more decisive role.

As an alternative, Levitsky and Way offer an interactive theory in which international linkage (in particular), leverage and a regime’s organizational power largely determine outcomes. Linkage is a multidimensional concept which includes economic, intergovernmental, social, informational and civil society ties among others. It is of paramount importance, according to their theory. In the absence of extensive linkages regime organization is decisive. The authors measure it in terms of both state and party strength along two dimensions – scope and cohesion – and it includes coercive power as well as discretionary economic spending. Finally, when regimes are weak, leverage plays a decisive role. Leverage is described as a state’s vulnerability to Western democratizing pressure. Thus, it is not necessarily the application of such pressure itself that matters, but rather the ability of a state to resist it. Larger, richer and strategically important states such as China, Russia or Saudi Arabia have more bargaining power and are less susceptible to punitive actions. In addition, competing Western economic and strategic interests interfere with democratizing efforts and “black knights” – great powers which actively support authoritarian regimes – make democratization even more difficult. The three outcomes are democratization, stable and unstable authoritarianism. On the domestic side of equation, the authors argue that powerful, well-organized regimes will be able to resist even a strong opposition. On the other hand, weak, disorganized regimes are likely to succumb to even weak challenges.

The theory performs well. Where linkages to the West were dense, states almost invariably democratized. These are the success stories found mostly in East-Central Europe and Latin America where geographic proximity and links with the EU and US, respectively, overcame unfavorable domestic conditions. The picture is a lot grimmer, albeit still in tune with the theory, in Africa and the former Soviet Republics. In these cases linkage was low, abuse of power received less attention, came at a lower cost and strong autocrats managed to consolidate their power. In other words, already poor domestic conditions were compounded by remoteness, Western indifference and Russia’s undemocratic influence to prevent democratization in many of these cases.
The book reads with ease belying its length and scope. Its legibility is due, in part, to an effort to specify all of its inherently abstract notions. The authors ground their variables in concrete phenomena and the numerous sub-points and short lists add to the book’s clarity. In addition, the original coding, the range of competitive authoritarian regimes covered and the relatively detailed case studies are an admirable achievement. Perhaps most importantly, the book offers a complex and intriguing, yet clear and straightforward organization of international and domestic variables.

It is hard to fault a book so keenly aware of its inevitable limitations or the tricky questions it raises. It is also unfair to blame the messenger for delivering a grim message. The authors admit that the theory is somewhat narrow and may be outdated, its application limited to a specific period when the democratic euphoria of the 1990s was higher. They also describe the serious dilemma facing state-builders. State power is a double-edged sword, necessary for democracy, yet easily abused by autocrats. Still, the book raises several questions worth addressing. They revolve around its possibly problematic conceptual distinctions and its difficult normative and policy implications.

The main argument rests on separations the validity of which is open to debate. First, the authors appear to treat regime and opposition as two separate and independent forces. The exclusionary emphasis on regime strength at the expense of civil society reflects a rejection of their mutually constitutive character and interdependence. Also, the book is rather skeptical of the power of domestic opposition and treats it as distinct and independent from international linkage even though the authors repeatedly tell the story of an opposition emboldened and strengthened by such links. Of particular importance are cultural and informational ties and the role of migration, Diasporas and civil-society links. Indeed, that is how linkage, according to the book, works – it exposes abuses of power, scares autocrats, empowers opposition and creates domestic democratic norms. All this makes the rigid separation between linkage and civil society and the relative marginalization of the latter somewhat difficult.

The book is largely the story of externally driven democratization. As such, it raises thorny normative and policy questions. While linkage is a more objective phenomenon, leverage more heavily depends on the whims, interests and preferences of the great powers. The crucial importance of Western involvement means greater responsibility for the West to act pro-democratically, perhaps even in places of less geopolitical or economic interest or in spite of more pragmatic priorities. Levitsky and Way do not exactly shy away from calling even some Western states “black knights,” but do they do it enough? Largely absent is a discussion of the US strategic economic and security partnerships and its implicit support for authoritarianism in the Middle East and elsewhere.

In the end, despite our striving for scientific objectivity, whether one sees the book as satisfying or unnerving, realistic or depressing, will depend on the reader’s worldview. Is this an account which rests on equal parts down-to-earth realism and determinism? Does it oscillate between sober assessment and pessimism? Does it constitute an unfair disempowerment of popular movements for democracy or is it a clear-eyed perceptiveness into the strength of autocrats? Below the outstanding empirical work – and despite all the success stories – there lurks a nagging glumness and a lack of idealism, an emphasis on geography and the strong at the expense of “people power.” Civil society is put on the back burner, stripped of potency, irrelevant and powerless. The toppling of authoritarianism seems impossible without outside help. It is too early to tell what the unfolding “Arab spring” will lead to, but it may force us to re-evaluate such claims. If popular movements can topple some of the world’s strongest dictators, they can probably bring change in competitive authoritarianism regimes.

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SECTION NEWS

2012 APSA Annual Meeting: Kurt Weyland (University of Texas at Austin), our section's program chair for the 2012 annual meeting, will soon begin reviewing all the paper and panel proposals submitted by the December 15 deadline. We look forward to learning of his decisions next spring, and to seeing many of you at the 2012 meeting in New Orleans.


The Section’s annual business meeting and reception were held on Saturday evening, September 3. Highlights of the meeting included the installation of new officers; the awarding of prizes for the Juan Linz Prize for Best Dissertation in Comparative Study of Democracy, and for the best book, article, field work, and paper presented at last year’s convention. For complete details see the minutes prepared by section Secretary Henry Hale of The George Washington University.

Minutes of the Annual Business Meeting, September 3, 2011:
Welcome to the Meeting: Section Vice-Chair Dan Slater (University of Chicago) thanked everyone for support of the section and attendance of the meeting.

OLD BUSINESS
New Officers: The Chair welcomes incoming officers, Stephen Haggard as President and Amaney Jamal as Treasurer, and thanks outgoing President Ashutosh Varshney and Treasurer Juliet Johnson for their outstanding service. He also thanks Melissa Aten-Becnel for organizing the election.

Treasurer’s Report: Treasurer Juliet Johnson reports that the section remains in good shape financially, thanks in part to a contribution from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and will be in a position to fully fund prizes, the section’s online elections, and its reception at the APSA annual meeting next year. She explains that the section has had a financial cushion due to its large membership in the past as well as a considerable number of contributions to the section awards, but notes that these reserves are gradually being depleted since its expenditures are currently greater than its income. She stresses the importance of increasing section membership or finding alternative sources of revenue lest the section need to cut back on expenditures like the awards dinner.

Membership Report: The Vice-Chair adds that section membership levels appear to have stabilized after a period of decline. Last year the section had 659 members, and currently there are 653. He notes that 22 panels were allocated to the section this year by APSA organizers, which is a bit of a drop from the 28 last year. He reports that APSA organizers shared with the section that this drop was due to reduced attendance at the panels. The Vice-Chair thanks Melani Cammett, the section’s panel chair for the 2011 APSA annual meeting, and notes that Kurt Weyland will serve in this capacity for the next APSA annual meeting.

Newsletter: The Vice-Chair notes that the newsletter has been perhaps the most exciting recent development in the section in the last few years, and turns to Michael Bernhard, chair of the editorial committee for the section newsletter, for a report. Bernhard reports that a new issue will be forthcoming in about a month and that themes for the two issues after that have been established. At that point, the leadership of the newsletter turns over to Bernhard’s University of Florida colleagues Benjamin Smith and Staffan Lindberg, though Bernhard plans to remain on the board. He notes that the newsletter leadership is open to ideas as to what the newsletter might do in the future. He concludes by thanking the NED for distributing and putting together the newsletter, thanking in particular executive editor Diego Abente-Brun and managing editor Melissa Aten-Becnel.

NEW BUSINESS
Section Awards:
Juan Linz Dissertation Award: Ekrem Karakoc (Pennsylvania State University) won the Juan Linz Dissertation prize for his work on “A Theory of Redistribution in New Democracies: How Democracy Has Increased Income Disparity in Southern and Postcommunist Europe.”

Prerna Singh (Princeton University) was awarded an honorable mention for a dissertation on “Subnationalism and Social Development: A Comparative Analysis of Indian States.”

This year’s award committee included Stathis Kalyvas (Yale University) (chair), Victor Shih (Northwestern University), and Maya Tudor (University of Oxford).

Committee’s Remarks on the Award Winners: “The Committee is pleased to present Ekrem Karakoc with the Juan Linz Dissertation Award for his dissertation on “A Theory of Redistribution in New Democracies: How Democracy Has Increased Income Disparity in Southern and Postcommunist Europe.”

“Using both large N analysis case studies of Spain, Turkey, the Czech Republic, and Poland, Karakoc reminds us that not all democratization waves are created equal. Although overall, democracies are more egalitarian than dictatorships, new democracies remain highly unequal—they have failed to reduce inequality. More generally, the thesis goes against the...
widespread perception that democracy provides higher levels of growth, higher levels of welfare, and a more egalitarian distribution of wealth. Recent democracies do not perform as expected. The thesis argues that poor citizens are not mobilized and do not vote and that weak party system institutionalization has a regressive effect on spending. Instead, government spending targets those who organized during the authoritarian period, rather than outsiders: civil servants, unionized skilled workers, the military, etc. Urban and rural poor are demobilized and left out. This is a piece of work that qualifies a lot of what we think we know about democracies today (think of Acemoglu and Robinson), is superbly researched and crafted, and does an excellent job in identifying the mechanisms connecting this outcome to its putative causes.”

Honorable Mention: Prerna Singh, “Subnationalism and Social Development: A Comparative Analysis of Indian States”

“This thesis begins by observing the striking variation in social development indicators across Indian states, especially educational and health outcomes, and argues that what helps explain this variation is the type of political community created. More specifically, Singh finds that the cohesiveness of subnationalist identification affects how progressive state social policy will be as well as its collective action by citizens. This is established via a comparison of Kerala and Tamil Nadu versus Uttar Pradesh. Rajasthan is used as a case of transition from less to more cohesive subnationalist id that also moves in the expected direction on the social indicator front. A key message is that nationalism is the deeper driver behind good social outcomes. The work is extremely rich, combining archival research, census, survey and macro-economic data; and elite interviews, focus groups meetings, and participant observation.”

Best Book Award: Timothy Frye (Columbia University) and Monica Nalepa (University of Notre Dame) were co-winners of the best book award for their work on Building States and Markets after Communism: The Perils of Polarized Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2010) and Skeletons in the Closet: Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Systems (Cambridge University Press, 2010).

This year’s committee members included Stephan Haggard (University of California at San Diego) (chair), Steven Wilkinson (Yale University), and Amaney Jamal (Princeton University).

Committee’s Remarks on the Award Winners: “Two books rose to the top of a very competitive field this year, both on Eastern Europe yet both addressing critical issues facing new democracies worldwide.

Timothy Frye’s Building States and Markets After Communism (Cambridge University Press) is the most comprehensive treatment to date of the political economy of economic reform in post-communist states. Comparing authoritarian and democratic regimes, Frye focuses on the conditioning effect of political polarization on the speed, coherence, and nature of market reforms. Working with a simple economic model with politicians, producers, and a dependent sector, Frye argues that democracies can combine incentives to producers and transfers that ease the transition; in an extension, he shows how these are combined somewhat differently depending on the partisan orientation of governments.

But this happy outcome is only likely when politics are not polarized. In politically-polarized settings, producers fear policy swings between governments and therefore under-invest, lowering the revenues needed to provide cushioning social insurance and services. Rather, politicians channel rents to favored and established firms, producing an erratic transition path; think Russia under Yeltsin.

Frye tests his model with both macro and micro data as well as rich case studies. He codes partisanship and polarization and looks at their effect on both the speed and consistency of reform and economic growth. He uses firm-level data to capture the reaction of producers to polarization, thus filling in the microfoundations of his macro approach. Recognizing the potential endogeneity of polarization, Frye devotes a chapter to the sources of partisan divisions, including a fascinating digression on how communist parties exploit nationalism to their political advantage. Rich and well-chosen case studies provide depth on a diverse range of cases from Russia and Bulgaria to Poland and Uzbekistan.

Monica Nalepa’s Skeletons in the Closet: Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe, builds up from what appears to be a “small” question: lustration. Yet Nalepa shows that the issue of post-transitional justice is in fact implicated in all aspects of the transition process, from the positions oppositions take prior to democratization to the nature of the political order once democracy occurs. The skeletons in Nalepa’s title refer to the fact that virtually all oppositions to autocratic rule include people who collaborated with the ancien regime. This fact obviously influences the willingness of new governments to undertake probing lustration; authoritarian incumbents are more than happy to expose collaborators. The shadow of the skeletons—so to speak—falls on the transition itself: the more infiltrated the opposition, the more likely incumbents are to initiate negotiations and oppositions to offer guarantees. In meticulous detail and paying attention to mico-level mechanisms and alternative explanations, Nalepa offers a fascinating account about the politics surrounding lustration.
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Nalepa’s book is built around a series of formal models characterizing these puzzles; not surprisingly, informational asymmetries play a central role in them. She picks cases that vary along key parameters and uses narratives to test the theory. She also utilizes surveys and public opinion and voting data to get at underlying preferences for lustration over time. Changing political circumstances, and particularly the emergence of altogether new parties not implicated in original bargains, is a key condition for bringing these skeletons out of the closet.

Even though used to generate predictions about lustration, her models have very much wider application to transition processes: the extent to which oppositions can take militant positions; the concessions they make to authoritarians; and the extent to which they can extinguish the old order. As Nalepa shows in a particularly well-crafted conclusion, the implications reach even beyond transitions. Democratic transitions that involve agreements with outgoing authoritarian leaders exemplify credible commitment problems and contracting more generally, issues to which the skeletons in the closet model also speak to.

The pool from which these books were drawn was a strong one, with major contributions by senior as well as junior scholars. Many books were worthy, but we were attracted to these two because of their tight integration of theory, research design, and the use of diverse empirical methods.”

Best Article Award: Ben Ansell (University of Minnesota) and David Samuels (University of Minnesota) won the best article award for their work on “Inequality and Democratization: A Contractarian Approach,” which appeared in the December 2010 Comparative Political Studies.

This year’s award committee included Ellen Lust (Yale University) (chair), Milan Svolik (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), and Lucan Way (University of Toronto).

Committee’s Remarks on the Award Winners: “The Committee for the Best Article in Comparative Democratization reviewed 340 articles published last year, finding the study of democratization is alive and well. We were impressed by a large number of interesting, carefully researched, and well-written pieces, drawn on research literally from across the globe. We are pleased to announce that among these, we found Ben Ansell and David Samuels’ article, “Inequality and Democratization: A Contractarian Approach,” published in Comparative Political Studies, to be of exceptional value in moving the field forward.

The argument is carefully explicated and tested through a formal model and quantitative analysis. In their model, Ansell and Samuels call into question a number of assumptions underlying some of the distributive models of democratization. They argue that autocratic regimes are more expropriative than democracies, even among elites; that inequality can vary both within and across economic sectors, independent of asset mobility, and that a more appropriate representation of the problem requires a three-actor model, with a small, landed elite, an industrial bourgeoisie, and the masses. Less explicitly, but also importantly, they distinguish between partial and full democratization, arguing that rising elites push for the former but not necessarily the latter. They then test the argument extensively using two data sets (one from 1858–1993 and a second from 1955–2004), two versions of the dependent variable (a dichotomous version and the 21-point Polity scale), and in both a linear and U-shaped model (a la Arcemoglu and Robinson). It is an impressive empirical assessment, particularly given the data limitations and the requirements of the theory.
In short, the article makes an important critique of distributive theories of democratization, explores an important distinction in inequality, and convincingly puts forth a novel, contractarian theory of the relationship between inequality and democratization. It reminds us that industrialization often creates high inequality as well as the expansion of a new bourgeoisie that may prefer partial democratization in order to protect their own rising assets. That is, democratization is not a struggle between elites and masses over the expropriation of resources, but also one between competing segments of elites. The goal of democratization is not simply a mechanism for reshaping the distribution of assets, but also for obtaining a mechanism for protecting expanding assets of a new bourgeoisie.

We believe these insights should shape the debate over economic growth, inequality, and democratization for years to come and commend Ben Ansell and David Samuels for a job well done.”

Best Field Work Award: Claire Adida (University of California, San Diego) was presented with the best field work award for her work on “Immigrant Exclusion and Insecurity in Africa.” Rodrigo Zarazaga (University of California, Berkeley) received an honorable mention for his work on “Peronist Hegemony and Clientelism: Strategic Interactions Among Mayors, Brokers, and Poor Voters.”

This year’s award committee included Giovanni Capoccia (University of Oxford) (chair), Gretchen Helmke (University of Rochester), and Sunila Kale (University of Washington).

Committee’s Remarks on the Award Winners: “I am very pleased to announce this year’s winner of the Award for the Best Field Research of the Comparative Democratization Section is Prof. Claire Adida. This is to honor the empirical fieldwork that she did for her dissertation “Immigrant Exclusion and Insecurity in Africa,” which she defended at Stanford University in 2010. The thesis analyzes important dynamics of South-South immigration in Niger, Ghana, and Benin, starting with an empirical puzzle. Adida notes wide variation in the extent to which immigrant communities are accepted by the host populations of the countries to which they move. To press the reasons for such variation, Adida developed an innovative theoretical perspective with a counterintuitive sensibility that argues that cultural similarity between immigrant and host communities works against the possibilities for integration. This is because host communities feel more competitive with culturally similar immigrant groups than they do with traders belonging to culturally dissimilar immigrant communities.

A large part of the empirical work for the dissertation consists of subtle and challenging fieldwork in several small communities in different contexts in urban Africa. Here Adida skillfully blended in-depth interviewing with the analysis of original surveys, in which she embedded an experiment that added further analytic leverage to her survey findings. In short, Adida carries out challenging, difficult, and innovative fieldwork in multiple settings, in order to refine and test an original theoretical perspective.”

Honorable Mention – Rodrigo Zarazaga “The Committee unanimously agreed to award an honorable mention to Rodrigo Zarazaga for the fieldwork that he conducted for his dissertation on clientelistic politics in Argentina. The dissertation, entitled “Peronist Hegemony and Clientelism: Strategic Interactions Among Mayors, Brokers, and Poor Voters,” is theoretically and empirically very rich. One key contribution is that brokers are essential for clientelistic parties not least because of their local knowledge of the voters’ “reservation value.” This allows parties to trade for votes at an efficient price. Zarazaga’s fieldwork consisted of interviews with 120 brokers in several Argentinean municipalities, often carried out in difficult and challenging conditions. The fieldwork and the findings constitute an important contribution to the study of vote-buying, fraud, and clientelism.”

Call for Applications: Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellowships: The Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellows Program at the International Forum for Democratic Studies invites applications for fellowships in 2012–2013. This federally funded program enables democracy activists, practitioners, scholars, and journalists from around the world to deepen their understanding of democracy and enhance their ability to promote democratic change. Dedicated to international exchange, this five-month, residential program offers a collegial environment for fellows to reflect on their experiences; conduct independent research and writing; consider best practices and lessons learned; engage with counterparts in the United States; and develop professional relationships within a global network of democracy advocates.

The program is intended primarily to support practitioners, scholars, and journalists from developing and aspiring democracies; distinguished scholars from established democracies may also apply. A working knowledge of English is required. All fellows receive a monthly payment, health insurance, travel assistance, and research support. The program does not fund professional training, fieldwork, or students working toward a degree. The program will host two five-month fellowship sessions in 2012–2013: Fall 2012 (October 1, 2012–February 28, 2013) and Spring 2013 (March 1–July 31,
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2013). More information and application instructions are available here. Flyers in English, French, Arabic, Chinese, Farsi, Spanish, Russian, and Portuguese are also available. Applications are due by Tuesday, November 1, 2011.

NEWS FROM MEMBERS

Dirk Berg-Schlosser, professor of political science at Philipps-University Marburg, Leonardo Morlino, professor of political science at LUISS Guido Carli, and Bertrand Badie, edited the 8-volume International Encyclopedia of Political Science, published by Sage and sponsored by the International Political Science Association. About 600 contributors from almost 50 countries cover all sub-fields of political science, including international relations. It includes several entries on democracy and democratization reflecting, uniquely, also specific Chinese, Russian, and Middle East perspectives.

Sarah Birch, reader in politics, University of Essex, published a monograph on Electoral Malpractice (Oxford University Press), in which the author undertakes an analytic and explanatory investigation of electoral malpractice, which is understood as taking three principal forms: manipulation of the rules governing elections, manipulation of vote preference formation and expression, and manipulation of the voting process.

Merike Blofield, associate professor of political science, University of Miami, edited The Great Gap: Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution in Latin America (Pennsylvania State University Press), in which the authors seek to contribute to the understanding of recent waves of democratization combined with deepened global inequalities by analyzing inequality and politics in the region with the highest socioeconomic inequalities in the world: Latin America. The chapters address the socioeconomic context and inequality of opportunities; elite culture, public opinion, and media framing; capital mobility, campaign financing, representation and gender quality policies; and taxation and social policies.

Sarmila Bose, senior research associate at the Centre for International Studies, University of Oxford, published Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War (Columbia and Oxford University Presses). Recognizing the bias the exists in the narratives of the war between Bangladesh and Pakistan, the author reconstructs events through extensive interviews conducted over a period of four years in the two countries.

Archie Brown, Emeritus Professor of Political Science and Emeritus Fellow of St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford, published “The Gorbachev Factor Revisited” in the September–October 2011 Problems of Post-Communism, in which the author argues that the collapse of the Soviet Union cannot be blamed on Gorbachev and that any “guilt” he should bear for the dissolution of the Soviet state lies in his making it possible by removing citizens’ fear of the authorities.

Melani Cammett, associate professor of political science and director of the Middle East Studies program, Brown University, and Sukkriti Issar won the 2011 Alexander L. George Award for their July 2010 World Politics article on “Bricks and Mortar Clientelism: The Political Geography of Welfare in Lebanon.” The prize was awarded by the American Political Science Association’s Section on Qualitative and Multi-Method Research.

Ryan Carlin, assistant professor of political science, Georgia State University, published “Distrusting Democrats and Political Participation in New Democracies: Lessons from Chile” in the September 2011 Political Science Quarterly, in which the author uses AmericasBarometer survey data to identify five profiles of democratic support in Chile: democrat, delegative, fair-weather, illiberal, and autocrat.

Mr. Carlin and Matthew Singer also published “Support for Polyarchy in the Americas” in Comparative Political Studies (available online), in which the authors measure support for the basic rights, liberties, and practices associated with polyarchy in 12 Latin American democracies.

Ellen Carnaghan, professor of political science, St. Louis University, published “The Difficulty of Measuring Support for Democracy in a Changing Society: Evidence from Russia” in the June 2011 Democratization, in which the author examines some of the ways respondents in non-democratic or imperfectly democratic countries may misinterpret the meaning of survey questions and consequently how their answers may mislead researchers.

Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera, assistant professor of government, University of Texas at Brownsville, won a Latin American Security, Drugs, and Democracy Postdoctoral Fellowship, which is funded by the Open Society Foundation’s Latin America Program and Global Drug Policy Program. Mr. Correa-Cabrera will work on a project on “Violent on the ‘Forgotten’ (Texas-Tamaulipas) Border: Unemployment, Corruption, and the Paramilitarization of Drug Cartels in Mexico’s ‘New Democratic Era.’”

Roman David, lecturer in politics, Newcastle University, published Lustration and Transitional Justice (University of Pennsylvania Press), in which the author examines how transitional democracies deal with officials who have been tainted by complicity with prior governments and if they should be excluded or incorporated into the new system. He also details major institutional innovations that developed in Central Europe following the collapse of communist regimes.
Lauren Duquette, who received her Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, was recently awarded the 2011–2012 University of California’s Postdoctoral Research Fellowship, which she holds at the University of California Los Angeles.

Fred Eidlin, professor of political science, University of Guelph, published “The Method of Problems Versus the Method of Topics” in the October 2011 PS: Political Science & Politics, in which the author argues that researchers should methodologically focus on problems rather than topics, as focusing on problems seeks solutions to inconsistencies in existing knowledge through free invention and severe criticism of hypotheses.


Bonnie N. Field, associate professor of global studies at Bentley University, and Peter Siavelis published “Endogenizing Legislative Candidate Selection Procedures in Nascent Democracies: Evidence from Spain and Chile” in the June 2011 Democratization. The article contends that within transitional systems distinct contexts constrain choice and bargaining for candidate selection procedures. It posits that the relative levels of uncertainty about the installation and continuance of democracy, strategic complexity of the electoral system, and party leadership autonomy create incentives for the adoption of more or less inclusive candidate selection procedures.

It evaluates these propositions using the relevant political parties in Spain and Chile.

M. Steven Fish, professor of political science, University of California at Berkeley, published Are Muslims Distinctive? A Look at the Evidence (Oxford University Press), in which the author finds that, in some areas, Muslims and non-Muslims differ less than is commonly imagined. Muslims are not inclined to favor the fusion of religious and political authority or especially prone to mass political violence. Yet, gender inequality is more severe among Muslims, Muslims are unusually averse to homosexuality and other controversial behaviors, and democracy is rare in the Muslim world.

Jonathan Fox recently became chair of the department of Latin American and Latino Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz for the second time.

Timothy Frye, Marshall D. Shulman Professor of Post-Soviet Foreign Policy and director of the Harriman Institute, Columbia University, and Andrei Yakovlev have opened the International Center for the Study of Institutions and Development at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, thanks to a generous grant from the Ministry of Science and Education of the Russian Federation. The Center is devoted to studying issues of governance, legality, and economic development and includes a dozen scholars from Russia and the US. More information about the Center is available at http://iims.hse.ru/en/csid.

Carlos Gervasoni, assistant professor of political science and international relations, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, published “Democracia, Autoritarismo e Hibridez en las Provincias Argentinas: La Medición y Causas de los Regímenes Subnacionales” in the July 2011 Journal of Democracy en Español. The article reviews the growing importance of scholarship on subnational regimes, stressing that the least democratic provinces and regions of national democracies are better characterized as “hybrid” than “authoritarian.”

Kenneth F. Greene, associate professor of government, University of Texas at Austin, was awarded the 2011–2012 Raymond Dickson Centennial Endowed Teaching Fellowship, a prize that recognizes teaching excellence in the College of Liberal Arts.

Mary Alice Haddad was recently promoted to associate professor of government (with tenure) at Wesleyan University.

Henry Hale, associate professor of political science and international affairs and director of the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at The George Washington University, and Ivan Kurilla edited Rossia "dvukhbytsiadnykh: stereoskopicheskii vzgliad (Russia in the 2000s: A Stereoscopic View), published in Moscow by Planeta Press in 2011.


Allen Hickman, assistant professor of political science, University of Michigan, and Ken Kollman, co-primary investigators on the Constituency-Level Election Archive (CLEA), have released the latest version of the dataset, which adds 16 countries and 105 elections, for a total of 73 countries and 1,063 elections. The central aim of CLEA is to produce

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a repository of detailed results at the constituency level from elections around the world, and the current release expands their coverage in Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, and Central America. All files can be found at www.electiondataarchive.org.

John Ishiyama, professor of political science, University of North Texas, along with a team that included UNT professors Marijke Breuning, Steven Forde, and Valerie Martinez-Ebers, have been named the incoming editors of the American Political Science Review, beginning in 2012. Mr. Ishiyama will be the first lead editor of the team.

Debra Javeline, associate professor of political science, University of Notre Dame, and Vanesse A. Baird published “The Surprisingly Nonviolent Aftermath of the Beslan School Hostage Taking” in the July–October 2011 Problems of Post–Communism, in which the authors examine how the 2004 hostage taking in Beslan, North Ossetia, was widely expected to provoke retaliatory violence by ethnic Ossetians against ethnic Ingush and Chechens and argue that the peaceful political activism that ensued suggests a key to breaking the cycle of ethnic violence.

Juliet Johnson, associate professor of political science, McGill University, and Benjamin Forest published “Monumental Politics: Regime Type and Public Memory in Post–Communist States” in the July–September 2011 Post–Soviet Affairs. The authors examine collective memory formation—the study of monuments, memory, and public space—through a political science lens. Using a new database on monuments in 26 post-communist states over a 25-year period, patterns of monument transformation are identified, and official and private efforts to transform monuments are systematically compared across different regime types.

On July 1, Barbara Junisbai became assistant dean of faculty at Pitzer College. She also contributed a chapter on “Oligarchs and Ownership: The Role of Financial–Industrial Groups in Controlling Kazakhstan’s ‘Independent’ Media” to After the Czars and Commissars: Journalism in Authoritarian Post–Soviet Central Asia, edited by Eric Freedman and Richard Schafer and published by Michigan State University.

Brandon Kendhammer, assistant professor of political science, Ohio University, won the Aaron Wildavsky Award for best dissertation in the field of religion and politics for his dissertation on “Muslims Talking Politics: Framing Islam and Democracy in Northern Nigeria.” The prize was awarded by the APSA section for Religion and Politics.

Maria Koinova, assistant professor of political science at the University of Amsterdam, won a 5-year institutional grant from the European Research Council for a multi-methods political science study that investigates the transnational mobilization of diasporas in Europe and their impact on their original homelands in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. Ms. Koinova, a post-doc, and two Ph.D. students will study on a comparative basis how the Albanian, Armenian, Bosnian, Iraqi, Kurdish, and Palestinian diasporas mobilize in five European states—France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom—in support of political processes taking place in their original homelands. The project considers also diaspora mobilization at the supra-national level, including the European Union, the United Nations, and other international organizations. A cross-country representative survey will be conducted among 25 country-groups, creating a much needed quantitative dataset, sensitive to both transnationalist processes and specific countries.


In September, Staffan Lindberg, associate professor of political science and research fellow at the Quality of Government Institute at the University of Gothenburg and research director of the World Values Survey Sweden, gave a talk on “Democracy and Elections in Africa” at the department of comparative politics at the University of Bergen, Norway. Mr. Lindberg and Keith R. Weghorst also published “Effective Opposition Strategies: Collective Goods or Clientelism?” in the October 2011 Democratization.

Cyanne E. Loyle recently began a new faculty appointment as an assistant professor of political science at West Virginia University.

Devra C. Moehler, assistant professor of communication, University of Pennsylvania, and Naunihal Singh published “Whose News Do You Trust? Explaining Trust in Private versus Public Media in Africa” in the June 2011 Political Research Quarterly. Using Afrobarometer data from 16 countries, Ms. Moehler finds that low political sophistication, illiberal attitudes, and support for incumbents are all associated with greater relative trust in government media over private broadcasters. She argues that private media need more democratic and critical citizens, rather than higher quality reporting and greater press freedom, to compete with the state media for influence and resources.

Jana Morgan has received tenure and been promoted to associate professor of political science at the University of Tennessee–Knoxville. She also recently published “Dominican Party System Continuity amid Regional
Transformations: Economic Policy, Clientelism, and Migrations Flow” (with Jonathan Hartlyn, Senior Associate Dean for Social Sciences and Global Programs and Kenneth J. Reckford Distinguished Professor of Political Science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and Rosario Espinal) in the Spring 2011 Latin American Politics and Society.

Monika Nalepa, assistant professor of political science, University of Notre Dame, was awarded a 2011–2012 visiting research fellowship at the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School.

Pippa Norris, visiting professor of government and international relations, University of Sydney, was awarded the 2011 Kathleen Fitzpatrick Australian Laureate fellowship. For the Laureate project, she aims to deepen and advance understanding of the impact of democratic governance upon prosperity, welfare, and peace in countries around the world since the late twentieth century. The third wave of democratization has transformed regimes around the globe and the research will seek to establish whether this process has in turn generated concrete benefits in human development. Ms. Norris also published Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited (Cambridge University Press).

In December 2011, an article by Anastassia Obydenkova, Ramon y Cajal Researcher, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, on “Democratization at the Grassroots: The European Union’s External Impact” will be published in the December 2011 Democratization, in which the author focuses on the role of the European Union in the democratic regime transition in the regions of Russia and, in this context, explores the international dimension of sub-national regimes.


Julio Rios-Rigueroa, assistant professor of political studies, CIDEx, and Andrea Pozas-Loyo published “The Politics of Amendment Processes: Supreme Court Influence in the Design of Judicial Councils” in the June 2011 Texas Law Review, a special issue on the “2011 Symposium: Latin American Constitutionalism.” In the article, the authors argue that the design of existing institutions and the political leverage of actors that do not participate directly in constitutional reform may exert an important influence on the design of institutions created by amendments.

Richard Rose, director of the Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Aberdeen, William Mishler, and Neil Munro published Popular Support for an Undemocratic Regime: The Changing Views of Russians (Cambridge). Using eighteen surveys of Russian public opinion from the first month of the new regime in 1992 to 2009, the authors tracked the changing views of Russians to show how political support has increased because of a sense of resignation that is stronger than the uncertain economic reliance on exporting oil and gas.

Holli A. Semetko, vice provost for international affairs, director of the office of international affairs and the Halle Institute for Global Learning, and professor of political science at Emory University, was elected a life-time member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Oxana Shevel, assistant professor of political science, Tufts University, published Migration, Refugee Policy, and State Building in Postcommunist Europe (Cambridge), in which the author examines why some similar postcommunist states respond differently to refugees and why some states privilege certain refugee groups. The author finds that when the boundaries of a nation are contested (and thus there is no consensus on which group should receive preferential treatment in state policies), a political space for a receptive and nondiscriminatory refugee policy opens up.

Svend-Erik Skaaning, associate professor of political science, Aarhus University (Denmark) and Jørgen Møller recently published Requisites of Democracy: Conceptualization, Measurement, and Explanation (Routledge), in which the authors examine theoretical and empirical approaches to measuring, defining, and understanding democracy.

Messrs. Skaaning and Møller have also been awarded the Meissel-Laponce Award that has been created by the International Political Science Review to honor John Meisel and Jean Laponce, the first two editors of IPSR. The authors won the prize for their article on “Beyond the Radical Delusion: Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy and Non-Democracy.”

Dan Slater, associate professor of political science, University of Chicago, has received an honorable mention for the Barrington Moore Book Award from the Comparative-Historical Section of the American Sociological Association for his book, Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia (Cambridge University Press). The book has also been recognized by the Asia Society as one of five finalists for its annual Bernard Schwartz Book Award.

Tariq Thachil, assistant professor of political science, Yale University, published “Embedded Mobilization: Nonstate Service Provision as Electoral Strategy in India” in the July 2011 World Politics, in which the author argues that social service provision constitutes an important electoral strategy for elite-backed
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religious parties to succeed in developing democracies. Mr. Thachil’s doctoral dissertation “The Saffron Wave Meets the Silent Revolution: Why the Poor Vote for Hindu Nationalism in India” also won the Sardar Patel Prize for best dissertation submitted to a U.S. university on modern India in the humanities, education, fine arts, or social sciences.


NEW RESEARCH

Journal of Democracy

The October 2011 (Volume 22, no. 4) issue of the Journal of Democracy features clusters of articles on comparing the Arab revolts, new democracies’ support of democracy promotion, and Peru’s 2011 elections, as well as individual articles on Nigeria and Singapore. The full text of selected articles and the tables of contents of all issues are available on the Journal’s website.

Comparing the Arab Revolts

I. “The Global Context” by Marc F. Plattner
Although the Arab revolts have a long way to go before they can be counted as gains for democracy, they do underline what is perhaps democracy’s greatest source of strength worldwide—its superior legitimacy.

II. “The Lessons of 1989” by Lucan Way
The Arab events of 2011 may have some similarities to the wave of popular upheavals against authoritarianism that swept the Soviet bloc starting in 1989, but the differences are much more fundamental.

III. “The Role of the Military” by Zoltan Barany
Across the Arab world, militaries have played a key role in determining whether revolts against dictatorship succeed or fail. What factors determine how and why “the guys with guns” line up the way they do?

IV. “The Impact of Election Systems” by John M. Carey and Andrew Reynolds
Methods of electing legislatures are fraught with consequences for the shape and quality of democracy, and must balance a number of competing goals. Amid the current political ferment of the Arab world, what kinds of electoral systems are emerging and what will they mean for democratic hopes there?

V. “Is Saudi Arabia Immune?” by Stéphane Lacroix
Saudi Arabia looked for a time in early 2011 as if it too would become swept up in the Arab uprising. Yet it never quite happened—why?

Peru’s 2011 Elections

I. “A Vote for Moderate Change” by Martín Tanaka
Despite the presidential victory of Ollanta Humala, Peru’s 2011 elections had some continuities with the 2006 contest. The electorate is dividing along regional and socioeconomic rather than partisan lines.

II. “A Surprising Left Turn” by Steven Levitsky
In a runoff between candidates with dubious democratic credentials, former antisystem outsider Ollanta Humala defeated Keiko Fujimori by attracting votes from the middle class.

Do New Democracies Support Democracy?

I. “Reluctant India” by Pratap Mehta
Though justly vaunted as the world’s largest democracy, India will in all likelihood remain reluctant to take on the mantle of “democracy promoter” for a mix of historical, ideological, and strategic reasons.

II. “Indonesia Finds a New Voice” by Rizal Sukma
Since its transition to democracy barely a decade ago, Indonesia has begun projecting its newly democratic values across international borders. So far, however, its efforts have been largely rhetorical.

III. “Turkey’s Dilemmas” by Soli Özel and Gencer Özcan
Long an “ultrarealist” power, Turkey has over the last decade begun taking human rights and democracy more seriously as aspects of its diplomacy, albeit still in a decidedly selective way.

IV. “The Multilateral Dimension” by Ted Piccone
When it comes to backing democracy and human rights in international forums, the behavior of the world’s six most influential rising democracies ranges from sympathetic support to borderline hostility.
The July 2011 (Volume 22, no. 3) issue of the *Journal of Democracy* features clusters of articles on the upheavals in Egypt and Tunisia and poverty, inequality, and democracy, as well as individual articles on Belarus, Uganda, Sudan, and Kyrgyzstan. The full text of selected articles and the tables of contents of all issues are available on the *Journal*’s website.

**The Upheavals in Egypt and Tunisia**

I. “Ben Ali’s Fall” by Peter J. Schraeder and Hamadi Redissi

The wave of unrest that swept through the Arab world at the end 2010 and the beginning of 2011 originated in Tunisia. What happened—and what are the prospects that Tunisia will make a successful transition to democracy?

II. “The Road to (and from) Liberation Square” by Tarek Masoud

Egyptians threw off the thirty-year dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak, but now find themselves under essentially the same military tutelage that they had hoped to escape by launching their struggle.

III. “The Role of Digital Media” by Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain

Widely reported as “Facebook revolutions,” the upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt show that social media not only can ignite protests but also can help to determine their political consequences.

“Belarus: A Tale of Two Elections” by Rodger Potocki

Strongman Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s suspiciously lopsided 2010 electoral victory—and subsequent crackdown on dissent—may seem like a repeat of the events of 2006, but much has changed in the interval, and his regime is much more precarious today.

**Poverty, Inequality, and Democracy**

I. “Dealing with Inequality” by Francis Fukuyama

Many new democracies have faltered due to high levels of inequality and a deep polarization between the rich and poor. What is the relationship between modern liberal democracy and socioeconomic inequality?

II. “Growth and Hunger in India” by Dan Banik

Despite India’s impressive achievements in democracy, economic development, and the rule of law, it remains home to a third of the world’s poor. Although it has successfully averted famine since independence, it still struggles to prevent chronic hunger.

III. “South African Disparities” by Charles Simkins

Despite improvements in South Africa’s socioeconomic landscape and the expansion of the black middle class since the end of apartheid, the country’s levels of poverty and inequality remain high and heavily correlated with race.

IV. “Mixed Governance and Welfare in South Korea” by Taekyoon Kim, Huck-Ju Kwon, Jooha Lee, and Ilcheong Yi

How did South Korea lift itself from destitution to affluence? And how was its ruthless authoritarian regime able to metamorphose into a stable democracy? Co-opting the business and voluntary sectors to deliver welfare positioned the country to accomplish both.

“Strife and Succession in Sudan” by Khalid Mustafa Medani

After decades of civil war, Sudan is set to divide into two nations on 9 July 2011. Yet a number of explosive issues—including the drawing of borders and sharing of oil revenue—have still not been resolved, and the prospects for peace appear to be dimming.

“Kyrgyzstan’s Latest Revolution” by Kathleen Collins

Having thrown out a corrupt, authoritarian president for the second time, this Central Asian republic has gained a new chance at securing a real democratic transition.

**Democratization**

The August 2011 (Volume 18, no. 4) Democratization is a special issue on “Democracy Promotion in the EU’s Neighbourhood: From Leverage to Governance?”

“EU Democracy Promotion in the Neighbourhood: From Leverage to Governance?” by Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig

“Political Conditionality and European Union’s Cultivation of Democracy in Turkey” by Paul Kubicek

“From Brussels with Love: Leverage, Benchmarking, and the Action Plans with Jordan and Tunisia in the EU’s Democratization Policy” by Raffaella A. Del Sarto and Tobias Schumacher

“The EU’s Two-Track Approach to Democracy Promotion: the Case of Ukraine” by Tom Casier

“The Promotion of Participatory Governance in the EU’s External Policies: Compromised by Sectoral Economic Interests?” by Anne Wetzell

“Transgovernmental Networks as Catalysts for Democratic Change? EU Functional Cooperation with Arab Authoritarian Regimes and Socialization of Involved State Officials into Democratic Governance” by Tina Freyburg
“Democracy Promotion through Functional Cooperation? The Case of the European Neighbourhood Policy” by Tina Freyburg, Sandra Lavenex, Frank Schimmelfennig, Tatiana Skripka, and Anne Wetzel

The June 2011 (Volume 18, no. 3) Democratization features articles on intelligence reform, the Catholic Church and democracy, party systems, and civil society.

“Personal Rule, Neopatrimonialism, and Regime Typologies: Integrating Dahlian and Weberian Approaches to Regime Studies” by Farid Guliyev

“Intelligence Reform in New Democracies: Factors Supporting or Arresting Progress” by Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas Bruneau

“Unfinished Business: The Catholic Church, Communism, and Democratization” by Lan T. Chu

“Dominant Party Systems: A Framework for Conceptualizing Opposition Strategies in Russia” by David White

“The Difficulty of Measuring Support for Democracy in a Changing Society: Evidence from Russia” by Ellen Carnaghan

“EU Assistance for Civil Society in Kosovo: A Step Too Far for Democracy Promotion?” by Adam Fagan

“The Quality of Civil Society in Post-Communist Eastern Germany: A Case Study of Voluntary Associations in Leipzig” by Christiane Olivo

“The Nationalization of the Korean Economy: An Evaluation of Reforms” by Yongtai Li and Yuliang Pao

“Beyond Hybridity: Culture and Ethnicity in the Mauritius Revenue Authority” by David Hirschmann

“Whispering Truth to Power: The Everyday Resistance of Rwandan Peasants to Post-Genocide Reconciliation” by Susan Thomson

“Post-Election Crisis in Cote d’Ivoire: The Gbonhi War” by Richard Banegas

Constitutions of Ecuador and Bolivia” by Pascal Lupien

“Endogenizing Legislative Candidate Selection Procedures in Naïve Democracies: Evidence from Spain and Chile” by Bonnie N. Field and Peter M. Siavelis

“Dynamics of Peace and Democratization: The Aceh Lessons” by Olle Törnquist


SELECTED JOURNAL ARTICLES ON DEMOCRACY

This section features selected articles on democracy that appeared in journals received by the NED’s Democracy Resource Center, May 6–October 1, 2011.

_African Affairs, Vol. 110, no. 440, July 2011_

“Peasant Grievance and Insurgency in Sierra Leone: Judicial Serfdom as a Driver of Conflict” by Esther Mokuwa, Maarten Voors, Erwin Bulte, and Paul Richard

“China and the Coups: Coping with Political Instability in Africa” by Jonathan Holslag

“A Duration Analysis of Democratic Transitions and Authoritarian Backslides” by José Alemán and David D. Yang

“Citizen Satisfaction with Democracy and Parties’ Policy Offerings” by Lawrence Ezrow and Georgios Xezonakis

“Foreign Media and Protest Diffusion in Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of the 1989 East German Revolution” by Holger Lutz Kern

“Views of Economic Inequality in Latin America” by Brian D. Cramer and Robert R. Kaufman

“State Retrenchment and the Exercise of Citizenship in Africa” by Lauren M. MacLean


_Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 44, No. 7, July 2011_

“Executive Elections in the Arab World: When and How Do They Matter?” by Jason Brownlee
“Institutions and Legacies: Electoral Volatility in the Postcommunist World” by Brad Epperly

“Presidents and Parties: How Presidential Elections Shape Coordination in Legislative Elections” by Allen Hicken and Heather Stoll

Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 44, No. 6, June 2011

“Political Risk, Reputation, and the Resource Curse” by Nathan M. Jensen and Noel P. Johnston

“Toward an Alternative Explanation for the Resource Curse: Natural Resources, Immigration, and Democratization” by David H. Bearce and Jennifer A. Laks Hutnik


Comparative Politics, Vol. 43, no. 4, July 2011

“Communism’s Shadow: Postcommunist Legacies, Values, and Behavior” by Grigore Pop-Eleches and Joshua A. Tucker


“Patronage as Institutional Choice: Evidence from Rwanda and Uganda” by Elliott Green

“Competition by Denunciation: The Political Dynamics of Corruption Scandals in Argentina and Chile” by Manuel Balán

Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 19, No. 3, Summer 2011

“Is Nationalism Rising in Russian Foreign Policy? The Case of Georgia” by Luke March

“Making Sense of Nashi’s Political Style: The Bronze Soldier and the Counter-Orange Community” by Jussi Lassila

“Education in the Period of Post-Soviet Transition in Ukraine” by Benjamin Kutsyuruba

Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 19, No. 2, Spring 2011

“From Viktor to Viktor: Democracy and Authoritarianism in Ukraine” by Olexiy Haran

“The Color Revolution Virus and Authoritarian Antidotes: Political Protest and Regime Counterattacks in Post-Communist Spaces” by Abel Polese and Donnacha Ó Beacháin

“ dedication and Power-Sharing Between Center and Regions in Post-Soviet Russia” by Mizuki Chuman


“The Rule of Law and Legal Pluralism in Development” by Brian Z. Tamanaha

“Legal Pluralism and International Development Agencies: State Building or Legal Reform?” by Julio Faundez

“Sustainable Diversity in Law” by H. Patrick Glenn


“Building the Rule of Law in Afghanistan: The Importance of Legal Education” by Geoffrey Swenson and Eli Sugerman

Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3, August 2011

“From Malabo to Malibu: Addressing Corruption and Human Rights Abuse in an African Petrostate” by Robert E. Williams


“Gender Justice in Puerto Rico: Domestic Violence, Legal Reform, and the Use of International Human Rights Principles” by Jodie G. Roure


“Minority Rights: A Major Misconception?” by Bas de Gaay Fortman

“On the Indivisibility and Interdependence of Basic Rights in Developing Countries” by Lanse Minkler and Shawna Sweeney

“Finding Shame in Truth: The Importance of Public Engagement in Truth Commissions” by Julie M. Mazzei

Insight Turkey, Vol. 13, No. 2, April–June 2011

“The Middle East in Transition – to What?” by Marina Ottaway

“Arab Revolts: Islamists Aren’t Coming!” by Asef Bayat

“The Arab Revolution of 2011: Reflections on Religion and Politics” by Nader Hashemi

“The Arab Uprisings: Debating the ‘Turkish Model’” by Alper Y. Dede

“Turkey’s ‘Demonstrative Effect’ and the Transformation of the Middle East” by Kemal Kirişci

“Beyond the Democratic Wave in the Arab World: The Middle East’s Turko-
New Research

Persian Future” by Mohammed Ayoob

“From Distance to Engagement: Turkish Policy towards the Middle East, Iraq and Iraqi Kurds” by Mesut Özcan

“Ukraine’s Changing Foreign Policy: Implications on the Black Sea Security” by Sergey Glebov

“Trade Among OIC Countries: Limits of Islamic Solidarity” by Savaş Alpay, Murat Atamaz and Esat Bakımlı

“Institutionalizing Pluralism in Russia: A New Authoritarianism?” by Laura Petrone

“Belarus and the West: From Estrangement to Honeymoon” by Grigory Ioffe

“Labour Management in Belarus: Transcendent Retrogression” by Hanna Danilovich and Richard Croucher

“Communism for the Twenty-First Century: The Moldovan Experiment” by Theodor Tudoroiu

Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 11, no. 2, May–August 2011
“Slowing at Sunset: Administrative Procedures and the Pace of Reform in Korea” by Jeeyang Rhee Baum and Kathleen Bawn

“Democratization and Ethnic Politics in Indonesia: Nine Theses” by Edward Aspinall

“Violence, Partisanship and Transitional Justice in Zimbabwe” by Michael Bratton

“Democratic Demands and Social Policies: The Politics of Health Reform in Ghana” by Giovanni Carbone

“Rhetorical Legacies of Leadership: Projections of ‘Benevolent Leadership’ in Pre- and Post-Genocide Rwanda” by Marie-Eve Desrosiers

“When Corruption Fights Back: Democracy and Elite Interest in Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption War” by Wale Adebanwi and Ebenezer Obadare

“Wellwatching: An Evaluation of Local Election Observers in Tanzania” by Alexander Boniface Makulilo

“Illiberal Peacebuilding in Angola” by Ricardo Soares de Oliviera

“Power-Sharing as a Fragile Safety Valve in Times of Electoral Turmoil: The Costs and Benefits of Burundi’s 2010 Elections” by Stef Vandegintse

“Mean Voter Representation and Partisan Constituency Representation: Do Parties Respond to the Mean Voter Position or to Their Supporters?” by Lawrence Ezrow, Catherine de Vries, Marco Steenbergen, and Erica Edwards

“When Corruption Fights Back: Democracy and Elite Interest in Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption War” by Wale Adebanwi and Ebenezer Obadare

“Watching the Watcher’: An Evaluation of Local Election Observers in Tanzania” by Alexander Boniface Makulilo

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“Out With the Old, In With the “New”: What Constitutes a New Party?” by Shlomit Barnea and Gideon Rahat

“The Endogenous Change in Electoral Systems: The Case of SNTV” by Jih-wen Lin

“Coalition Agreement and Party Mandate: How Coalition Agreements Constrain the Ministers” by Catherine Moury

“Dimensionality and the Number of Parties in Legislative Elections” by Heather Stoll

Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 126, no. 2, Summer 2011
“The Drug War’s Impact on Executive Power, Judicial Reform, and Federalism in Mexico” by Juan D. Lindau


Taiwan Democracy Quarterly, Vol. 8, no. 1, March 2011
“The Designation and Its Implications of the Ethnic-Based Representative Agency in Taiwan” by Way Sun

“Emailing as a New Medium of Communication between Parliament Members and their Constituents in Taiwan” by Rung-Yi Chen and Yun-Chu Tsai
SELECTED NEW BOOKS ON DEMOCRACY

ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES


AFRICA


EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION


East and Central Europe: The Impact of EU Membership on Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Economy. Edited by Naveed New Research
New Research


LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN


Evo Morales and the Movimiento al


MIDDLE EAST


COMPARATIVE, THEORETICAL, GENERAL


Building Global Democracy? Civil Society
Comparative Democratization

Vol. 9, No. 3

Comparative Democratization

and Accountable Global Governance.
Edited by Jan Aart Scholte. Cambridge

Citizens, Context, and Choice: How
Context Shapes Citizens’ Electoral Choices.
By Russell J. Dalton and Christopher J.
293 pp.

Democracy and Expertise: Reorienting

Democracy and Political Violence.
By John Schwarzmantel. Edinburgh University

Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens
Revisited. By Pippa Norris. Cambridge

Democratic Governance and Non-State
Actors. By Anne-Marie Gardner. Palgrave

Democratic Legitimacy: Impartiality,
Reflexivity, Proximity. By Pierre
Rosanvallon, translated by Arthur
Goldhammer. Princeton University Press,

Do Democracies Win Their Wars?
An International Security Reader.
Edited by Michael E. Brown et al. MIT Press,

The Dynamics of Democratization:
Dictatorship, Development, and Diffusion.
Edited by Nathan J. Brown. Johns

Elections in Dangerous Places: Democracy
and the Paradoxes of Peacebuilding.
By David Gillies. McGill–Queens University

Electoral Systems: A Comparative

Empire of Humanity: A History of
Humanitarianism. By Michael Barnett.

The Ethics of Voting. By Jason Brennan.

Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative

The Future of Representative Democracy.
Edited by Sonia Alonso, John Keane, and
Wolfgang Merkel. Cambridge University

Hiring and Firing Public Officials:
Rethinking the Purpose of Elections.
By Justin Buchler. Oxford University Press,

Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary
Approach. 2nd edition. By Michael


Journalism for Democracy. By Geraldine

Just Democracy: The Rawls-Machiavelli

Machiavellian Democracy. By John P.
McCormick. Cambridge University Press,

Edited by Donatella Campus, Gianfranco
Pasquino, and Martin Bull. ECPR Press,

Political Communication in Postmodern
Democracy: Challenging the Primacy of
Politics. Edited by Kees Brants and Katrin

The Pseudo-Democrat’s Dilemma:
Why Election Observation Became an

Ruling by Statute: How Uncertainty
and Vote Buying Shape Lawmaking.
By Sebastián M. Saiegh. Cambridge

The Secret History of Democracy.
Edited by Benjamin Isakhan and Stephen Stockwell.

Semi- Presidentialism and Democracy.
By Robert Elgie, Sophia Moestrup, and
296 pp.

State Formation, Parties and Democracy:
Studies in Comparative European Politics.

Tocqueville and His America: A Darker
Horizon. By Arthur Kaledin. Yale

Tocqueville: The Ancien Régime and the
French Revolution. Edited by Jon Elster,
translated by Arthur Goldhammer.

The Tyranny of Science. By Paul

Victory for Hire: Private Security
Companies’ Impact on Military
Effectiveness. By Molly Dunigan. Stanford

Women and War: Power and Protection
in the 21st Century. Edited by Kathleen
Kuehnast, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat,
and Helga Hernes. U.S. Institute of Peace

Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic
Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. By Erica
Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan.

New Research

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Comparative Democratization

October 2011
Diego Abente Brun is deputy director of the International Forum for Democratic Studies at the National Endowment for Democracy. Prior to joining the Forum, Mr. Abente served as a professor of sociology and politics at Catholic University in Asunción, Paraguay, where he had taught since 1994, as a senior research fellow at the Centro de Análisis y Difusión de la Economía Paraguaya, and as an associate professor of political science at Miami University from 1984 to 1992. Mr. Abente-Brun has published and edited several books and his work has also appeared in numerous academic journals, including the Journal of Democracy, Comparative Politics, Journal of Latin American Studies, and Latin American Research Review.

Michael H. Bernhard is the inaugural holder of the Raymond and Miriam Ehrlich Eminent Scholar Chair in Political Science at the University of Florida. His work centers on questions of democratization and development both globally and in the context of Europe. Among the issues that have figured prominently in his research agenda are the role of civil society in democratization, institutional choice in new democracies, the political economy of democratic survival, and the legacy of extreme forms of dictatorship.

Petia Kostadinova is an assistant professor of political science and associate director of the Center for European Studies at the University of Florida. Her research interests include comparative politics, comparative political economy, East European Politics, and the European Union. Her current projects fall in two main categories: the impact of the European Union on applicant countries and member states and the role of public preferences, and media's transmission of these preferences, in shaping social and economic policies in postcommunist countries. She frequently participates in outreach activities aimed at educating teachers, business leaders, or the general public about recent developments in the European Union or its member states.

Staffan I. Lindberg is an associate professor of political science and the Center for African Studies at the University of Florida. He is also the research director of the World Values Survey Sweden, a research fellow at the Quality of Government Institute, and an associate professor of political science at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden. His research focuses on state building, political clientelism, political parties, legislative-executive relations, women's representation, voting behavior, elections, and democracy in Africa. He is the author of Democracy and Elections in Africa (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006) and the editor of Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition? (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).

Bryon Moraski is an associate professor of political science at the University of Florida. His research considers the politics of institutional choice, institutional development, and the influence of short-term electoral incentives on long-term political trajectories. Most of his published work focuses on the former Soviet Union and includes articles in the American Journal of Political Science, Europe-Asia Studies, Government and Opposition, the Journal of Politics, and elsewhere. His 2006 book, Elections by Design: Parties and Patronage in Russia's Regions (Northern Illinois University Press), examines the origins and consequences of electoral system design at the sub-national level in the Russian Federation.
Conor O’Dwyer is an associate professor of political science at the University of Florida. His book *Runaway State-Building: Patronage Politics and Democratic Development* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006) examines the relationship between party-building and state-building in new democracies, looking specifically at the relationship between party competition and patronage politics in postcommunist Eastern Europe. His latest research explores how the expansion of the European Union is changing the terrain of domestic politics in the postcommunist member-states, especially with regard to the protection of minority rights.

Benjamin Smith is an associate professor of political science at the University of Florida. His research focuses on separatist conflicts, regime change, and democratization. His first book, *Hard Times in the Land of Plenty: Oil Politics in Iran and Indonesia*, was published in 2007 by Cornell University Press, and his articles have appeared in *World Politics*, the *American Journal of Political Science*, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, *the Journal of International Affairs*, and other journals and edited volumes. Mr. Smith is currently working on a book exploring the long-term factors that shape the success of separatist movements.

Philip Williams is the director of the Center for Latin American Studies and a professor of political science and Latin American Studies at the University of Florida. He also co-directs the Latin American Immigrants in the New South project. His research interests include religion and politics, transnational migration, democratization, social movements, and civil-military relations. His latest book, *A Place to Be: Brazilian, Guatemalan, and Mexican Immigrants in Florida’s New Destinations*, was published by Rutgers University Press in 2009 and his articles have appeared in numerous academic journals, including *Comparative Politics*, *Latin American Perspectives*, *Latin Studies*, and *the Journal of Latin American Studies*.

Leonardo A. Villalón is the director of the Center for African Studies and associate professor of political science at the University of Florida. His research has focused on Islam and politics and on democratization in West Africa, particularly Senegal, Mali, and Niger. He is the author of *Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal* (Cambridge University Press, 1995) and co-editor of *The African State at a Critical Juncture: Between Disintegration and Reconfiguration* (Lynne Rienner, 1998) and *The Fate of Africa’s Democratic Experiments: Elites and Institutions* (Indiana University Press, 2005), as well as of numerous articles and book chapters on politics and religion in West Africa.

Managing Editor
Melissa Aten-Becnel is the research and conferences officer at the National Endowment for Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic Studies and associate director of the Network of Democracy Research Institutes. She earned an M.A. from The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, where she focused on foreign policy and Central and Eastern Europe.

Editorial Assistant
Tristan Vellinga received a B.S. in political science from the University of Iowa and is now a Ph.D. student in the department of political science at the University of Florida, where he studies comparative and American politics. His interests include comparative EU studies, European enlargement, Turkish politics, and Turkey-EU relations. His current research focuses on the role that enlargement has on the party systems of new and existing member states and what this means for larger trajectories of party competition and state development.